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Central Banks around the world increasingly intervene in the foreign exchange market
for a variety of reasons, such as maintaining exchange rate stability and maintaining a buffer
against the impact of capital flight. In fact, research shows that central banks can lean
against the macroeconomic policy trilemma through maintaining reserves and intervening in
the foreign exchange market, and thereby secure policy space. However, securing this policy
space can come at substantial cost. This dissertation explores the political economy of these
costs of foreign exchange intervention. Chapter I discusses the concept of the direct cost
of intervention, calculates these costs for several countries over the period 1990–2015, and
shows the trends in this cost across countries and over time. This essay shows that foreign
exchange intervention and the cost associated with it has increased substantially since the
1990s. Moreover, this cost is higher for developing and emerging economies, countries with
more open capital accounts, and countries with less access to a de facto international lender
of last resort.
viii
Chapter II shifts focus to the indirect costs of foreign exchange intervention. Accumula-
tion of foreign exchange reserves by central banks has meant that they have some capacity to
act as a lender of last resort, even when emergency liquidity required is not denominated in
their own currency, thereby reducing the probability of default by borrowers in their country
in the event of a financial crises. This chapter examines whether the accumulation of reserves
due to foreign exchange intervention can be counterproductive by encouraging the inflow of
volatile capital flows that are linked to the occurrence of financial crises. Using panel data
regression analysis, this chapter finds that episodes of high reserve accumulation are likely
to be followed by surges in inflows of capital within one year and five years, and a heightened
probability of the occurrence of a currency crisis within five years. However, a higher level
of foreign exchange reserve accumulation is associated with a lower probability of systemic
banking crises.
Finally, Chapter III revisits the importance of institutions that form the global financial
safety net in mitigating the costs of foreign exchange intervention. Chapters I and II high-
light the importance of access to the global financial safety net, particularly the role played
by central bank swap lines with the Federal Reserve in mitigating the costs of foreign ex-
change intervention. Therefore this Chapter explores the factors that explain the differential
access of countries to the global financial safety net, specifically to provision of emergency
liquidity by the US Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Trea-
sury. Specifically, it examines the relative importance of economic and political factors in
determining which countries secure access to these de facto lender of last resort operations.
This chapter finds that in addition to economic factors like US bank exposure and trade
links, political factors like capital account openness, US unemployment rate, defense cooper-
ation agreements, and the party composition of the US government plays an important role
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores the relatively unexplored aspects of a policy tool that is widely
used by Central Banks around the world: intervention in the foreign exchange market. While
there is a vast literature that asks why Central Banks intervene in the foreign exchange
market, whether foreign exchange intervention is effective at achieving and maintaining a
desired exchange rate, and the impact of foreign exchange intervention on domestic inflation,
the discussion about the costs of foreign exchange intervention and the political economy is
typically considered of second order importance. In this dissertation, I work towards filling
this lacuna.
The trilemma of international finance, theorized initially by John Fleming and Robert
Mundell, states that it is possible to only achieve two of the following three policy objectives:
a fixed foreign exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy.
Achieving all three at the same time is impossible since the tools to achieve each individual
objective would conflict with the achievement of the other objectives. Foreign exchange in-
tervention allows policymakers in governments and central banks around the world to achieve
some combination of all three policy objectives, or create policy space that can otherwise
be limited by the movement of capital flows across borders. By intervening in the foreign
exchange market and accumulating reserves, central banks can lean against the trillemma
(Ilzetzki et al., 2017; Aizenman et al., 2010a; Steiner, 2017). However, this policy space
is expensive to create and may have unintended consequences. Furthermore, policymakers
in some countries can achieve this policy space in a rather inexpensive and more effective
manner, that is simply not available to policymakers in most economies.
In this dissertation, I show that reserve accumulation as a result of foreign exchange
intervention is expensive, and constitutes a significant continuing transfer of wealth from
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developing countries to developed countries. This is the content of Chapter I. One of the
motivations of holding foreign exchange reserves despite the cost involved is to protect against
the effects of volatility in capital flows. However, in chapter II, I show that holding reserves
could actually create moral hazard and increase the likelihood of surges of capital inflows
and currency crises. Furthermore, some central banks accumulate a lower level of foreign
exchange reserves, despite having high capital mobility. This is especially true of some
advanced economies. One of the reasons many advanced countries do not need to accumulate
expensive and, in some instances, counterproductive foreign exchange reserves is that they
can access emergency lending in the global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar, from the U.S.
Treasury or the Federal Reserve. In chapter III, I show that this emergency support is
extended at the discretion of these institutions as it is not in their mandate to act as the
lender of last resort for all economies, even though both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal
Reserve have the capacity to do so. I show that several political economy factors play a role
in determining this access, which results in a highly unequal global monetary system.
The goal of this dissertation is not to suggest that policy makers are not aware of these
costs or unintended consequences of foreign exchange intervention. It is also not the goal of
this dissertation to suggest that there are not benefits to reserve accumulation as a result of
foreign exchange intervention. The goal is to contextualize the use of this policy tool and
identify the trade-offs, especially insofar as they are not discussed much in the literature.
Through this dissertation, I hope to elevate these concerns and highlight their importance to
any evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention. I
also highlight the high cost at which policy makers, especially those in developing economies,
secure policy space in the presence of volatile capital flows. The discussion in this disserta-
tion also identifies venues of inequality and instability in the global monetary system, and
elements that need to be reformed.
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CHAPTER 1
THE COST OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION:
CONCEPT, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS
1.1 Introduction
Central Banks regularly intervene in the foreign exchange markets. One of the most
common forms of foreign exchange intervention is sterilized sale and purchase of international
reserves by Central Banks. There is evidence to suggest that interventions increasingly take
the form of purchases of foreign exchange reserves (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Levy Yeyati,
2008). For instance, Fratzscher et al. (2016) find that, in the 33 countries examined, central
banks intervened in the foreign exchange market on 19.1% of the trading days between
1995 and 2011; of these, interventions took the form of purchases of foreign currency on
76.1 % of the trading days. Their findings are consistent with other studies that document
extensive central bank activity in the foreign exchange markets (Dominguez and Frankel,
1993; Menkhoff, 2013).
The “trilemma” of international economics states that it is only possible to maintain two
of the following three policy objectives in an economy: fixed exchange rates, open capital
account, and independent monetary policy. However, holding foreign exchange reserves
allows central banks to weaken the constraints of the policy trilemma. As is described
above, holding reserves can be used to act against undesirable movements of the exchange
rate and cushion against the effects of volatile capital flows, among other things. Therefore,
reserve holdings allow countries to lean against the trilemma (Ilzetzki et al., 2017; Aizenman
et al., 2010a; Steiner, 2017).
Foreign exchange intervention has led to an unprecedented increase in the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves in Central Banks around the world. Moreover, this accumulation
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is especially pronounced in developing countries and emerging market economies. However,
as is demonstrated in this chapter, the cost of maintaining foreign exchange positions is sig-
nificant. This chapter measures the cost of maintaining foreign exchange reserves by central
banks, and documents its variation across countries. It also discusses the determinants of
this variation across countries.
This chapter documents the substantial increase in reserve accumulation resulting from
foreign exchange interventions since the 1990s. The cost associated with these interventions
have fluctuated, but have increased to large and significant magnitudes in recent years.
This chapter also presents preliminary evidence which suggests that, on average, developing
and emerging economies incur a higher cost than advanced economies. Moreover, countries
with more open capital accounts incur a higher cost as compared to countries with less
open capital accounts. However, this relationship is more pronounced for developing and
emerging economies, and advanced countries can choose to and are able to maintain more
open capital accounts, hold fewer reserves, and incur a lower cost. The chapter discusses the
role played by access to an institutional network of emergency liquidity assistance from a de
facto international lender of last resort in mitigating the cost of foreign exchange intervention.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the existing
literature on reasons for reserve accumulation, extent and determinants of reserve accumu-
lation and cost of reserve accumulation and foreign exchange intervention. Section 1.3 lays
out the definition of cost on which the analysis is based. Section 1.4 outlines the data used.
Section 1.5 documents the extent of reserve accumulation and estimates the cost of foreign
exchange intervention, while Section 1.6 discusses the determinants of these costs. Section
1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
In the heyday of neoliberal restructuring all over the world, especially since the 1990s,
conventional wisdom was that any hindrances to the openness of the external account are
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inefficient. Governments were expected to reduce their intervention in markets and allow
the market determination of all prices, including the exchange rate. Capital controls were
considered an impediment to market discovery and a hurdle that needed to be overcome in
order to achieve financial and economic development. Therefore, intervention in the foreign
exchange market by central banks was considered sub-optimal tool of maintaining under-
valued exchange rates for the purposes of export promotion or the pursuit of mercantilist
objectives. The established wisdom that market fundamentals would eventually make for-
eign exchange interventions unsustainable in the long run, and anticipating this, market
forces would make it ineffective in the short run. The skepticism regarding foreign exchange
intervention also stems from the sheer size of the foreign exchange market: it is the largest
financial market in the world (Fratzscher et al., 2016). Therefore, the size of interventions
is dwarfed by the volume and size of transactions that take place in a particular currency in
the foreign exchange market.
Despite this skepticism, however, evidence suggests that foreign exchange interventions
by central banks can be highly effective. For instance, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) find
that intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank was effective in moving the
exchange rate in the desired direction in the mid-1980s. Adler et al. (2011) focus on Latin
American economies to find that interventions can slow the pace of appreciation of the
exchange rate. However, these effects decrease with the degree of capital account openness
and are more effective in the context of already overvalued exchange rates. Fatum and
Hutchison (2003) provide evidence that sterilized intervention affects the exchange rate in
the short run. Menkhoff (2013) surveys the literature on exchange rate interventions and
argues that foreign exchange intervention often has an impact on exchange rate level and
volatility in emerging market economies. Fratzscher et al. (2016) argue that intervention has
been effective tool for smoothing the path of exchange rates and in stabilizing the exchange
rate in countries with narrow bank regimes. It is also effective in affecting the level of
the exchange rate in flexible exchange rate regimes when interventions are large and have
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been publicly announced. Blanchard et al. (2015) find that official reserve intervention can
stem pressures of currency appreciation in the face of capital inflows in emerging market
economies. Therefore, the current consensus in the intervention literature seems to be that
foreign exchange interventions can be effective for a variety of exchange rate related policy
objectives.
In addition, official reserve holdings can provide a buffer against a freely falling currency
in the event of a sudden stop or reversal in capital flows. Bussière et al. (2015) find that
higher levels of reserves and capital controls prior to the 2008 crisis are associated with
higher economic growth as they are both used to buffer against external shocks. Holding
of international reserves equal to at least the value of short term external debt reduces the
annual probability of a country experiencing a reversal in capital flows, which can precipitate
and external debt and/or currency crisis, by 10 percentage points (Rodrik, 2006). Moreover,
a rise in reserve holdings often lowers the cost of private debt and equity capital (Feldstein,
1999). To some extent, reserve holdings have substituted for capital controls (Ilzetzki et al.,
2017). Reserve accumulation is considered a by-product of a shift to the trilemma configura-
tion towards greater capital mobility (Steiner, 2017) engendered by financial globalization.
Therefore, reserve holdings can be considered insurance against the costs of sudden stops
and reversals in capital flows.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, accumulation of reserves has increased substantially with the
increasing liberalization of the capital account around the world since 1990 (Rodrik, 2006)
and the East Asian crisis in 1997 (Aizenman and Lee, 2005; Aizenman et al., 2010a). Capital
account openness as measured by the Chinn-Ito index has increased for all groups of countries
examined (Figure 1.1).1
1While the country classification into developing and advanced countries is based on the World Economic
Situation Prospects of the UN, the classification as emerging economies is more ambiguous. Here, countries
are classified based on the S&P Emerging Markets Core Index.
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Chinn and Ito (2006a)
Some explanations for the trends in reserve accumulation can be found in the literature.
Cheung and Ito (2009) find that accumulation of reserves has been pronounced in Asian
economies since the Asian financial crisis. For instance, between 2000 and 2004, China,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan increased their holding of international reserves by 262
percent, 133 percent, 107 percent, 124 percent, and 126 percent, respectively. Similarly,
Bussière et al. (2015) argue that the rate of reserve accumulation has partly been a response
to crisis experienced in emerging market economies in the recent past. Countries that used
more reserves in foreign exchange interventions and decumulated reserves in the past, during
crises, rebuilt their reserve pool at a faster rate as compared to others in the aftermath of
crises, with the rate of accumulation eventually slowing down. Bussière et al. (2015) attribute
the decline in the rate of reserve accumulation to the decline in the rate of increase of short-
term external debt (Bussière et al., 2015). Cheung and Ito (2009) show that the explanatory
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power for traditional trade-related variables in explaining reserve accumulation is decreasing
over time, while that of financial variables related to external financing has increased. They
also show that, ceterus paribus, developed economies can afford to hold fewer reserve assets
as compared to developing economies if faced with the same conditions. Obstfeld et al.
(2010) argue that reserve accumulation is a key tool for managing financial stability in a
globalized world and show that reserve growth in a broad panel of developing and developed
economies is correlated with financial openness, financial development, and exchange rate
policy. Dominguez (2012) shows that, during the global financial crisis, reserve accumulation
was higher in countries with sovereign wealth funds, lower for countries that drew on Federal
Reserve Swap Lines, higher in countries with higher short-term external debt as a proportion
of GDP, higher for countries that experienced higher export growth, and lower for countries
with a higher interest rate differential.
While the literature documenting the extent of reserve accumulation, and the reasons
for it is extensive, the literature on the cost associated with it is quite limited, perhaps
due to the perception that these costs are marginal and of second order importance Adler
and Mano (2016). The trends in cost of intervention are of course related to the trends in
reserve accumulation, but we cannot expect the trends in cost to exactly mirror the trends
in reserve accumulation. The concept of the cost of intervention is discussed in detail in
Section 1.3, but briefly, it arises because foreign exchange intervention typically involves the
substitution of a higher yield asset (domestic government bonds) with a lower yield asset
(foreign exchange reserve assets, typically US Treasury securities) on the balance sheet of the
central bank. Since these assets are typically denominated in different currencies (Section
1.3), the changes in the relative price of these currencies or the exchange rate also play a
role in determining the cost of intervention. For instance, if reserves accumulated as a result
of foreign exchange intervention reduces the relative spread between domestic government
bonds and reserve assets, higher reserve accumulation as a result of foreign exchange in-
tervention need not translate into higher cost of intervention. Similarly, if intervention is
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such that there is additional reserve accumulation and appreciation of the exchange rate, a
high cost of intervention will be observed. Therefore, the trends in cost of foreign exchange
intervention are not a forgone conclusion.
Among the few studies that examine the costs of foreign exchange intervention is Ro-
drik (2006). Rodrik (2006) approximates this cost for different country groups (developed,
developing, and emerging) assuming different spread levels between the rate of interest at
which private borrowers acquire external debt and the rate of interest on the reserve as-
set(0.03, 0.05, 0.07), and finds that the social opportunity cost of excess reserves stood at
about 1 percent of GDP (for the assumed spread level of 0.05) of developing economies as
of 2004. However, Rodrik (2006) does not use actual spreads for calculating costs and does
not account for currency depreciation. Therefore, the costs calculated in Rodrik (2006) are
approximate at best. Levy Yeyati (2008) argues that the literature on the cost of reserve ac-
cumulation overestimates the cost as it does not consider the benefits of reserve accumulation
in the form of the reduced probability of crisis and the reduced borrowing costs. Therefore,
Levy Yeyati (2008) argues that the marginal cost of reserve accumulation is typically over-
estimated by about 50 percent. Nonetheless, Levy Yeyati (2008) also does not calculate
the total costs being incurred ex-post given the levels and accumulation of reserves across
counties. It is worthwhile to note here that this chapter does not posit that the benefits
of reserves accumulated as a result of foreign exchange intervention are insignificant; how-
ever, any reductions in borrowing costs would be incorporated into the cost of intervention
(Section 1.3). Furthermore, any other benefits that are realized do not mitigate the cost as
defined here.
Adler and Mano (2016) is, to the author’s knowledge, the only study that systematically
estimates the marginal and total costs of reserve accumulation for a set of 73 developed and
developing economies during 2012-13, and find that ex-ante marginal cost incurred by the
median emerging market economy was in the inter-quartile range of 2–5.5 percent per year,
and total costs in the range of 0.3–0.9 percent of GDP per year. Moreover, about 20 percent
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of the countries in their sample incurred greater than 1 percent of their GDP in sustaining
foreign exchange reserve assets per year over the sample period. However, they consider a
very limited time period and sample of countries in their calculation. Furthermore, they do
not consider the patterns in the cost of intervention, as is done here. This chapter follows the
method in (Adler and Mano, 2016), extends the period and sample of analysis, and discusses
patterns in the cost of intervention. Furthermore, this chapter puts the cost of intervention
in context of broader trends and structures in the international monetary system.
1.3 Definition of Cost
Foreign exchange reserves are typically held in the form of highly liquid safe assets, such
as sovereign bonds of some developed nations, especially short term US Treasury securities.
However, the cost of holding these reserves is typically much higher than the return on these
safe assets. Therefore the cost of foreign exchange intervention is the cost of maintaining a
given foreign exchange reserve position.
In order to consider operations that are strictly foreign exchange transactions and not
monetary policy actions, the literature on foreign exchange interventions typically consider
sterilized interventions by the Central Bank. A sterilized foreign exchange intervention
is one in which the central bank substitutes between foreign and domestic assets on its
balance sheet. Therefore, in a sterilized intervention, if the central bank purchases (sells)
foreign exchange, it typically also sells (purchases) domestic assets such as government bonds
through open market operations, so as to leave the monetary base and monetary policy rate
unchanged.
Formally, the change in a central banks net foreign asset position, ∆NFA due to a foreign
exchange operation is
∆NFA = ∆MB −∆NDA (1.1)
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where ∆MB is the change in the monetary base and ∆NDA is the net domestic asset
position of the central bank (Adler and Mano, 2016). If the intervention is fully sterilized,
∆NFA = −∆NDA (1.2)
Adler and Mano (2016) argue that the extent of sterilization of the official reserve op-
eration is irrelevant from the perspective of the opportunity cost of foreign exchange inter-
vention. For instance, in the case of a reserve purchase, the extent of the operation that is
unsterilized results in an expansion of the monetary base. However, this expansion could
have been carried out by expanding the size of the central bank balance sheet with higher
yielding domestic government assets. Therefore, insofar as a monetary expansion is brought
about from purchasing foreign reserve assets which is not sterilized by the sale of domes-
tic government assets, an opportunity cost is still created. This is because this monetary
expansion could, alternatively, have been created by purchasing higher yielding domestic
government assets. Therefore, the marginal cost of the operation would be the opportunity
cost of increasing the foreign exchange reserve asset position of the Central Bank. The cost







where ik,t is the nominal interest rate on the domestic government assets, i∗t is the nominal
interest rate on the reserve asset, and Sk,t is the exchange rate expressed as the units of
local currency per unit of foreign currency. The uncovered interest parity condition, in this
context, is the condition under which there is no incentive to hold domestic government assets
over reserve assets, as there is no arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, ex-post, deviations from
this condition measures the cost of holding the reserve asset as opposed to the domestic
government asset.
Two things should be noted as regards the definition of the costs of intervention. First,
the cost as it is being measured is not necessarily the book cost of intervention, that is, it
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is not the cost that is reflected in the central bank’s balance sheet. The book cost would
depend on the degree of sterilization of the foreign exchange intervention. The cost that is
being considered here is the opportunity cost, based on the next best alternative to foreign
reserve assets on the central bank’s balance sheet. Second, the cost being measured here
is the quasi-fiscal opportunity cost incurred by the central banks. Some literature, notably
Rodrik (2006), measures opportunity cost to the economy as a whole, by considering the
spread between private borrowing costs in the economy and the return on the foreign reserve
assets. This formulation is likely to result in the overestimation of the cost of intervention,
as private borrowing costs in any economy are typically higher than the borrowing costs of
the sovereign, or the nominal interest rate on domestic government assets (ik,t in Equation
1.3) of a comparable term. However, this formulation of opportunity cost is unsatisfactory as
foreign exchange interventions are typically not undertaken through the sale and purchase
of bonds issued by private borrowers in an economy 2. Moreover, it is not clear, in this
formulation which actors in the economy are bearing this cost of intervention.
Taking logarithms on both sides of equation 1.3,
mck,t+1 = ln(1 +MCk,t+1)
= ln(1 + ik,t)− ln(1 + i∗t ) + ln(Sk,t+1)− ln(Sk,t)
≈ (ik,t − i∗t )−∆sk,t+1
(1.4)
where ∆sk,t+1 is the log change in exchange rate from time t to t+ 1.
The total cost of foreign exchange intervention is thus
TCk,t+1 = MCk,t+1 ×NFAk,t (1.5)
2Unconventional monetary policy during the recent financial crisis in some countries, notwithstanding
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Since most central banks are quasi-government bodies that typically transfer their sur-
pluses to the government, this total cost is the quasi-fiscal cost of foreign exchange interven-
tion. Therefore, this is a direct loss to the government surplus, and a diversion of government
budgetary resources away from other uses of fiscal resources. Moreover, it directly increases
the size of the government budget deficit.
1.4 Data
In order to calculate cost of intervention, therefore, data on reserve positions built as a
result of foreign exchange intervention, interest rate spreads, and exchange rate are required.
This data is acquired from the International Financial Statistics produced by the IMF, World
Development Indicators produced by the World Bank, and OECDstat. In addition, data on
capital account openness is based on the index created by Chinn and Ito (2006a). This index
is a composite of a variety of factors that determine the degree of capital account openness
based on the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. A
complete list of variables used and their sources are listed in Appendix A.1 .
The classification of countries into advanced and developing is based on the classification
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The classification
of countries into emerging markets is slightly trickier as UNCTAD and other multilateral
organizations do not classify countries as emerging market economies. It seems more to be
a matter of convention and varies from study to study. For the purposes of this chapter, the
classification of Chinn and Ito (2006a) is used. The complete list of countries studied and
their classifications are listed in Appendix A.2.
1.5 Extent and Cost of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Based on the definition of quasi-fiscal costs in Section 1.3, the trends in the costs of
foreign exchange intervention can be observed in Figure 1.2. As mentioned previously, the
cost of foreign exchange intervention has been estimated as the deviations from uncovered
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interest parity. This quasi-fiscal cost of holding reserves is calculated based on the spread
between short-term sovereign bonds and US Treasury Securities. Since no interest is received
on reserves held in the form of gold, these are excluded in the calculation of costs of holding
reserves 3.
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Source: Author’s calculations
It is evident from Figure 1.2 that, while there is significant variation in the cost incurred
by these country groups over time, the average cost incurred by advanced countries is lower
than the average cost incurred by developing and emerging economies. The cost incurred by
all countries peaked in 2011; however, the emerging economies incurred an average cost of
3While appreciation in the price of gold can be considered a return on reserve holdings, they are excluded
in the estimation of costs in Figure 1.2. This is unlikely to significantly affect the cost estimate since an
increasing proportion of reserves are being held in the form of non-gold assets at least in developing and
emerging economies. However, about 50 % of reserves of advanced economies are held in the form of gold
reserves.
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nearly 3 percent of the GDP, while advanced economies incurred an average cost of less than
1 percent of GDP. This trend is also reflected in the trends in reserve accumulation, which
are shown in Figure 1.3. The dramatic decline in costs in 2015 are likely to be due to an
appreciating dollar, as even though reserve accumulation has reduced, it has not dramatically
collapsed.
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of the costs incurred by year by developing
countries. The average understates the magnitude of the costs incurred by some countries;
therefore, table 1.1 also lists the maximum cost incurred in any given year after 1990 and
the country incurring it.
The magnitudes of the costs are not insignificant. For instance, in 2000, the Government
of Ghana spent 1.5 percent of its GDP on healthcare, but incurred nearly 4.3 percent of
its GDP in conducting foreign exchange intervention. In 2010, government expenditure on
education in Lebanon was 5.5 percent, which is comparable to the cost it incurred on foreign
exchange intervention reserves (4.3 percent). In the middle of a severe financial crisis, the
Icelandic economy spent 4.5 percent of its GDP on foreign exchange intervention.
Figure 1.4 shows the accumulation of reserves in months of imports. A marked up-
ward trend in reserve accumulation can be observed since 1990 in both Figures 1.3 and 1.4.
As a rule of thumb, it is considered good practice for central banks to maintain reserves
worth three months of imports (This is the Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule (Rodrik, 2006)),
as maintaining liquidity is considered to be the “key to financial self-help.” Countries that
hold substantial internationally liquid foreign currency reserves and/or a ready source of
foreign currency loans are considered to be less likely to experience a speculative currency
attack (Feldstein, 1999). However, central banks have been holding reserves far in excess of
the three month convention. Interestingly, the level of reserves in terms of months of imports
has remained quite stable around the 3-month mark for advanced countries.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Quasi-fiscal cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves of Developing
Countries
Year Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Country incur-
ring Maximum
cost
1990 0.21 0.89 2.54 Lebanon
1991 0.74 1.51 8.46 Guyana
1992 0.94 1.81 11.16 Guyana
1993 1.06 1.63 7.52 Guyana
1994 0.98 1.60 6.08 Guyana
1995 0.99 1.59 6.79 Hungary
1996 1.12 1.61 7.29 Moldova
1997 0.99 1.64 8.48 Romania
1998 0.94 1.48 7.83 Kyrgyz Republic
1999 1.02 2.18 15.63 Kyrgyz Republic
2000 0.70 1.50 9.74 Kyrgyz Republic
2001 0.94 1.19 5.72 Kyrgyz Republic
2002 1.14 1.27 5.69 Uruguay
2003 1.19 1.28 5.39 Uruguay
2004 0.92 1.00 5.09 Yemen
2005 0.49 0.81 4.27 Yemen
2006 0.25 0.79 4.29 Yemen
2007 0.44 1.09 5.89 Iraq
2008 1.05 1.22 6.17 Iraq
2009 1.25 1.11 5.04 Lesotho
2010 1.03 0.88 3.93 Yemen
2011 1.02 0.92 4.27 Kyrgyz Republic
2012 1.02 0.93 4.07 Mongolia
2013 0.84 0.76 3.43 Lesotho
2014 0.83 0.82 4.35 Uruguay
2015 0.91 1.06 4.57 Moldova
2016 0.96 1.05 4.11 Moldova
2017 0.79 1.05 5.85 Mozambique
2018 0.50 0.75 2.97 Mozambique
Total 0.88 1.27 15.63 Kyrgyz Republic
Source: Author’s calculations
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Source: Author’s calculations
1.6 Factors that determine the Cost of Intervention
This section explores the patterns in cost of intervention, specifically by country group
and other important aspects of the international monetary system.
1.6.1 Country Group
In 2014, EMEs and developing economies incurred a cost of 1.51 percent and 1.37 percent
of their GDP, respectively, for holding reserves. By contrast, advanced nations earned a
return of 0.02 percent on their reserve holdings in 2014. This is consistent with the results
in Adler and Mano (2016) 4. Figures 1.5 through 1.7 show histograms of the distribution
of quasi-fiscal costs incurred by developing countries and advanced countries by year. In
4Unfortunately, a more extensive comparison with the cost estimates in the literature are not possible as
no other study has calculated costs for a broad sample of countries over the time period under consideration.
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Source: Author’s calculations
several of the years shown (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2and 017), the distribution of
cost for developing countries is to the right of those of advanced economies, while in several
other years the two distributions overlap significantly.
Once again, it is interesting to note that advanced economies are on average incurring
close to zero quasi-fiscal costs over the period under consideration. The average cost incurred
by advanced nations has ranged between -0.17 percent of GDP and 0.10 percent of GDP
since 1990. Clearly, advanced economies are able to incur lower average costs partly because
central banks in these countries are holding a higher share of their reserves in the form of
gold as opposed to foreign currency assets (Figure 1.8) and partly because they simply do
not hold significant reserves. However, these lower costs are interesting especially since, on
average, the advanced economies have more open capital accounts (Figure 1.1).
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1.6.2 Capital Account Openness
In addition to the disparity between the cost incurred by emerging and developing
economies as a group and advanced economies as a group, there is also significant varia-
tion within these groups. In 2014, the Reserves to GDP ratio varied from 2.56 percent in
Zimbabwe to about 113 % in Hong Kong. Official reserve interventions can be seen as a
substitute for capital controls (Steiner, 2017; Ilzetzki et al., 2017). From figures 1.9 and
1.10, we can see that both the reserves to GDP ratio in several countries in the world and
the degree of capital account openness has increased between 1994 and 2014. The darker the
shade in Figure 1.9 and 1.10, the higher is the reserve to GDP ratio and degree of capital
account openness of the economy, respectively. However, it is not immediately apparent if
countries with more open capital accounts have higher reserve accumulation and higher costs
of foreign exchange intervention.
A different picture emerges if the correlation between cost incurred and capital account
openness is analyzed for advanced countries and developing countries separately. Figure 1.11
shows the scatterplot between the cost of foreign exchange intervention and capital account
openness in the years 2011–2014 separately for advanced countries and developing coun-
tries. In the four years shown, the cost of foreign exchange intervention and capital account
openness (as measured by the Chinn-Ito index) exhibits a mildly negative relationship in ad-
vanced nations, that is, advanced nations that have more open capital accounts incur lower
costs. However, developing countries with more open capital accounts incur higher costs.
This relationship is also observed for the total period under consideration (1990–2018).
1.6.3 Trade and Financial Variables
The size of a country’s trade and exchange rate volatility is likely to affect the extent of
foreign exchange intervention. However, in their exploration of the determinants of reserve
holdings, Obstfeld et al. (2010) compare whether trade related or financial variables offer a
better explanation for the accumulation of reserves. They argue that financial motives have
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Figure 1.9: Reserves to GDP ratio, 1994 and 2014
(a) 1994
(b) 2014
Note: Countries are shaded gray if data was not available
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Figure 1.10: Capital Account Openness, 1994 and 2014
(a) 1994
(b) 2014
Note: Countries are shaded gray if data was not available
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Quasi-fiscal cost of FX intervention Fitted Values
always been an important motivation for the accumulation of reserves as an adverse shock to
the balance of payments can arise from domestic deposit holders moving their assets abroad.
In other words, in addition to sudden stops and share reversals of capital flows, capital flight
is associated with domestic financial instability, and therefore domestic financial stability is
an important consideration as regards reserve accumulation. The central bank can stem the
depreciation pressure in this event using its reserves. Obstfeld et al. (2010) argue that since
the extent of the flight of capital out of domestic bank deposits depends on the size of M2
or the broad money supply, its size should play a role in determining the size of the reserve
holdings of the central bank. Consequently, the size of M2 should play a role in determining
the cost of foreign exchange intervention.
Additionally, the nature of the exchange rate regime is likely to have an impact on the
size of reserve holdings. Have a pegged or de facto pegged exchange rate would require
central banks to sell foreign exchange to stem pressures on the currency to depreciate and
absorb foreign exchange to stem pressures on the currency to appreciate. Therefore, central
banks in economies with pegged exchange rates are likely to hold higher reserves.
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1.6.4 International Lender of Last Resort
It is striking that this system is consistently less expensive for advanced countries (Figure
1.2). And this is despite the case that, on average, advanced economies are likely to have
more open capital accounts than developing economies (Figure 1.1). Why has this been
the case? Feldstein (1999) argues that the only way to maintain private lending in an
economy and increase credit is to ensure that lenders are reasonably sure of receiving a
return on their investment. This can be done through ensuring the availability of some
form of collateral. International reserves provide one form of collateral. However, a credible
international lender of last resort to which borrowers could turn to in the event of financial
distress eliminates the need for such collateral. While some institutions have historically
functioned as international lenders of last resort at specific historical moments, in general
there is no such consistent international lender of last resort. However, there are several
institutional mechanisms through which the provision of an international lender of last resort
is mimicked in times of financial distress. One such institutional arrangement is swap lines
between central banks of several advanced economies. The role of these swap lines was
exceptionally important during the current financial crisis. However, not all countries have,
historically, had access to the International Lender of Last Resort in this form. This is
particularly noteworthy since multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund have not been very effective in playing the role of the International Lender of Last
Resort.
In the context of the British banking system in the 19th century, Bagehot (1873) argued
that, in order to avoid a financial crisis in the face of a bank run and prevent a shortage of
liquidity, the lender of last resort or the monetary authority should provide unlimited and
automatic credit to any party with good collateral (McDowell, 2017). However, in general, no
individual central bank can serve as central banks for the global financial system. McDowell
(2017) defines the International Lender of Last Resort as “an actor that is prepared to
respond to international financial crises by providing credit to illiquid institutions in foreign
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jurisdictions when no other actor is willing or able” (McDowell, 2017). In lender of last resort
operations, time is of the essence, as in the absence of timely injection of liquidity, a liquidity
crisis can quickly morph into a solvency crisis. In this regard, the IMF has been inadequate
as an international lender of last resort as it is moves slowly only to often provide inadequate
liquidity to financial systems in distress. However, in several instances, institutions in the
United States have provided liquidity to foreign governments for the purposes of managing
financial crises in the post-War period. Specifically, the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the
US Treasury and the swap lines extended by the Federal Reserve has historically functioned
as an international lender of last resort. Between 1980 and 2000, institutions in the United
States effectively acted as the lender of last resort on 40 different occasions for about 20
countries (McDowell, 2017).
However, the United States has not uniformly provided the international lender of last
resort facility uniformly. McDowell (2017) argues that the institutions that can function as
the international lender of last resort in the United States, which are the Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund of the US Treasury and the swap lines of the Federal Reserve in this analysis, have
only done so for foreign governments to prevent the collapse of their financial systems only
insofar as the potential collapse of these financial systems jeopardizes the stability of the US
financial system. This is not surprising since neither of these institutions has a mandate of
stabilizing the global financial system. However, these institutions, specifically the Federal
Reserve is likely to be the most effective stabilizer of the global financial system since it has
the power to create the global reserve currency, that is, the US dollar. The importance of
access to these institutions is indicated in the literature. For instance, (Bordo et al., 2014),
find that during the Bretton Woods era, the mere announcement of an increase in the avail-
able credit under a pre-existing swap line stemmed the speculative sales of a deficit country’s
currency, even if the increased credit line was not actually drawn upon.
Specifically, the international lender of last resort facility has mostly been extended to
advanced nations. Insofar as some developing countries have been recipients of assistance
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from the institutions that can function as international lender of last resort, the assistance has
been less robust as compared to that received by advanced nations. The Central Bank swap
lines provided to the central banks of advanced nations were very large: in most instances,
the size of the swap exceeded 50 percent of actual reserves. In the case of the European
Central Bank, the size of the swap was larger than the size of the reserves held. However,
for developing economies, the size of the swap never exceeded more than 50 percent of the
reserves held (Obstfeld et al., 2009).
Therefore, the quasi-fiscal costs of holding reserves can potentially be mitigated by the
extension of these institutional arrangements to developing countries, or creation of parallel
arrangements between developing countries. To this end, several developing countries and
emerging economies have formed regional agreements and mechanisms such as the Chiang
Mai Initiative (CMIM), The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), Arab Monetary Fund
(ArMF), and the New Development bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangements of the
BRICS countries (Grabel, 2015).
Being excluded from this institutional network of lender of last resort operations partly
explains the large accumulation of reserves and the cost associated with it. This suggests
that the trends described in the chapter are not inevitable and can be avoided by, among
other things, including emerging markets and developing economies in the access to the
lender of last resort facility.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter documents the cost incurred in fairly common policy decisions undertaken
by Central Banks all over the world, namely the cost of foreign exchange intervention. It
shows that reserve accumulation resulting from foreign exchange interventions have increased
substantially since the 1990s. The cost associated with these interventions have fluctuated,
but have increased to large and significant magnitudes in recent years. The average pol-
icy configuration has moved away from the use of capital controls to manage the external
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account towards the reserve accumulation through frequent foreign exchange intervention.
This has become standard practice in the existing international monetary system. However,
this specific policy configuration is an expensive proposition as there is a significant cost
associated with it. This cost is of concern as it is typically considered of second order im-
portance, and therefore has not drawn significant and systematic scrutiny. However, this
chapter shows that its magnitude is not insignificant. Government surpluses always have
many competing uses, and this cost being incurred by the fisc necessarily means that these
resources can not be used for a competing purpose, such as expenditure on health, educa-
tion, poverty alleviation programs, or subsidies for crucial manufacturing industries. This is
not to say that the trade-off is not worth it, as there are many reasons why central banks
should hold reserves. The benefits are varied, but are unlikely to affect the calculation of
cost here. However, the the size of the trade-off varies across countries, which suggests that
it is not inevitable. Furthermore, this cost constitutes a direct transfer from developing and
emerging economies to the advanced nations, the assets of which are typically held as foreign
exchange reserves, and to the United States in particular.
The chapter also hypothesizes the reasons for this variation. Specifically, evidence sug-
gests that, on average, developing and emerging economies incur a higher cost than advanced
economies. Moreover, countries with more open capital accounts incur a higher cost as com-
pared to countries with less open capital accounts, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that reserve accumulation through foreign exchange interventions has substituted for capi-
tal controls to some extent. However, this relationship is more pronounced for developing
and emerging economies, and advanced countries are able to maintain more open capital ac-
counts, hold fewer reserves, and incur a lower cost. This may be due to a variety of trade and
financial variables, such as the exchange rate regime. However, it is also likely that access
to an institutional network of emergency liquidity assistance from a de facto international
lender of last resort, access to which is more common for advanced economies, reduces the
need for foreign exchange intervention and reserve accumulation. The extent of the impor-
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tance of these factors, and other potential factors, will be examined systematically in the
subsequent chapters.
The data used in this chapter uses annual data obtained from the World Bank and the
IMF because most central banks do not make their intervention data public. However, a more
granular look at the trends in cost of intervention for countries that make their intervention
data public can be instructive, especially since it can be analyzed in the context of changes
in economic policy. We hope to do this in subsequent research.
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CHAPTER 2
CAN RESERVE ACCUMULATION BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?: THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
INTERVENTION
2.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange intervention by central banks can be highly effective in terms of several
criteria. As is discussed in Dutt (2018), foreign exchange intervention can be effective in
moving the exchange rate in a desired direction, it can slow the pace of appreciation of the
exchange rate, it can reduce volatility in exchange rates, it can smooth the path of exchange
rates, and it can stem pressures of currency appreciation in the face of capital inflows in
emerging market economies. In addition to exchange rate related policy objectives, official
reserve holdings can lower the cost of private debt and equity capital. Most importantly,
foreign exchange reserves provide a buffer against a freely falling currency in the event of a
sudden stop or reversal in capital flows. In particular, Aizenman and Lee (2005) show that
the purpose behind this reserve accumulation has been precautionary. Jeanne and Rancière
(2007) also find that the negative impact of a reversal of capital flows on domestic absorption
is mitigated by the reduction in official reserve holdings.
Moreover, official reserve interventions are likely to reduce the likelihood of a sovereign
default on external debt. Additionally, since private borrowers in most countries suffer
from the ‘original sin’, that is, the inability to undertake external borrowing in their own
currency, the official reserve interventions are also likely to reduce the currency risk that
lenders undertake. Therefore, official reserve holdings are likely to make lending to countries
in which central banks hold foreign exchange reserves a relatively lower credit risk. However,
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the costs of this foreign exchange intervention are usually considered to be marginal and of
second order importance (Adler and Mano, 2016). Dutt (2018) and Chapter 1 argue that
the opportunity cost of holding these reserves are substantial and related to the absence
of an International Lender of Last Resort. This chapter argues that, in addition to the
opportunity costs of holding foreign exchange reserves on the balance sheets of Central
Banks, reserve accumulation may be imposing an indirect cost on countries by creating
moral hazard for international lenders, and encouraging higher capital inflows. We argue
that reserve accumulation is positively associated with higher capital inflows in the future.
This question is relevant because the one of the best predictors of financial crises can be
shown to be excessive credit growth (Schularick and Taylor, 2009). In particular, gross flows
of capital can serve as a source of significant instability, even if net flows do not reflect an
imbalance in the balance of payments. The relationship between the official reserve holdings
and the net external account is the following accounting identity:
Balance of Payments ≡ Current Account + Capital Account
+ Official Reserve Position
≡ 0
(2.1)
There is no such obvious relationship between the official reserve position and the gross
inflow of capital into the economy. Determining this relationship is especially important
because of the increasing degree of capital account openness, as is evident from Figure 1.1.
Moreover, since economists increasingly argue that official reserve holdings are a substitute
for capital controls, it is natural to examine the role reserve holdings play in the management
of the capital account or the lack thereof.
This chapter presents evidence that questions the mitigating influence of reserve holdings
on the occurrence of financial crises.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the existing literature
on the topic. Section 2.3 lays out the central hypothesis of the chapter. Section 2.4 describes
the data used in this study and its sources, while Section 2.6 presents the methodology used
to examine the hypothesis presented in Section 2.3 and our results. Section 2.7 discusses the
results and concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In order to investigate the impact of reserve accumulation and capital inflows, we examine
three strands of literature. First, we explore the limited literature on direct relationship
between higher reserve accumulation and higher capital inflows. Second, we examine the
literature on the determinants of capital flows, and finally, we rely on the literature on early
warning systems for financial crises.
2.2.1 Literature on Relationship between Higher Reserve Accumulation and
Higher Capital Inflows
There is some limited literature that directly engages with the question of the relation-
ship between reserves accumulated as a result of foreign exchange accumulation and capital
flows. Dooley (2000) builds a model of crisis in emerging market economies that develops
without a necessary imbalance in economic “fundamentals” an inconsistent policy regime.
The model in Dooley (2000) is based on an alternative policy conflict between the holding
of foreign exchange reserves as a form of self-insurance, and the yield differential relative to
international returns generated by the availability of free insurance, which in turn generates
a private gross capital inflow. When the government reserves are matched by its contingent
insurance liabilities, the yield on domestic liabilities falls below its market rate, and investors
sell their insured assets to the government exhausting its reserves. However, a crucial feature
of this model is something that Dooley (2000) calls “appropriation”, which is defined as “any
activity that benefits the intermediary or its principle at the expense of the asset values.”
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As an example, Dooley (2000) cites governments instructing banks it owns or controls to
lend to firms that do not earn the competitive rate of interest in order to promote exports
or employment, or managers of a bank booking a loan at more than its market value and
investing the difference offshore. Appropriation, as per Dooley’s definition, seems to be de-
scribing special instances of government policy or corrupt practices that need not always be
taking place. Furthermore, the model in Dooley (2000) is based on an unexpected increase
in the government’s net assets, and it is not clear why such a shock should necessarily arise.
Acharya and Krishnamurthy (2018) theoretically examine the role of reserves manage-
ment and capital controls as ex-post and ex-ante safeguards, respectively, against sudden
stops. They argue that, absent capital controls, the safeguard provided by reserves is partly
undone by short term capital flows due to the moral hazard provided by reserves in the
event of a sudden stop. They also analyze movements in external debt and reserves in India
based on their model. In the period between June 2013 and October 2017, they show that
higher liquidity provided by higher reserve accumulation vis-à-vis short term external debt
is associated with more favorable emerging market asset price outcome.
Fatum and Yetman (2018) explore whether the accumulation of foreign reserves in 10
Asia-Pacific economies is systematically associated with risk-taking using an event study
approach to examine responses to official announcements of reserve stocks. They find little
evidence of reserve accumulation having a systematic impact on risk-taking, measured by
implied volatility of out-of-the-money currency options, CDS spreads on sovereign US dollar-
denominated bonds, and equity price indices. However, Sengupta (2010) finds an empirically
robust correlation between foreign exchange reserve accumulation and dollar-denominated
debt held on the balance sheets of 1500 non-financial firms from the six largest Latin Amer-
ican economies over the sample period, 1995–2007. Gabor (2010) discusses the implications
of foreign exchange reserve accumulation as a result of sterilization of the capital inflows
in 10 Eastern European economies. They argue that foreign exchange intervention served
to increase the international attractiveness of domestic asset markets the Czech Republic
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during 1994–96 before for short-term speculative activity, and exposed countries to greater
international volatility. They also discuss the case of Romania in 2005, which is the in-
verse situation: capital inflows into Romania declined substantially within a month after the
central bank announced that it would scale back its sterilization of capital inflows through
foreign exchange intervention (Gabor, 2010). Similarly, Tong and Wei (2019) study the im-
pact of foreign exchange reserve accumulation on corporate leverage in 6610 non-financial
firms in 23 emerging market economies between 2000 and 2006, which is a source of corpo-
rate risk. They examine the hypothesis of whether the level of private-sector risk exposure
increases to take advantage of a reduction of vulnerability to external shocks in response
to a rise in foreign exchange reserve holding. They find that firms in countries that have
a higher ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP have a higher leverage ratio. In light
of these region specific, but contradictory results related to the research question in this
chapter, further investigation is required.
2.2.2 Literature on Determinants of Capital Flows
The literature on capital flows hypothesizes that capital flows to wherever the returns
to capital are the highest. In neoclassical theory, this would suggest that capital flows to
wherever the marginal productivity of capital is the highest. Moreover, given the assump-
tion of diminishing marginal product of capital, the relative average scarcity of capital in
developing countries and emerging market economies, and the relative average abundance of
capital in advanced countries, standard neoclassical theory predicts that capital should flow
from advanced economies to developing and emerging market economies. Several studies
show that, after 1970, net flows have been from developing countries to advanced economies
(For example, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004); Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)). This is known
as the Lucas Paradox in the literature, and Lucas (1990) attributed the inconsistency with
neoclassical theoretical predictions to differences in human capital and capital market im-
perfections. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show that cross-country correlation between
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productivity growth and net flows over the period 1980-2000 is negative, or at best, zero.
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) show that most capital flows are between rich countries and are
therefore indicate “diversification finance” as opposed to “development finance.”
Another explanation of capital flows follows directly from the condition of covered in-
terest parity, which views capital flows as being driven by global asset market decisions. In
the absence of capital market imperfections and impediments to capital mobility, capital
will flow in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities: equilibrium is achieved when rate of
return on assets in different countries is equalized. Covered interest parity assumes perfect
asset substitutability, and therefore the only factor that drives capital flows is the rate of
return. The Portfolio Balance Model, on the other hand, does not assume perfect asset
substitutability, and argues the capital flows are driven by portfolio decisions of investors
based on a variety of factors such as interest rate differential, expected change in exchange
rates, and risk premium.
There is also a large and rich empirical literature on the determinants of capital flows.
In general, the literature classifies the determinants of capital flows into supply-push factors
and demand-pull factors. Supply or push factors refer to global determinants of capital
flows, will demand or pull factors refer to country-specific factors that attract capital flows
(Felices and Orskaug, 2008). The discussion of supply push factors has assumed importance
in light of large co-movements of flows of capital, especially immediately preceding and
during the recent global financial crisis. Rey (2015) shows that across countries capital flows
to different regions have a strong common component, and that were negatively correlated
with the Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, which is taken as
an indicator of global expectations. Capital flows are also shown to negatively correlated
with the federal funds rate. Shin (2011) argues that global lending by banks depends on
their balance sheet capacity, which in turn depends on the amount of bank capital and
the degree of permitted leverage. Therefore, Shin suggests that cross-border banking and
fluctuating leverage transmit permissive financial conditions globally. Moreover, several
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regulatory changes allowed for the creation of permissive financial conditions. Bruno and
Shin (2013) make a similar argument.
On the other hand, several studies emphasize the demand-pull factors of capital flows.
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) argue that the collapse of capital flows during the financial
crisis can be attributed to a collapse in investor confidence. However, the impact of this
shock on a specific country depended on the extent and nature of international financial
linkages, macroeconomic conditions, and dependence on world trade. Specifically, there
was a capital retrenchment out of countries with large net external debt liabilities, and
large exposure to liquidity risk. Portes and Rey (2005) argue that market size, efficiency
of the transactions technology, and distance are important determinants of capital flows.
Other studies emphasize the importance of more structural and institutional explanations of
capital flows. Alfaro et al. (2007) argue that legal origins, and components of institutional
quality such as investor protection, and macroeconomic policy plays an important role in
determining capital flows and their volatility in the period 1970-2000. Similarly, Papaioannou
(2009) argues that institutional underdevelopment such as the weak protection of property
rights, legal insufficiency, and high risk of expropriation impedes flow of capital to developing
countries.
Increasingly, several studies argue that these factors are not mutually exclusive, and
both supply-push and demand-pull factors play a role in determining capital flows. Calvo
et al. (1996) emphasize the importance of interest rates in developed countries, the external
debt burden of developing countries, and creditworthiness of debtor countries in determining
capital flows to developing countries. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) show that growth differentials,
interest rate differentials, and global risk aversion are important drivers of capital flows to
emerging market economies. The first two are demand-pull factor while global risk aversion
is a supply-push factor. Felices and Orskaug (2008) use a joint estimation of demand and
supply systems as both types of factors, push and pull, could be part of both demand and
supply functions. They argue that supply of flows to emerging market economies depend
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on interest rate spreads, sovereign credit ratings, global GDP growth, and US high-yield
spreads. More recently, Ghosh et al. (2014) study the characteristics of surges in net capital
flows between the period 1980–2011 for 56 emerging market economies, as they find that
they have characteristics that are distinct from normal net capital flows. They find that
global factors, such as the US interest rate and global risk (measured by volatility in S&P
500 index returns) play a role in determining the occurrence of surge episodes, as they are
synchronized across countries and decades. However, whether an economy experiences a
surge in net capital inflows also depends on its attraction as an investment destination. In
particular, they find that external financing need (measured by current account deficit),
financial openness, and exchange rate regime are correlated to the magnitude of net capital
inflows in surge episodes. Barrot and Serven (2018) find that while gross capital flows
exhibit considerable co-movement, there are differences in the degree of co-movement between
countries and country groups. Their estimated common factors dominate capital flows in
advanced economies, but local or idiosyncratic factors dominate capital flows in emerging
economies. Additionally, they argue that the importance of global factors is also not stable
over time, as common factors display an increasing importance in explaining the pattern of
gross inflows and outflows of capital until 2008, after which the effect of common factors
exhibit a decline. Interestingly, they also find that the exposure of countries to global cycles
is related to their policy framework, as some factors like financial openness amplify the
effects of the global cyclical factors on gross flows in a particular country. Clearly, several
country-specific factors play a role in determining capital flows, and credit worthiness and
risk assessment is an important determinant. In this regard, the role played by reserves in
improving credit worthiness, and thereby encouraging capital flows, has not been assessed
in the literature.
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2.2.3 Literature on Early Warning Systems for Currency Crises
The literature on early warning systems and prediction, and currency crises in particular,
is also insightful. While there are several studies that explore the best predictors of crises,
Kaminsky et al. (1998), Hawkins and Klau (2000), and Frankel and Saravelos (2010) provide
comprehensive surveys of this literature. Kaminsky et al. (1998) examine the existing evi-
dence on currency crises by reviewing 28 theoretical and empirical studies on currency crises
till 1997, and propose an early warning system for currency crises. They find that individual
variables that are consistently found to be useful indicators of currency crises are interna-
tional reserves, real exchange rate, credit growth, credit to the public sector, and domestic
inflation. Hawkins and Klau (2000), on the other hand, only find that short-term debt to
foreign exchange reserves as an important predictor of crises under some conditions. Frankel
and Saravelos (2010) review 83 studies in this literature, based on which they conduct an
empirical investigation into country vulnerability to crises during 2008–09. They find that
foreign exchange reserves, the real exchange rate, the growth of credit, GDP, and the current
account are the most frequently statistically significant indicators in the literature surveyed.
Moreover, of these and other indicators, they find that the level of reserves stood out as a
key leading indicator of crisis incidence during 2008–09.
It is important to note here that in this literature, it appears that a decline in reserve hold-
ings is taken as an indicator of crisis incidence, in contrast to the relationship being posited
in this chapter. However, there are reasons to be suspicious of this result. Even though there
is variation in the definition of crisis in the early warning system literature, most of them use
an exchange rate pressure index, which is a composite of exchange rate, interest rates, and
international reserves. Therefore, international reserves figure among both the dependent
and independent variables in several studies in the early warning system indicators. Even
though the indices and explanatory variables used are usually not contemporaneous in the
econometric models, there is reason to suspect a bias in the results. Moreover, the tendency
that this chapter posits is likely to not be observed immediately before a crisis, as in that
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period, central banks spring into operation in an attempt to prevent the crises. This is
likely to take the form of decumulation of reserves. Figures 2.1 through 2.4 show the trend
in reserves as a share of GDP for some selected developing economies over time. In these
figures, the vertical red line marks the year of a currency crisis. In several instances, there
is a sharp decline in reserves as a share of GDP immediately preceding a currency crisis.
However, in several instances, there is also a sharp increase in reserves as a share of GDP
immediately preceding the sharp decline before the currency crisis. Figure 2.5 shows that
this is also observed in advanced economies. Therefore, a more careful investigation into the
role of reserves in the period leading up to a financial crisis is warranted.
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Red line marks the year of a currency crisis
Source: Author’s Calculations
2.3 Central Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this chapter is that reserve holdings may be imposing an additional
indirect cost on countries in which Central Banks hold a large quantity of foreign exchange
reserves, based on the following dynamic:
1) Central banks accumulate foreign exchange reserves to protect against currency/sovereign
debt/financial crises
2) Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves reduces the probability of a currency/sovereign
debt/financial crises
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3) Reduced probability of crisis makes investment in country less risky, ceterus paribus
4) Reduced perception of risk encourages gross inflow of capital into an economy
5) Increased gross flow of capital into an economy increases likelihood of currency/sovereign
debt/financial crises
Therefore, even though central bank reserve holdings are meant to act as a buffer against
the effects of volatile capital flows, they may contribute to creating the situation they are
meant to prevent by creating moral hazard for foreign lenders. This is because with the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves with the central banks through foreign exchange
intervention increases their ability to bail out the domestic borrowers borrowing from in-
ternational lenders in foreign currency. In other words, it affords central banks the space
to act as a lender of last resort in instances in which the assets at the risk of default are
denominated in a currency other than the one that it issues. An expectation of bailout is
reasonable, even without an explicit promise of bailout. As argued by Corsetti et al. (1999),
...no ex-ante announcement by policy makers can convince the public that ex-
post (that in the midst of a generalized financial turmoil) the government would
cross its arms and let the financial system proceed towards its debacle. (Corsetti
et al., 1999)
Even the use of these reserves to stabilize the currency in the wake of a generalized
outflow of capital from the economy guarantees, to a certain extent, an exchange rate within
a certain range for the first lenders out of the door, maintaining the feasibility of returns
on their investment for foreign lenders. This safety afforded by the accumulation of reserves
on the margin can conceivably encourage further capital inflows into the economy. Since
the volume of lending or capital flows have implications for financial stability, determining
whether high reserve accumulation encourages a higher volume of lending is important.
This chapter tests this hypothesis by examining the relationship between reserve accu-
mulation, gross capital inflows, net capital inflows, and the occurrence of crises. Specifically,
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it explores whether high reserve accumulation leads to higher capital inflows in an economy
and financial crises, accounting for other determinants of capital flows.
2.4 Data
The dataset used in this study has been constructed using several publicly available
sources. The main source of data is the International Financial Statistics and the Global
Debt Database of the International Monetary Fund. This has been supplemented with other
datasets whenever needed.
The key dependent variables used in this study are gross capital inflows, gross capital
outflows, net capital inflows, and crisis variables.
2.4.1 Capital Flows
Data on capital flows is obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. How-
ever, the coverage of data is better in the dataset constructed in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2017). Gross capital inflows are defined as the change in total liabilities for each country,
and gross capital outflows are defined as the change in total assets for each country. There-
fore, data on gross and net capital flows are the same as those used in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2017). Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017) supplement the data on the international investment
position of economies in the International Financial Statistics from country reports, and
bilateral data on portfolio, foreign direct investment, and bank holdings, allowing for better
data availability. Capital inflows measure net purchases or sale by nonresidents of domestic
assets, and capital outflows measure net purchases or sale of foreign assets by residents.
Data is denominated current US Dollars, which is then scaled by Nominal GDP measured
in current US Dollars, and converted to natural logarithmic form.
2.4.2 Crisis Data
This chapter draws on the work of Laeven and Valencia (2018) for defining crisis variables.
For the period 1970–2017, Laeven and Valencia (2018) identify three types of crises: systemic
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banking crisis, currency crisis, and sovereign debt crises. In the case of the first two types of
crises, this dataset identifies the first year of the crises, while in the case of a sovereign debt
crisis, the dataset records the year of a sovereign default. We define four variables sb, cc,
and sd, which take a value of 1 for the country-year of a systemic banking crisis, currency
crisis, and sovereign default, respectively, and zero otherwise.
2.4.3 Foreign Exchange Reserves
The key independent variable, on the other hand, used in the study is foreign exchange re-
serves accumulated by central banks, both including and excluding gold reserves. In general,
since the key role played by reserves posited in this chapter is the provision of immediate in-
ternational liquidity, foreign exchange reserves should be considered excluding gold reserves.
This assumption is supported by Figure 2.6, which shows that a decreasing proportion of
foreign exchange reserves are held in the form of gold.
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Source: Author’s calculations
Data on Foreign exchange reserves are obtained from the International Financial Statis-
tics, and supplemented by the dataset in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017). Reserves are scaled
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by the GDP in order to facilitate comparison across countries and over time, and converted
to natural logarithmic form.
2.4.4 Country Classification
In this chapter, the World-Bank income classifications are used in order to classify coun-
tries into High Income countries, Upper-Middle Income countries, Lower-Middle Income
countries, and Low-Income countries. Countries in the Upper-Middle Income, Lower-Middle
Income, and Low-Income country categories are classified as Developing countries, while
High-Income countries are classified as Advanced countries. We obtained the historical clas-
sification of countries, which takes into account how countries have moved from one country
group to another. However, since there is not much movement of countries between country
groups, specifically from the Developing country classification to Advanced country classifi-
cation, we have used the classification of countries as it stands in 2017.
It is questionable whether per-capita income (on which the World Bank income classi-
fications are based) adequately characterizes the level of development. Therefore, we also
have data on the World Bank classification of countries into operational lending categories of
International Development Association (IDA), which includes countries that do not have the
financial ability to borrow from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development,
countries that can borrow from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), and Blend, which includes countries that are eligible for both IDA and IBRD loans.
Based on this classification, we classify any of the countries in IDA, IBRD, and Blend groups
into the Developing by Lending country category, and all other countries in the Advanced by
Lending country category. This classification is used to check the robustness of our results.
The full list of countries in all the categories mentioned that are used in the analysis in
this chapter are mentioned in the Appendix.
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2.4.5 Control Variables
In addition to these key variables, several other control variables are also included in this
study. In general, we want to control for other factors that are found in the literature to
have an impact on determining capital inflows. As in Ghosh et al. (2014), we classify the
control variables into push and pull factors. The push, or global, factors used as control
variables are the volatility in S&P 500 returns1 and the global commodity price index. The
pull, or country-specific, factors that are controlled for include n=log real GDP per capita,
log real GDP growth rate, log of the current account as share of GDP, de jure capital account
openness (measured by the Chinn-Ito index), interest rate on domestic government treasury
bills, and the exchange rate regime. A full list of variables and sources are listed in the
Appendix A.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
In the period under consideration, the reserve accumulation as a result of foreign exchange
intervention has increased to unprecedented levels, especially towards the end of the last
decade. This trend is specifically marked in Developing Economies as compared to Advanced
Economies, as can be seen in Figure 2.7
During the same period, the trends in gross capital inflows and outflows can be seen in
Figure 2.8. Interestingly, while there is not an immediately apparent trend in capital and
capital outflows, it is evident that positive inflows and outflows are much higher in advanced
economies than in developing economies. However, in comparison, while foreign exchange
reserve holdings is increasing in both country groups, it is higher in developing economies.
Additionally, there is a marked coordinated increase in foreign exchange reserve accumulation
1We use this as opposed to the more traditionally used Volatility Index or VIX of the the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE) as data on VIX is only available since 1990. VIX is calculated as “30-day
expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500 Index call
and put options.” In comparison, our measure is a rolling standard deviation of closing values of the daily
S&P 500 Index for each year.
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Source: Author’s Calculations
in both country groups, when there is also a marked increase in capital inflows. This is also
seen in the trends in the change in reserve accumulation as can be seen in Figure 2.9.
The trend in external debt in both country groups are shown in Figure 2.10. It shows
the increase in foreign exchange reserve accumulation, has happened despite the decline in
the total stock of external debt in both country groups since the mid-2000s, followed by a
modest recovery since 2009. Furthermore, while the level of external debt as a share of GDP
was much higher in advanced economies in the advanced economies, the level of external
debt as a share of GDP in advanced economies after the global financial crisis is comparable
to that in developing economies. Of the total external debt, short term external debt as a
share of GDP has also declined in advanced economies. However, short term external debt
has recovered in developing economies, while this is not the case in advanced economies.
This trend is significant for our hypothesis, especially in light of the high levels of reserve
accumulation in developing economies as compared to that in advanced economies, as is
shown in Figure 2.7.
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Table 2.1 summarizes the trends in Reserves as a share of GDP, Gross Capital inflows
as a share of GDP, Net Capital Inflows as a share of GDP, External Debt as a share of
GDP, and Short-term External Debt as a share of GDP by decade. The summary statistics
are weighted by real GDP. It is interesting to note that net capital inflows are, on average,
much smaller than the gross capital inflows. Furthermore, the average trends in gross capital
inflows are not mirrored in the trends in net capital inflows. Therefore, a closer look at both
gross and net capital inflows is warranted.
Table 2.1: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median of key variables by decade
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018
Reserves
Mean 0.020 0.024 0.029 0.060 0.079
SD 0.023 0.022 0.039 0.98 0.129
Median 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.015 0.015
Gross Inflows
Mean 0.044 0.060 0.101 0.189 0.062
SD 0.043 0.061 0.197 0.717 0.528
Median 0.029 0.049 0.082 0.107 0.056
Net Inflows
Mean 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006
SD 0.0006 0.0006 0.0024 0.0031 0.0063
Median 0.0000 0.0000 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.0000
External Debt
Mean 0.080 0.076 0.343 0.274 0.293
SD 0.066 0.095 0.267 0.128 0.127
Median 0.120 0.111 0.197 0.229 0.265
Short-term Debt
Mean 0.003 0.007 0.060 0.047 0.058
SD 0.002 0.008 0.044 0.034 0.035
Median 0.004 0.007 0.062 0.037 0.048
2.6 Methodology and Results
In order to determine the impact of the high levels of reserves on capital inflows into an
economy and crisis, we examine the correlations between reserves accumulated as a share of
GDP with the inflows of capital. There are a host of endogeneity concerns that the analysis
has to contend with. Given that high levels of capital inflows are likely to also facilitate
foreign exchange intervention that leads to accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, there
is a serious concern of reverse causation. In order to address these concerns as we conduct
53
our analysis, we use dynamic panel data methods. The data has been analyzed using the
STATA 16 software.
The key variables in the analysis are likely to exhibit persistence over time, that is, there
is likely to be serially autocorrelated. This is true for capital inflows, reserves, and change in
reserves. When we check for serial autocorrelation in the panel using Wooldridge’s test for
panel serial autocorrelation, we can reject the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation2.
Furthermore, reserves as a share of GDP is likely to be an endogenous variable and capital
inflows and reserves are likely to be highly correlated: it would not be surprising if reserve
accumulation if higher with higher capital inflows. Therefore, in order to examine the effects
of reserves accumulation on capital inflows, we cannot use contemporaneous values of re-
serves. We use lagged values of the stock of foreign exchange reserves accumulated through
foreign exchange intervention. In order to account for this, we estimate a Difference GMM
model.
yit = Xitβ1 + Zitβ2 + αi + uit
where t = 1, 2, ..., T , i = 1, 2, ..., n, yit is the dependent variable, Xit is the 1 × k vector
of independent variables, Zit is the vector of control variables. This is estimated by taking
the first difference of this equation (thereby getting rid of the country fixed effects) and
estimating the Arellano-Bond estimator using the Generalized Methods of Moments. They
key independent variable used is the lagged values of the reserves to GDP ratio. We use five
lags of the reserves to GDP ratio as the independent variable. Additionally, in our difference
GMM estimation, we also use the five lags of the dependent variable as independent variables.
Countries that have continued to increase their reserves year-over-year are also considered
distinctly. Specifically, we define a binary variable consistent that takes the value 1 if
there has been a consistent increase in reserves for five consecutive preceding years, and
2The F-statistic for Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is 8.7557, at which we can reject
the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. This is obtained in STATA using the xtserial command
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zero otherwise. In addition, we also estimate a simple Fixed Effects model, with country
and year fixed effects, system GMM model, to examine the robustness of our results across
specifications. In order to preserve efficiency, we limit the number of lags used as instruments
in our difference and system GMM estimation to five.
We also estimate the system GMM model with an external instrumental variable. In
their examination of the lessons from the Global Financial Crises for the management of
capital accounts in emerging market economies, Gabor (2012) highlights the importance
of the internationalization of banking activity and the degree of foreign ownership in the
banking system in determining the appropriate level of foreign exchange reserves a central
bank should ideally hold. Specifically, the presence of a high degree of foreign ownership of
banks eases access to short-term borrowing in the international inter-bank market (Gabor,
2010), and their presence can better transmit external shocks to the domestic economy
without necessarily increasing domestic access to credit Cull et al. (2017). This increased
vulnerability to external shocks would require the accumulation of a higher level of foreign
exchange reserves in order for foreign exchange reserves to mitigate the risk of capital flight,
but their presence may not necessarily increase the inflow of foreign capital into the economy.
Therefore, we use the presence of foreign-owned banks in an economy as an instrumental
variable in our analysis.
We obtain data on cross-border claims on the residents of a country by Bureau of Interna-
tional Settlements banks available through the BIS Locational Banking Statistics by country.
We scale the data by the GDP of the country to obtain the share of cross-border claims of
banks on residents as a share of GDP, which is then used as an instrumental variable 3.
Table 2.2 shows the results from our Dynamic Panel Data analyses. The different columns
reports the coefficients for our different estimators, using both push and pull factors as control
3While we would ideally like to use the share of foreign ownership of banks in an economy as our instru-
ment, the publicly available data from the World Bank Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey does
not have sufficient coverage for our purposes.
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variables. Interestingly, across all specifications, the coefficient on the first lag is positive
(and significant in columns 2, 3, and 4). These coefficients suggest a 1 percent increase
in reserves to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.006–0.046 percent increase in gross capital
inflows as a share of GDP. The coefficients on the second lag and third lag are all negative
(except for third lag in columns 3 and 4), but insignificant. The coefficients on the fifth lag
are consistently positive and significant across specifications, except for in Column 4. These
results suggest that a 1 percent increase in reserves to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.006–
0.011 percent increase in gross capital inflows as a share of GDP in five years. However,
these results are tempered by the consistently negative coefficients on the fourth lag of our
reserves variable, and statistically significant in Columns 1, 3, and 4.
The coefficients on the current account variable are negative and significant in Columns 1
and 2. This is consistent with the result in Ghosh et al. (2014): higher gross capital inflows
are associated with a current account deficit, implying that an economy’s total financing
need is associated with higher gross capital inflow. It is also important to note that the
coefficient on the Chinn-Ito index is positive and significant in columns 2 and 4, providing
some evidence that countries with greater capital account openness also experience greater
gross capital inflows.
We conduct the same analysis for Net Capital Flows, to see if the patters on gross
inflows can also be seen in net inflows as a share of GDP 4. The results are shown in
Table 2.3. The coefficients on the first lag of reserves to GDP are positive and significantly
related to net capital inflows in column 2. The coefficients on the second and third lag are
consistently negative, but not statistically significant. The coefficients on the fourth lag are
all consistently positive, but not statistically significant. The coefficients on the fifth lag do
not display a consistent sign across specifications and are not statistically significant either.
4We exclude the current account control variable as it is tautologically related to net capital flows, as
shown in Equation 2.1.
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Table 2.2: Dynamic Panel Regression results for Gross Capital Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.logreserves 0.005 0.006∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.046∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.025) (0.025)
l2.logreserves -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
l3.logreserves -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
l4.logreserves -0.005∗∗ -0.005 -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
l5.logreserves 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Consistent 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Volatility -0.017∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Commodity Index 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Account -0.073∗∗ -0.108∗∗ 0.216 0.196
(0.032) (0.047) (0.185) (0.185)
Per-capita Income 0.024∗∗ 0.010 0.015 -0.017
(0.011) (0.010) (0.031) (0.025)
GDP growth 0.036 0.011 -0.053 -0.081
(0.029) (0.017) (0.053) (0.059)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.014 0.016∗∗ 0.023 0.036
(0.009) (0.007) (0.043) (0.031)
Interest Rate 0.001∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Exchange Rate -0.002 -0.008∗∗ -0.059∗ -0.043∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.033) (0.024)
ER Regime -0.001 -0.001 0.031 0.027
(0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.020)
Constant 2.940∗∗∗ 4.010∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗ 3.963∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.307) (0.387) (0.368)
N 1085 1009 1089 1045
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the Fixed Effects Model, five lags of the dependent variable are included as control variables.
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Table 2.3: Dynamic Panel Regression results for Net Capital Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.logreserves 0.0132 0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0174 -0.0156
(0.0087) (0.0047) (0.0208) (0.0194)
l2.logreserves -0.0076 -0.0073 -0.0014 -0.0009
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0073)
l3.logreserves -0.0109 -0.0087 -0.0117 -0.0125
(0.0118) (0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0081)
l4.logreserves 0.0091 0.0067 0.0164 0.0162
(0.0152) (0.0059) (0.0123) (0.0123)
l5.logreserves 0.0010 0.0018 -0.0061 -0.0058
(0.0086) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Consistent 0.0030 0.0034 -0.0048 -0.0050
(0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0066)
Volatility -0.0085 -0.0042∗ -0.0010
(0.0170) (0.0024) (0.0028)
Commodity Index 0.0003 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita Income -0.0471 -0.0155 -0.0053 0.0251
(0.0383) (0.0165) (0.0532) (0.0239)
GDP Growth 0.0512 -0.0081 0.0229 0.0417
(0.0484) (0.0304) (0.0376) (0.0451)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.0421 0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0473 -0.0477
(0.0257) (0.0131) (0.0545) (0.0571)
Interest Rate -0.0007 0.0003 0.0014 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Exchange Rate 0.0250 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0379∗ 0.0187
(0.0158) (0.0084) (0.0214) (0.0164)
ER Regime 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0014
(0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0115) (0.0101)
Constant -0.8255 -0.8398∗∗∗ -1.8680∗∗∗ -2.1729∗∗∗
(0.5570) (0.2208) (0.5529) (0.3740)
N 980 902 1040 1013
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the Fixed Effects Model, five lags of the dependent variables are used as control variables
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We estimate these models for external debt as a share of GDP and external short-term
debt as a share of GDP, but we do not find a relationship that is statistically significant
across any lags of the reserves to GDP ratio, and is not reported.
2.6.1 Relatively High Reserve Accumulation
Since the relationship between capital inflow and reserves is posited in this chapter is
one of creating moral hazard for international lenders, the volume of reserves held by a
central bank relative to other central banks are likely to be a more relevant determinant
of the volume of capital flows received by a country rather than the absolute volume of
foreign exchange reserves held in a country by a central bank relative to its GDP. Therefore,
we examine the role played by the holding of FX reserves in countries relative to all other
countries in a given year. In order to do this, we determine the location of a country’s
reserve accumulation in the distribution of reserve accumulation in a given year. We still
consider distribution of the foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP since the size of the
economy would determine whether the reserve holdings of a Central Banks are sizeable in
the economy under consideration.
Therefore, instead of considering reserves as a share of GDP as the independent variable,
we calculate the standard score of the reserves holdings of a country in a given year, that is,
we calculate the number of standard deviations away the foreign exchange reserve holding
of a country is from the average foreign exchange reserve holding in any year. We estimate
our model using the lagged values of the foreign exchange reserves standard score in order to
answer the question: is a relatively higher accumulation of foreign exchange reserves causally
related to higher capital inflows into an economy. The results are shown in Table 2.4.
Interestingly, in Table 2.4, the coefficient on the first lag is positive in all four specifi-
cations, and significant in three of those. Furthermore, the coefficients on the fifth lag are
also positive in all of our specification and statistically significant in all but the fixed effects
model. The coefficients on our other lags are mixed, with some being positive and some
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Table 2.4: Impact of Relative Reserve Accumulation on Gross Capital Inflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.Zreserves 0.012 0.013∗ 0.161∗ 0.143∗
(0.015) (0.007) (0.087) (0.084)
l2.Zreserves 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.013
(0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
l3.Zreserves -0.009 -0.008 0.002 -0.000
(0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
l4.Zreserves -0.013 -0.013 -0.002 -0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
l5.Zreserves 0.020 0.027∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015)
Volatility -0.015∗∗ 0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Commodity Index 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Account -0.077∗∗ -0.119∗∗ 0.358 0.231
(0.033) (0.046) (0.228) (0.177)
Per-capita Income 0.021 0.009 0.044 -0.006
(0.013) (0.010) (0.029) (0.018)
GDP growth 0.037 0.008 -0.043 -0.076
(0.028) (0.017) (0.055) (0.058)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.014 0.014∗ 0.003 0.020
(0.009) (0.007) (0.044) (0.027)
Interest Rate 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Exchange Rate -0.002 -0.007∗∗ -0.051∗ -0.028
(0.002) (0.003) (0.028) (0.019)
ER Regime -0.001 -0.001 0.025 0.018
(0.001) (0.002) (0.018) (0.016)
Constant 2.938∗∗∗ 4.123∗∗∗ 3.014∗∗∗ 3.683∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.307) (0.367) (0.303)
N 1085 1009 1089 1045
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the Fixed Effects model, five lags of the dependent variable are also used as controls
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being negative. However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant. Our result
provide evidence that higher reserve accumulation as compared to other countries in a given
year is associated with higher gross capital inflows within within one year and within five
years.
We also calculate the standard score of the gross capital inflows and net capital inflows
received by a country in every year. We then ask: is it the case that a higher reserve
accumulation relative to other countries is associated with higher gross capital inflow relative
to other countries in a year? Table 2.5 shows the results for this investigation. Notably, the
results in this table are consistent with those in Table 2.4: the first and fifth lag of the
standard score of reserves as a share of GDP are positively and significantly associated with
a higher standard score of gross capital inflows as a share of GDP.
We conduct a similar analysis for net flows, that is, we analyze whether relatively higher
reserves as a share of GDP is causally related with relatively higher net capital inflows.
Unlike the results for gross capital inflows, we do not find similar, systematic, and robust
results for net capital inflows. The regression results for net capital inflows and standard
score for the net capital inflows are available in Table B.4 and Table B.5, respectively, in
Appendix C.
2.6.2 Quantile-specific effects
It may be the case that higher levels of reserve accumulation have a qualitatively different
impact on capital inflows than lower levels of reserve accumulation, and are not simply scaled
up impacts as those compared to lower levels of reserve accumulation. If this is the case, a
difference GMM analysis may not be sufficient, and we need a panel data quantile regression
approach. Therefore, we estimate a panel quantile data regression model with fixed effects
for each quantile, with five lags of the reserves to GDP ratio5. Table 2.6 shows the results
5This model has been estimated using qregpd STATA module using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
optimization
61
Table 2.5: Impact of Relative Reserve Accumulation on Relative Gross Capital Inflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.Zreserves 0.440 0.373∗∗ 2.968∗ 3.666
(0.416) (0.165) (1.626) (2.313)
l2.Zreserves -0.108 -0.113 -0.008 -0.378
(0.343) (0.214) (0.278) (0.301)
l3.Zreserves -0.124 -0.005 0.261 0.154
(0.434) (0.217) (0.302) (0.278)
l4.Zreserves -0.433 -0.442∗∗ -0.035 0.028
(0.425) (0.220) (0.309) (0.366)
l5.Zreserves 0.529∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.644∗ 0.881∗∗
(0.315) (0.177) (0.386) (0.425)
Volatility -0.419 0.056∗ 0.099 0.088
(0.264) (0.032) (0.067) (0.079)
Commodity Index 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Current Account -1.779∗∗ -2.428∗∗ 6.648 7.835
(0.837) (1.093) (4.582) (5.947)
Per-capita Income 0.362 0.075 0.105 0.089
(0.279) (0.235) (0.597) (0.417)
GDP growth 1.042 0.574 -0.426 -1.046
(0.804) (0.403) (0.734) (1.017)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.227 0.218 0.848 1.332
(0.227) (0.169) (1.487) (0.954)
Interest Rate 0.009 0.015 -0.012 -0.018
(0.006) (0.010) (0.030) (0.033)
Exchange Rate -0.015 -0.081 -0.425 -0.276
(0.039) (0.073) (0.344) (0.317)
ER Regime 0.001 0.000 0.265 0.282
(0.017) (0.043) (0.222) (0.304)
Constant -20.107∗∗∗ -1.232 -5.283 -4.058
(6.949) (2.751) (7.687) (7.265)
N 1085 1009 1089 1045
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the Fixed Effects model, five lags of the dependent variable are also used as controls
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with five lags of the reserves to GDP ratio as the independent variables, controlling for both
push and pull factors, and Figure 2.11 plots the coefficients against the quantile for different
lags of the reserves to GDP ratio.
The quantile regression results in reveal some interesting patterns. The coefficient on the
third and fifth lags are consistently positive over all the quantiles. For the fifth lag this is
consistent with the results of our dynamic panel data analysis as the coefficient on the the
fifth lag was positive and significant across specifications. Furthermore, the coefficients on
the fifth lag increase with the quantile: the coefficients increase between the 40th percentile
and the 80th percentile. The coefficients on the second lag of reserves increase from being
negative to being positive, as there is a sharp upward trend in the coefficients from the 30th
percentile. To the contrary, the coefficients in the first and fourth lags decrease from the
30th and 40th percentile, respectively.
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If we consider the coefficients on the Chinn-Ito index over different quantiles, shown in
Figure 2.12, they decrease with the higher quantiles of capital account openness. In addition,
the coefficient go from being positive to being negative around the 50th percentile. The de-
cline in coefficients, which suggest a decline in impact of gross inflows with increasing capital
account openness for higher quantiles of the Chinn-Ito index is somewhat counterintuitive.
However, the coefficients increase again around the 70th percentile, but are not significantly
different from zero.
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The variation of the impacts of reserves to GDP on capital inflows is even more evident
when we consider net capital inflows. Figure 2.13 show the results for relationship between
the different quantiles of the lags of the reserves to GDP ratio on net capital inflows. In
particular, it appears that there is a qualitative change in the relationship between reserves
and capital inflows at the 70th or 80th percentile of reserves to GDP ratio. The full quantile
regression results for the net capital account are shown in Table B.6 in Appendix C.
The results of the quantile regressions confirms the hypothesis that higher levels of reserve
accumulation may be qualitatively different from lower levels of reserve accumulation insofar
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as their impact on gross capital inflows are concerned. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to
consider the the higher quantiles of reserve accumulations distinctly from the lower quantiles.
2.6.3 Highest Quantiles of Reserve Accumulation
Given the results of our quantile regression analysis, we identify the episodes of reserve
accumulation in the top 30th percentile of the distribution. Following the algorithm used
in Ghosh et al. (2014) to define surges in net capital inflows, we define a high accumulation
episode as one which is in the top 30th percentile of the level of accumulated reserves at the
level of a country over time, and in the top 30th percentile of all observations. We define
these observations as those that meet our global criteria for high reserve accumulation. In
addition we also identify the high accumulation episodes as those that are only in the top
30th percentile of the level of accumulated reserves at the level of a country over time. These
observations are those that meet our local criteria for high reserve accumulation. Based on
these definitions, we identify 246 global episodes of high accumulation 498 local episodes of
higher reserve accumulation. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 summarize the characteristics of levels of
reserves, gross inflows, net inflows, external debt, and short term external debt as a share of
GDP for global and local instances of high reserve accumulation.
The increasing number of episodes of high reserve accumulation over time is consistent
with the pattern of increased foreign exchange intervention since the 1990s. Comparing the
descriptive statistics of the global episodes of high reserve accumulation with the descriptive
statistics presented in 2.1, it is interesting to note that except for the decade 2000–09,
the average gross capital inflows are higher in the identified episodes of global high reserve
accumulation. Similarly, average short-term external debt is higher in the last two decades
(2000–09 and 2010–18) in our global episodes of high reserve accumulation as compared to
our entire sample. On the contrary, except for the decade 2010–18, net capital inflows are
on average lower in the global episodes of high reserve accumulation in every other decade.
Furthermore, average external debt is lower in every decade in our global episodes of high
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Table 2.7: Mean and Standard Deviation of key variables in Global Instances of High Reserve
Accumulation
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018
Reserves
Mean 0.162 0.298 0.240 0.252
SD 0 0.216 0.126 0.136
Median 0.162 0.227 0.199 0.233
Gross Inflows
Mean 0.083 0.111 0.095 0.068
SD 0 0.140 0.2 0.163
Median 0.083 0.082 0.072 0.063
Net Inflows
Mean 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.001 0.001
SD 0 0.002 0.004 0.008
Median 0.000 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.0001
External Debt
Mean 0.105 0.278 0.283
SD 0 0.117 0.126
Median 0.105 0.252 0.230
Short-term Debt
Mean 0.0001 0.049 0.060
SD 0 0.032 0.038
Median 0.0001 0.041 0.043
N 0 1 10 116 119
reserve accumulation, except 2000–09. However, the average net capital inflows, external
debt, and short-term external debt are higher in every decade in the episodes of high reserve
accumulation.
Table 2.8: Mean and Standard Deviation of key variables in Local Instances of High Reserve
Accumulation
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018
Reserves
Mean 0.053 0.034 0.025 0.141 0.214
SD 0.015 0.024 0.046 0.141 0.142
Median 0.051 0.036 0.006 0.163 0.192
Gross Inflows
Mean 0.071 0.064 0.081 0.107 0.050
SD 0.058 0.067 0.060 0.848 0.360
Median 0.046 0.062 0.082 0.074 0.057
Net Inflows
Mean 0.00003 -0.00002 0.0004 -0.0004 0.001
SD 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.008
Median -0.00002 0.0000 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00004
External Debt
Mean 0.714 0.262 0.287
SD 0.398 0.107 0.110
Median 0.528 0.242 0.247
Short-term Debt
Mean 0.042 0.044 0.058
SD 0.013 0.030 0.033
Median 0.037 0.036 0.044
N 25 52 85 175 161
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Considering the episodes of locally high reserve accumulation, average gross inflows and
average net inflows are lower than averages in table 2.1 in every decade. This is also the
case for average external debt, except for the decade 1990–99, and for average short-term
external debt. In comparison, the average net capital inflows are higher in all decades during
the episodes of locally high reserve accumulation.
In addition to defining episodes of globally and locally high reserve accumulation due to
foreign exchange intervention, we identify episodes of surges in gross capital inflows and net
capital inflows, using both local and global criterion is described above. We identify 430
global and 505 local surges in gross capital inflows and 203 global and 427 local surges in
net capital inflows.
2.6.4 Occurrence of Capital Inflow Surges and Crises
We examine whether the occurrence of surges in capital inflows is related to higher reserve
accumulation in the preceding years. Specifically, we estimate a panel logistic regression
model with our surge variable, for both gross inflows and net inflows, as the dependent
variables. The results for gross inflows are shown in Table 2.9, while those for net flows
are shown in Table 2.10. We estimate the model used lagged values of the reserves and
the control variables we used in our fixed effects model, the results for which are shown in
Column (1). Next, we estimate the model with the standard score of the country’s reserve
accumulation in five years prior to the current year as the independent variable, with the
same controls, and the results are shown in Column (2). Column (3) shows the estimates of
the model when high reserve episodes are used as the independent variable. In other words,
Column (3) shows the result for the examination of whether the episodes of high reserve
accumulation are likely to be associated with a surge in gross capital inflows within one,
two, three, four, or five years. Column (4), on the other hand estimates the model with the
level of reserve accumulation in the episodes of high reserve accumulation. We do this by
interacting our episode of high reserve accumulation variable with our reserves variable.
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Table 2.9: Logistic Regression Results for Surges in Gross Capital Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reserves ZReserves High Reserve Reserves in
Episodes High Reserve Episodes
l1 0.281 0.762 0.685∗∗ -0.103
(0.259) (0.711) (0.281) (0.401)
l2 -0.095 -0.153 -0.548∗ 0.649
(0.334) (0.934) (0.318) (0.475)
l3 0.013 0.110 -0.168 0.244
(0.329) (0.931) (0.330) (0.466)
l4 -0.128 -1.076 0.214 -0.260
(0.331) (0.977) (0.341) (0.468)
l5 0.428 1.478∗∗ -0.611∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.744) (0.305) (0.409)
Volatility -0.003 -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Per-capita Income 2.028∗∗ 2.032∗∗ 2.680∗∗∗ 2.663∗∗∗
(0.893) (0.888) (0.909) (0.933)
GDP growth 3.216∗ 3.693∗∗ 3.363∗ 2.433
(1.734) (1.733) (1.737) (1.786)
Interest Rate -0.116∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.184 0.024 -0.022 0.412
(0.632) (0.629) (0.614) (0.646)
N 1018 1018 1018 1018
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients and standard errors for the control variables commodity index, current account,
exchange rate and ER Regime are not shown in the interest of space, and are available on request.
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Our results indicate that in the case of gross capital inflows, there is no significant re-
lationship between the occurrence of a surge in gross capital inflows and the lagged values
of the reserves to GDP ratio (Column 1). However, when we consider the standard score
of the reserves accumulation of a country in a given year, the coefficient on the fifth lag is
positive and significant. Specifically, the coefficient on the fifth lag is positive and significant,
which means that a unit increase in the standard score of reserves as a percentage of GDP
is associated with an increase in the odds of occurrence of a surge in capital inflow by 4.38
within five years. However, when we consider episodes of high reserve accumulation, the
coefficients on the first, second, and fifth lags are significant. Specifically, a unit increase in
the standard score is associated with an increase in the odds of the occurrence of a surge in
gross capital inflows by 1.98 within a year. However, the coefficients on the second and fifth
lag are negative and significant. The level of reserves in a high reserve episodes is also asso-
ciated with a statistically significantly higher probability of a surge in gross capital inflows
within five years. By contrast, the results in table 2.10 show that a high reserve episodes or
reserve accumulation is not associated with a statistically significant higher probability of a
surge in net capital inflows.
We also try to assess whether the occurrence of crises are associated with episodes of high
reserve accumulation in the preceding years. Table 2.11 shows the logistic regression results
for the occurrence of currency crises. Column (1) shows the results for the model estimated
with the lagged values of the reserves variable as the independent variables. Column (2)
shows the results for the model estimated with the standard score of reserves as a share of
GDP in the preceding five years as independent variables. Column (3) shows the result for the
logistic regression model with the occurrence of an episode of high reserve accumulation in the
preceding five years as independent variables. Finally, Column (4) shows the results for the
logistic regression model with the interaction between episodes of high reserve accumulation
and level of reserves in the preceding five years. The probability of occurrence of currency
crisis decreases with an increase in reserve accumulation in the year prior to a crisis as the
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Table 2.10: Logistic Regression Results for Surges in Net Capital Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reserves ZReserves High Reserves in
Reserve High Reserve
episodes episodes
l1 -0.121 0.113 -0.200 0.013
(0.328) (1.170) (0.411) (0.516)
l2 -0.111 -0.156 0.159 -0.277
(0.434) (1.447) 0.159 (0.619)
l3 0.316 1.538 0.115 0.286
(0.439) (1.472) (0.468) (0.643)
l4 -0.032 -2.574∗ -0.182 0.095
(0.422) (1.562) (0.458) (0.613)
l5 0.078 1.146 0.466 -0.219
(0.333) (1.240) (0.458) (0.520)
Volatility -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Per-capita income -2.359∗ -2.049 -2.346∗ -2.490∗
(1.346) (1.319) (1.377) (1.400)
GDP growth 0.003 0.246 0.341 0.165
(2.370) (2.365) (2.353) (2.383)
Interest rate -0.083 -0.082 -0.085 -0.086
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.934 1.074 0.933 0.884
(1.061) (1.077) (1.063) (1.066)
N 457 457 457 457
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients and standard errors for the control variables commodity index, exchange rate and
ER Regime are not shown in the interest of space, and are available on request.
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coefficients on the first lag are negative and significant. However, higher reserve accumulation
two years prior is associated with a statistically significant higher odds of the occurrence of
a currency crisis when considering the level of reserves as a share of GDP. This is evident
from the coefficients presented in Column (1). Higher reserve accumulation and a high
reserve accumulation episode five years prior is also associated with a higher probability of
occurrence of a currency crisis (Columns (1), (2), and (3)).
Table 2.11: Logistic regression results for Currency Crises
Reserves ZReserves High Reserves in
Reserve High Reserve
episodes episodes
l1 -3.423∗ -35.215∗ -21.733 3.278
(2.064) (18.382) (3355.419) (4.268)
l2 4.496∗ 4.841 -17.347 7.721
(2.439) (14.547) (2875.298) (8.369)
l3 -2.560 -0.820 -4.581 -0.817
(2.698) (13.684) (3.681) (2.145)
l4 -2.519 -13.328 2.504 -0.684
(2.456) (15.447) (2.720) (1.573)
l5 8.106∗ 41.618∗ 7.844∗∗ -2.324
(4.496) (21.778) (3.424) (1.890)
volatility 0.015 -0.018 0.012 -0.009
(0.018) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017)
Per-capita Income -17.044∗∗ -17.174∗∗ 1.385 3.091
(8.023) (8.546) (8.988) (3.459)
GDP Growth -3.193 -25.297 -14.679 -8.828
(8.107) (16.920) (10.470) (6.584)
Current Account -56.873 -94.880 -84.087 -40.154
(54.463) (72.273) (55.331) (25.819)
Interest Rate 0.363 0.323 0.732∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.330) (0.376) (0.174)
Chinn-Ito Index -18.138∗∗ -9.974 -6.038 -3.960
(8.158) (10.476) (5.544) (3.230)
N 255 255 255 424
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients and standard errors for the control variables commodity index and ER Regime
are not shown in the interest of space, and are available on request.
A similar result is not observed for systemic banking crises. In other words, we do
not find evidence of higher reserve accumulation and high reserve accumulation episodes
being associated with a higher probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. On the
contrary, we find that higher reserve accumulation and a episode of high reserve accumulation
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is associated with a statistically significantly lower probability of occurrence of a systemic
banking crises within 1 year as is evident in Columns (1)–(3) of Table 2.12.
Table 2.12: Logistic Regression results for Systemic Banking Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reserves ZReserves High Reserves in
Reserve High Reserve
episodes episodes
l1 -9.500∗ -20.185∗ -5.403∗∗ 5.267∗∗
(5.158) (11.801) (2.709) (2.581)
l2 2.256 19.857 1.118 -3.187
(3.863) (13.048) (3.022) (2.453)
l3 -5.801 -38.004∗∗ -4.289 -1.880
(4.434) (18.712) (3.685) (2.103)
l4 -2.271 22.861 0.029 1.506
(4.278) (16.473) (2.806) (2.452)
l5 4.753 1.154 3.761 -5.121∗∗
(4.549) (15.073) (3.760) (2.504)
volatility 0.047∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010)
Per-capita Income 41.108∗ 25.221∗ 11.276 4.484
(23.119) (14.106) (10.186) (3.609)
GDP growth 26.939 30.410 10.863 0.982
(21.858) (20.520) (17.074) (9.163)
Current account -196.415 -144.787 -92.735 -71.538∗∗
(135.392) (94.241) (76.348) (31.276)
Interest rate -0.476 -0.242 -0.106 0.236
(0.435) (0.529) (0.355) (0.226)
Chinn-Ito index 0.325 -8.553 -9.124 -4.349
(12.739) (11.175) (7.846) (3.643)
N 506 506 506 720
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients and standard errors for the control variables commodity index and ER Regime
are not shown in the interest of space, and are available on request.
The change in signs in the significant coefficients between the first, second, and fifth lag
of reserves in Table 2.11 suggest that there may be some non-linearities in the relationship
between reserve accumulation and the occurrence of currency crises. On the other hand,
it appears that foreign exchange reserves provide a stabilizing influence as far as systemic
banking crises are concerned. It is not immediately clear why we see these contrasting effects
of foreign exchange intervention on currency crises and systemic banking crises; further
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exploration is required in order to understand these differential impacts, which are beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
2.7 Implications and Conclusions
The results in this chapter pose a challenge to the assumptions about the impacts of
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves on financial stability. Even though the literature
suggests that the accumulation of reserves allows central banks to protect against the impacts
of potential capital flight. However, our results show that the impact of foreign exchange
intervention is not so straightforward. In particular, we show that very high levels of reserve
accumulation are qualitatively different from lower levels of reserve accumulation, and have
impacts that are distinct from scaled up levels of lower reserve accumulations. In particular,
the direction of the relationship between reserve accumulation in the preceding first, second,
and fifth year changes at 60th and 80th percentiles of reserve accumulation. This warrants
a closer look at the highest levels of reserve accumulation resulting from foreign exchange
intervention.
When we analyze the episodes of reserve accumulation in the top 30th percentile in
reserve accumulation, we find that higher reserve accumulation and episodes of high reserve
accumulation are associated with a higher probability of occurrence of a surge in gross
capital inflows within one year and five years. However, a similar relationship is not observed
between foreign exchange reserve accumulation and net capital inflows. We also observe that
while higher reserve accumulation is associated with a lower probability of crisis within one
year, our results also show that higher reserve accumulation and episodes of high reserve
accumulation are also associated with a heightened probability of a currency crisis within
five years. On the other hand, higher foreign exchange reserve accumulation is associated
with a lower probability of the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis.
Therefore, this chapter finds some evidence of two opposing and contradictory impacts on
foreign exchange intervention on gross capital inflows, net capital inflows, and occurrence of
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currency crises. Further analysis is needed to identify the conditions under which the stabi-
lizing effect dominates the destabilizing effects of foreign exchange intervention. Specifically,
the role of mitigating factors and effectiveness of other policy factors like capital controls
would be of interest. This is not to suggest that the policy of accumulating foreign exchange
reserves is irrational, and that they should not conduct foreign exchange intervention to
accumulate foreign exchange reserves. In the context of an average lower level of capital
controls, it is perfectly rational for Central Bankers to continue to intervene in the foreign
exchange market and accumulate foreign exchange reserves. Reserves clearly play an impor-
tant role in fostering global financial stability in the absence of other more effective measures
of protecting against the destabilizing effects of volatile capital flows. However, this chapter
shows that they can also have a destabilizing effect, and their use and effectiveness need to
be evaluated taking this potential destabilizing effect into account.
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CHAPTER 3
EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE OR ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY?: ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
3.1 Introduction
The global financial safety net is especially crucial insofar as, like an international lender
of last resort, it can provide emergency liquidity to countries that require it. Scheubel and
Stracca (2016) characterize the global financial safety net as consisting of (i) own foreign
exchange reserves, (ii) the International Monetary Fund, (iii) Regional Financial Arrange-
ments, and (iv) central bank swap lines. Dutt (2018) and Chapter 1 argues that countries
that have access to central bank swap lines, and swap lines from the Federal Reserve in par-
ticular, rely less on other aspects of the global financial safety net. For instance, countries
that have had access to Federal Reserve Swap lines hold fewer foreign exchange reserves. The
differential use of the different parts of the global financial safety net is, in part, a reflection
of differential access, especially to swap lines and emergency loans.
Emergency liquidity support from the International Lender of Last Resort has been found
to be extremely effective in alleviating the pressure of or staving off an imminent crisis. It
has often been the case that simply an agreement with the ILLR institutions has made it
unprofitable for speculators to continue to speculate against a country or an economy and
has therefore stemmed the outflow of capital from an economy in distress. Munk (2010)
highlights how often ESF loans were used as “window dressing”1 until such a time that an
1This meant that the borrowing government were required to leave the funds in an account at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York until negotiation with the International Financial Institution concerned could be
completed.
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IMF agreement could be negotiated: therefore, they calmed financial markets even if the
funds made available through the ESF loans were never used for stabilization. Similarly,
the mere announcement of a swap line raised the potential cost for speculators to continue
betting against a deficit country’s currency (Bordo et al., 2014). Aizenman et al. (2010b)
argue that in 2009, the Bank of Korea spent $60 billion in defending the value of the won,
but was unable to reduce the pressure on the won. It was only when the Federal Reserve
established a swap agreement with the Bank of Korea of a maximum of $30 billion drawing
that some measure of stability was restored to the won markets. Further Aizenman and
Pasricha (2010) find that extension of swap lines had a large impact on the currencies of
emerging markets that had access to swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve relative
to those that did not, even though the impact on the credit default swap spreads was much
smaller. Bahaj and Reis (2019) additionally find that extension of swap agreements between
central banks allowed commercial banks in recipient country to access funding at lower costs
and in turn provide liquidity to firms, and reduce credit risk of the their respective banking
systems (Morelli et al., 2015; Allen and Moessner, 2010).
McDowell (2017) documents the extensive nature of the financial rescue operations of the
Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the US Treasury, and the impor-
tance role the United States economy has played in stabilizing the global financial system.
Drawing on McDowell (2017) and Sahasrabuddhe (2019), we show that very few countries
have historically had access to swap lines from the Federal Reserve or have received assis-
tance from the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Therefore, we pose the
question: what determines access to emergency financial assistance from the United States,
either in the form of a central bank swap line or emergency loan arrangement from the Ex-
change Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury? Do these institutions provide emergency
liquidity to the countries that have strong linkages with the U.S. economy, countries that
exhibit “good” policy behavior, countries that can help the U.S. further its foreign policy
objectives, or some combination thereof?
78
By examining FOMC meeting minutes between 1962 and 2020, this chapter documents
the number, size, and recipients of Reciprocal Currency Arrangements or swap lines from the
Federal Reserve, and the extension of short term loans from the Exchange Stabilization Fund
of the US Treasury. Thereafter, this chapter empirically examines the economic and political
factors that determine access to these institutions between 1982 ans 2018. We find that US
bank exposure to an economy and an economy’s share in US exports play an important role
in determining access to the Federal Reserve swap lines and short term loans from the US
Treasury. We also find that, significantly, political factors such as capital account openness,
trade agreements and defense cooperation agreements with the United States, unemployment
in the United States, and party composition of the United States government also play an
important role in determining access to these institutions.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the historical
context and background of the functions of an International Lender of Last Resort, and
the institutions that have the capacity to act as the International Lender of Last Resort,
namely the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury. Furthermore, this section also documents
the changing objectives of these institutions over time, the relationship between these two
institutions, and the limited literature that addresses the selective extension of ILLR support.
Section 3.3 describes the data used and the methodology followed in this chapter. Section 3.4
presents the descriptive statistics of our data. Section 3.5 presents the results of our empirical
model and Section 3.5.4 describe the robustness checks performed to ensure that the results
are robust to alternative specification. These results and robustness checks are conveniently
summarized in Section 3.5.5. Section 3.6 examines the cases of countries that received ILLR
support in some instances and not in others, and intertemporally compares the differences in
our explanatory variables. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. Thereafter, Appendix
C.1 lists all the loans provided by the Exchange Stabilization Fund and all swap agreements
of the Federal Reserve since 1962, and Appendix C.2 presents the robustness checks in full
detail.
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3.2 Historical Context and Background
In this section, I present the historical context and background of the extension of swap
agreements by the Federal Reserve and short-term loans from the Exchange Stabilization
Fund. This is based on our analysis of the minutes of the meetings of the Federal Open
Market Committee between 1962 and 2020, in addition to the existing related literature.
Specifically, we looked at the monthly meeting minutes, looking for discussion of establish-
ments of new swap agreements or renewal of existing swap agreements, and the reasons cited
by the committee members for establishing or renewing swap agreements.
3.2.1 The International Lender of Last Resort
A Lender of Last Resort has become an indispensable stabilizing features of modern
money, credit, and financial markets. National Central Banks are typically the lenders of
last resort in their respective national economies as, in the event of destabilizing influences
in national financial systems, they can and do lend freely, at a high rate of interest, based on
good collateral, especially when credit markets seize up and are unwilling to provide liquidity
to borrowers that need it (Bagehot, 1873). Central Banks are able to do so as, in the last re-
sort, they can create liquidity in the national currency in which there is a shortage of liquidity
in the national credit markets. Under normal circumstances, the availability of emergency
liquidity alleviates any credit shortage that is making financial market participants nervous.
However, if there is a shortage of liquidity in another currency in the national credit
markets that is threatening financial stability, the central bank’s ability to act as an effective
lender of last resort depends on its capacity to provide liquidity in the currency that is in
short supply in the national credit markets. The questions of capacity arise crucially because
a national central bank cannot necessarily create liquidity in the currency that it does not
issue. This constraint on Central Banks has become increasingly relevant because of financial
globalization which has resulted in increased borrowing and lending outside the borders of
the national currency. Specifically, globalization has meant that more and more economic
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activity is being conducted all over the world in a few key currencies. The US Dollar, in
particular, is the dominant anchor currency or the global reserve currency (Ilzetzki et al.,
2017). Therefore, US Dollar shortages have the potential to create pressures on the financial
system that individual central banks cannot alleviate, apart from the U.S. Federal Reserve
of course.
The Federal Reserve has paid attention to dollar shortages globally, since at least 1962,
when the Federal Reserve established Reciprocal Currency Arrangements or a network of
swap lines with 9 central banks in Austria, Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Bordo et al., 2014). The swap arrangements between
central banks typically take the following form: Central Bank A creates a deposit for Central
Bank B on its balance sheet of the currency it issues loan. Central Bank B does the same
for Central Bank A on its balance sheet. The size of the two deposits are determined by
the spot exchange rate between the two currencies. At an agreed upon future date, this
deposit is eliminated on the respective balance sheets. Effectively, one central bank loans
the currency it issues to another central bank and holds the currency of that central bank
as collateral (Bahaj and Reis, 2019; Allen and Moessner, 2010). The Central Bank that is
issuing the loan charges an interest rate that is agreed upon which is typically a spread on
the overnight swap interest rate between the two currencies, which is the USD overnight
index swap (OIS) rate (Bahaj and Reis, 2019). Since their inception, swap lines from the
Federal Reserve were not standing facilities and are typically instituted occasionally for a
fixed period of time and a limited amount of US Dollars. However, since 1994, the Federal
Reserve has standing swap facilities with the Banco de México and Bank of Canada, as a
part of the North American Framework Agreement, and with the Bank of Canada, the Bank
of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank
since 2013.
Apart from the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury has also made US dollar loans to
foreign governments that are “fundamentally solvent” (Henning, 1999, pp. 9) through its
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Exchange Stabilization Fund for “preventing excessive downward overshooting of their cur-
rencies, smoothing their balance of payments adjustment, and reducing output and employ-
ment losses” (Henning, 1999, pp. 9). The Exchange Stabilization Fund was created by the
Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt through the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, and
has made stabilization loans and foreign exchange interventions under the discretion of the
Secretary of the Treasury, subject only to the approval of the President. The stabilization
loans that the ESF provides are required to be short-term (less than 1 year), although the
ESF has provided medium-term loans in the past, at an interest rate that is higher than the
average interest rate on short-term government bills.
Therefore, a threat to financial stability in any financial system from a shortage of the
reserve currency can only be resolved through a USD loan, either from the Federal Reserve or
the US Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). Given that the a US Dollar shortage
is the only currency that can create widespread financial instability, the US Federal Reserve
and the US Treasury collectively are the International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR). To
some extent, US Dollar reserves held by national central banks stabilize the exchange rate
and the financial system to some extent, but this would be limited by the size of these
reserves accumulated during normal times.
It is important to note here that the IMF does not and cannot play the role of the
International Lender of Last Resort. The IMF does not have the necessary flexibility (as it
cannot create high powered money (Schwartz, 1998)) or agility to act in a rapid time-sensitive
manner without conditionalities in order to provide emergency liquidity to economies that
need it. This is despite the creation of two precautionary credit lines in the wake of the 2008
global financial crisis, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary and Liquidity Line
(PLL).2 Therefore, unlike the ESF and the Federal Reserve, the IMF cannot lend freely, at
2Introduced in 2009 and 2011, respectively, the FCL and PLL were instituted as precautionary facilities
through which funds could be disbursed rapidly to countries that were facing imminent balance of payments
crisis. These facilities were available to countries with a “track record of prudent economic and financial
management” (Birdsall et al., 2017, pp. 2). While FCL does not come with any conditionalities and the
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at a premium, and against good collateral (Bagehot’s rule) since most countries do not at
present qualify or want to qualify for the IMF emergency credit facilities.
3.2.2 Changing Objectives of the ILLR
Even though we have defined the Federal Reserve and the ESF as the International
Lender of Last Resort, the objectives of these institutions have evolved over time. Initially,
both these institutions were geared towards stabilizing the value of the dollar through foreign
exchange intervention at the time of the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods era, when
fixed exchange rates were the norm.
In fact, in the early years of the operation of the Federal Reserve’s Reciprocal Currency
Arrangements, the Federal Reserve used the swap lines with other several banks to borrow
key foreign currencies in order to maintain the gold value of dollar at $35 dollars an ounce
of gold. From the 1962 to the closing of the gold window in 1971, the Federal Reserve drew
on swap lines to borrow $11.5 billion to “provide cover to foreign central banks for unwanted
dollar exposures” (Bordo et al., 2014). This allowed the Federal Reserve to protect its gold
reserves, and therefore alleviate the pressure of the Triffin paradox3. Similarly, foreign central
PLL has minimal conditionalities attached with it, countries need to pre-qualify to be eligible to avail of
these facilities from the IMF. As of the time of writing, only Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico are eligible
to draw on the FCL and North Macedonia and Morocco are eligible to draw on the PLL. Poland also had a
FCL facility until 2017, although it was not drawn upon. The low uptake of this facility is likely to be due
to the stigma of approaching the IMF for assistance (Birdsall et al., 2017). In March and April 2020, the
IMF created new lending arrangements that do not come with conditionalities, that are the Rapid Financing
Instrument and the Rapid Credit Facility. However, they appear to come with policy “advice”, and it is too
soon to tell if these facilities can make the IMF a more effective ILLR.
3The Triffin paradox or dilemma refers to the basic conflict that arises for the economy of the country
the currency of which is the global reserve currency (Triffin, 1960). Essentially, in order to supply the global
economy with the US Dollar, the US economy needs to run trade deficits. However, the growing trade
deficit of the US in a fixed exchange rate system would create depreciation pressures on the US Dollar,
since the total claims on the gold reserves through the US dollar would exceed the total value of the Federal
Reserve’s gold reserves. In order to maintain its value, the Federal Reserve would have to sell gold, of which
it had a finite supply. However, the existence of the swap network meant that the Federal Reserve could
borrow Deutsche Mark or Swiss Francs and use them to defend the value of the US Dollar against these
currencies. Eichengreen (2013) also draws attention to the Triffin Dilemma when considering the importance
of international considerations in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, when they identify that it was in
the 1960s that US foreign monetary liabilities were going to be higher than the US gold reserves, which is
when the Federal Reserve first established Reciprocal Currency Arrangements.
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banks drawing on the swap lines to borrow US Dollars also facilitated the defense of the gold
value of the dollar, as foreign central banks could supplement their dollar reserves without
adding to the U.S. current account deficit. However, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, the use of the swap lines to support the value of the dollar declined, and the Federal
Reserve stopped drawing on swap lines for its foreign exchange interventions by 1980 (Bordo
et al., 2014).
Similarly, the ESF was also initially geared towards defending the value of the US Dollar.
In fact, it was created as a counterpart to the UK government’s Exchange Equalisation
Account, which was set up to manage the value of the pound sterling in global markets.
The ESF served as the US Treasury’s main instrument in the Tripartite Monetary Accord of
1936 with Britain and France. However, between the establishment of the ESF in 1934 and
1962, there was little need for intervention, and thereafter, ESF conducted foreign exchange
intervention along with the Federal Reserve (Schwartz, 1997). A large number of loans that
were extended from the ESF to foreign governments were also ultimately meant to support
the value of the dollar and/or the fixed exchange rate system; for instance, dollar loans were
made to the United Kingdom to facilitate a support of the value of the pound sterling in 1967
and 1968 (Henning, 1999). After the suspension of the fixed exchange rate system in 1973,
the ESF and the Federal Reserve were not obligated to maintain the dollar at a fixed value
relative to other currencies or gold. However, until the Reagan Administration, both the ESF
and Federal Reserve intervened to support the value of the dollar on several instances. For
example, in 1979 and 1980, the ESF intervened frequently to purchase foreign exchange, as
the objective of the Carter administration was to eliminate dependence on foreign monetary
authorities for maintaining the value of the dollar.
That being said, the objectives of the use of ILLR seem to be more ambiguous after
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, since one of the stated objectives of both the
ESF and Reciprocal Currency Arrangements was the defense of the value of the US Dollar.
Arguably, these institutions are still intervening to defend the value of the dollar as the global
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reserve currency, by alleviating dollar shortages outside the national borders of the United
States. However, it is clear that neither the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury conducts
operations with the explicit objective of acting as the International Lender of Last Resort,
even though on many occasions outlined in this chapter, the impact of their international
activities has been one of providing stability to the global financial system. Specifically, it is
not that these institutions want to act as the Lender of Last Resort for the global economy
with a view to foster global financial stability, at least not explicitly and consistently in the
post-War era. Insofar as the confidence in the US Dollar is related to the stability of the
global financial system, these institutions do act as the ILLR, but only incidentally.
This has been a consistent contradiction of the global monetary system for many decades
that the issuer of the key global currencies are either unwilling or unable to stabilize the global
monetary system. This could either be due to domestic political and economic concerns or
due to strategies of foreign policy or simply because stabilizing the global financial system is
not part of its mandate. And this situation is not without historical parallels; for instance,
Kindleberger (1973) argues that duration and the devastation of the Great Depression was
a result of the instability in the global economy. This is turn was a result of “British
inability and the United States unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing” the
global economy (Kindleberger, 1973, pp. 292). The British inability is relevant in that at this
time the pound sterling can be thought of as the key currency, albeit a waning one. However,
what is more relevant is the “United States unwillingness” as this was also the period that
was characterized by the “changing center of gravity of the international system,” with its
weight shifting away from the United Kingdom to the United States (Eichengreen, 2008, pp.
89), and the US Dollar becoming the key currency in the global monetary system.
Therefore, in general, the institutions that have the ability to act as the International
Lender of Last Resort, namely, the Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury, are
not willing to act as the International Lender of Last Resort. However, on several occasions,
these institutions have fulfilled the role of the ILLR, only to certain countries. This chapter
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explores what are the factors that determine which countries the ILLR institutions are willing
to lend to during the instances in which they do so.
3.2.3 Relationship between the Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Federal
Reserve
While the US Treasury’s ESF and the Federal Reserve System’s Reciprocal Currency
Arrangements are institutionally distinct facilities, this section discusses how they compare
as regards the size of the loans available from each facility, the recipients of these loans,
the institutions involved in the loans, and the duration and frequency of the loans that are
typically extended.
Size: The Federal Reserve, like most modern central banks, is considered to be indepen-
dent of the government of the United States. However, as regards the defense of the value
and strength of the dollar, both the ESF and the Federal Reserve have played a key and
inter-related role, often in coordination with the other institution. For instance, the foreign
currency being held in the ESF could be temporarily converted into US dollars in order to
conduct its operations and supplement the size of funds at its disposal.4 In general, the role
of managing the dollar is explicitly under the responsibility of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve, in principle, is just the agent for the Treasury. However, as far as the ESF is con-
cerned, its size was much smaller than the size of the funds at the disposal of the Federal
Reserve, especially given that the Federal Reserve can create liquidity, while the ESF could
only use the funds on its balance sheet. Therefore, the loans or bilateral swap arrangements
were of a much larger magnitude than the outstanding loans that the ESF could provide.
Nonetheless, the ESF had a much clearer mandate of conducting foreign exchange interven-
tion to maintain the value of the dollar against gold and against other key currencies, as
4This is called the practice of warehousing It involves the spot sale of foreign currency to the Fed for
dollars along with a parallel repurchase at some specified date in the future. The size of the warehousing
facility has varied over time, being raised from $1.5 billion in January 1977 to $15 billion in March 1990.
The limit was then eventually reduced to $5 billion in 1992, only to be increased again to $20 billion in 1995
during the Mexican peso crisis.
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opposed to that of the Federal Reserve System. As a result, the Federal Reserve System
carried the burden of stabilizing the global dollar system to a much larger extent than the
ESF, especially during the gold exchange standard (Henning, 1999).
Recipients: Nonetheless, the ESF provided several stabilization loans to foreign govern-
ments throughout its existence. The list of recipients of loans from the ESF are much wider
than the recipients of swap lines from the Federal Reserve. Specifically, the ESF extended
stabilization loans to several governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe and on
multiple occasions. By contrast, during the early years of operation of the Federal Reserve
Reciprocal Currency Arrangements, most of the recipients were in Western Europe. Sub-
sequently, swap lines were also extended to Japan and Mexico. It is not until the financial
crisis in 2007 that the Federal Reserve entered into swap arrangements with a wider set of
countries.
Institutions involved: Credits from the ESF and credits in the form of Reciprocal Cur-
rency Arrangements with the Federal Reserve are also distinct in that a ESF credit is a loan
from the Federal Government of the United States to other governments, while swap lines
are the provision of short term loans between central banks. However, both types of facilities
can provide the emergency US dollar liquidity to an economy that needed it, albeit through
different institutions and instruments.
Duration and Frequency: The ESF has been in operation for longer than the Federal
Reserve’s Reciprocal Currency Arrangements, as the ESF was established with the Gold
Reserve Act of 1934, but the Reciprocal Currency Arrangements were first established in
1962. The ESF has been used consistently to make loans to foreign governments since its
existence, though no loans have been made from the ESF since August 2002 (Table C.1).
Since, the loans from the ESF were for the purposes of stabilization and averting imminent
balance of payment crises, all loans from the ESF were typically for 6 months, but could be
for up to 12 months, but it needed to be accompanied by a justification by the President
to Congress about the “emergency and unique circumstances” that required the term of the
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loans (Henning, 1999, pp. 54).5 In contrast, the Reciprocal Currency Arrangements have
been in place consistently between 1962 and 1998, even though they had fallen into relative
disuse since 1981 (Bordo et al., 2014). Thereafter, the Federal Reserve swap lines were
reinstituted with some central banks in 2007 during the global financial crisis.6 The swap
arrangement that have been established are bilateral in that they are agreements between
two central banks, however, they are not reciprocal in nature in that the Federal Reserve
cannot draw on them.78 While the duration of the drawings on the swap lines were for
3 months, the arrangements could be for a duration of 12 months, and thereafter require
renewal by the Federal Open Market Committee.
Relationship with the IMF : After the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in December 1945, US government officials envisaged the primary role of stabilization of the
monetary system to be taken up my the IMF. In fact, the large majority of the US quota
payment to the IMF ($1.8 billion of $2.75 billion) were made from the ESF. Furthermore,
in 1976, the Gold Reserve Act was amended that required the Secretary of the Treasury to
use the ESF in a manner that is “consistent with the obligations of the Government in the
IMF”(Henning, 1999, pp. 23). It was during this time that the US Congress also limited
the term of the ESF loans to 6 months or less unless so as to prevent conflict with the
functioning and objectives of the IMF. The ESF has often be used to make bridge loans to
5The duration and size of the loans that could be made from the ESF became a significant political
controversy in 1995, when the Clinton administration extended a $20 billion loan to Mexico for a period of
5 years. As a result, as per the D’Amato amendment to an “unrelated recession bill” (Henning, 1999, pp.
67), any ESF loans that were greater than “$1 billion and 6 months’ duration would require the approval of
Congress unless the President certified in writing that a foreign financial crisis threatened ‘vital US economic
interests’ ” (Henning, 1999, pp. 69)
6This is consistent with the hypothesis in (Eichengreen, 2013) that the Federal Reserve paid greater
attention to international aspects of its monetary policy in the 1960s, but this was followed by a period of
“benign neglect of the international dimension” (pp. 87).
7This is with the exception of the swap arrangements with the Banco de México that have been in place
since 1994 and are bilateral in that the Federal Reserve can also draw on them.
8In parallel with these swap arrangements, the Federal Reserve also entered into swap agreements that
would allow it to borrow foreign currency from these central banks. However, these foreign currency swap
agreements were never used (Bordo et al., 2014).
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governments that had approached the IMF for emergency financing, but negotiations were
still underway of the terms of the IMF loan (McDowell, 2017; Henning, 1999). However, it
does not appear that the ESF loans were accompanied by conditionalities, such as the ones
that typically accompany loans from the IMF, unless of course they were part of a larger
package of assistance along with the IMF.
The Federal Reserve’s swap arrangements on the other hand do not appear to have a
clear link to the IMF. However, IMF membership and being compliant with the Articles
of Agreement has been used in deliberations of whether a swap arrangement should be
extended to certain Central Banks. For example, the establishment of a swap arrangement
with Japan was slowed down due to the Japanese economy not being compliant with Article
VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which requires full currency convertibility.
However, subsequently, the Federal Reserve System extended a swap arrangement to the
Bank of Japan in anticipation of Japan achieving compliance with the IMF Article VIII by
the following year (FOMC, 1963). Similarly, one of the reasons cited for not extending a
swap line to the Central Bank of Venezuela was that it was not compliant with IMF Article
VIII, among others (FOMC, 1965). On the other hand, the Swiss National Bank has had
several swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve, the first one effective July 7, 1962,
even though Switzerland did not accept Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF
until 1992, about 30 years later. Therefore, Article VIII does seems not appear to be a strict
condition that the FOMC used when deciding which central banks should be included in its
swap network.
3.2.4 Determinants of Recipients of Assistance from the ILLR in the Literature
Neither the US Treasury, nor the Federal Open Market Committee clearly outline which
governments or central banks are eligible to receive assistance form the ILLR institutions.
From a legal standpoint, any ESF loan should meet the following requirements (Munk, 2010):
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i. Lending from the ESF should be in keeping with US obligations to the IMF on orderly
exchange rate arrangements.
ii. Lending from the ESF should have the requisite Presidential approval.
iii. The term of the loan should be less than 6 months, or would require the President to
justify the terms of the loan to Congress.
iv. The ESF loans should have an assured source of repayment.
On the other hand, the report of the Government Accountability Office to the US
Congress on the policies put in place during the 2007–2010 global financial crisis outlines
that approval of requests for swap agreements with the Federal Reserve were approved based
on the “economic and financial mass of the country’s economy, a record of sound economic
management, and the probability that the swap line would make an economic difference.” As
a result swap arrangements were put in place with foreign central banks of “important US
trading partners or global financial centers” (GAO, 2011, pp. 118). In addition, as per early
discussions regarding the countries that should be part of the swap network, being compliant
with the Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement appears to have been an important
consideration (for example, FOMC (1963) and FOMC (1965)), as mentioned previously.
In both cases, the existing documentation leaves a large degree of ambiguity as to whether
there are strict pre-defined criteria regarding which countries can receive emergency liquidity
assistance. As a result, the US treasury and the Federal Open Market Committee have
substantial discretion in their decision about the recipients of stabilization loans and swap
arrangements. There have been some examinations of the selective nature of emergency
liquidity assistance provided by the United States in the post-War era. Munk (2010) analyzes
the role of the U.S. Treasury Department financing provided to sovereign countries from 1982
to 2010, with great success9. Typically, an ESF loan to a sovereign served as a bridge loan
9The ESF made a profit, all accrued interest paid, and principal amount repaid (Munk, 2010).
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till financing from some other International Financial Institutions like the IMF or World
Bank was finalized, or it was part of broader package of financing to the sovereign provided
by multiple stakeholders. Loans from the ESF were typically structured as swap agreements,
and were predominantly extended to Latin American countries, with some notable exceptions
like Philippines (1984), Nigeria (1986), Hungary (1990), Romania (1991), and Liberia (2008),
among others. Notably, no loans were extended to any Asian countries during the Asian
Financial Crisis, despite extended negotiations between the U.S. Treasury and the Korean
Finance Ministry (Munk, 2010).
Schwartz (1997) argues that the use of the ESF to provide dollar loans to other countries
to stabilize their currencies comes from trying to ensure their return to the gold standard
between 1924 and 1931. However, both Schwartz (1997) and Munk (2010) acknowledge
the political nature of the decision that determines whether emergency liquidity assistance is
extended to a sovereign borrower. Humpage (2008) also argues that loans from the ESF have
a “distinct foreign aid and foreign policy flavor” (pp. 2), giving the example of ESF loans
extended to Yugoslavia (1988) and Poland (1990) despite the currencies of these countries
being relatively unimportant to the United States. In fact, the US Congress wanted the
Secretary of Treasury to extend a longer-term loan to Poland, which was resisted given that
they were uncertain about how the government of Poland would repay the loan. However,
the Treasury Secretary relented and extended a loan to Poland as a short-term bridge loan
once progress had been made on an IMF program (Henning, 1999).
On the other hand, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) discuss the selective extension of
swap lines by the Federal Reserve to other Central Banks during the 2007–2009 financial
crisis. The Federal Reserve extended dollar swaps arrangements to the Central Banks of
only four emerging markets economies (Banco Central de Brasil, Banco de México, Bank of
Korea, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore) and several OECD economies (Reserve
Bank of Australia, Bank of Canada, Danmarks National Bank, Bank of England, European
Central Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss
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National Bank). Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) explores the reasons for this differential
access by examining the relative importance of the following factors: US bank exposure to
these markets, share of the country in total US trade in 2007, capital account openness, and
year since independence or 1800 that the country spent in default or restructuring. They find
that exposure of US banks to emerging markets was the most important selection criterion,
consistent with the results of McDowell (2017). Specifically, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010)
find that all countries that received swap lines from the Federal Reserve had higher shares
of US bank exposures as compared to countries that did not received swap lines, with the
notable exception of India. Broz (2015) also studies the selection of central banks by the
Federal Reserve between 2007 and 2010 and finds that exposure of U.S. banks is the strongest
correlate of a central bank receiving a swap line from the Federal Reserve, accounting for 59
percent of the variation. Similarly, Bordo et al. (2014) argue that the the Banco de México
was the only developing country central bank among the central banks that had reciprocal
currency arrangements with the Federal Reserve in the 1960s and 1970s due to Mexico’s
“close economic and financial ties with the United States” (pp. 15). Seghezza (2018) also
argues that the central banks in countries with the closest link to the US banking system,
with massive currency mismatches but low levels of official reserves relative to the currency
mismatches received assistance from the Federal Reserve. As far as extension of swap lines
to emerging market economies are concerned, (Aizenman et al., 2010b) also highlight the
importance of trade links in determining the recipients of swap arrangements, but also of
being “fundamentally sound and well-managed emerging market economies” (pp. 17), where
sound management included holding a significant pool of foreign exchange reserves.
Given that most Central Banks, including the Federal Reserve, are typically quasi-
government institutions that are independent from the executive branch of the government,
political motives behind policy actions are typically not attributed to central banks. How-
ever, there is a large and rich literature that argues that central banks are not fully tech-
nocratic institutions and often have policies that are politically and strategically motivated
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(for example, Epstein (2019), Van Der Pijl and Yurchenko (2015), and Tsingou (2014)).
The selective extension of swap lines can be seen as another instance of that. Furthermore,
time and time again, the global stabilization role played by the Federal Reserve has created
domestic political controversy in the United States. For instance, the extension of swap
agreements by the Federal Reserve during the global financial crisis created a backlash in
the legislature of the United States (Broz, 2015). It prompted Representative Ron Paul
of Texas to introduce the “Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012”, which passed the
House of Representatives but not the Senate10. Therefore, it is not unfeasible that potential
political controversy in the Congress may weigh on the Federal Open Market Committee as
they make decisions about whether to have swap agreements with foreign central banks.
There are some recent studies that highlight the politically strategic nature of the Federal
Reserve swap lines. Sahasrabuddhe (2019) argues that extension of swap lines to developing
economies was “a more selective process” (pp. 462), and on the margin the decision to extend
swap lines to some developing economies and not others was a political one. They show that
the US banking system had higher exposure to certain economies which did not receive swap
lines, notably India, as compared to others that received swap lines during the 2007-2010
Global financial crisis, like Brazil, Singapore, New Zealand, and Switzerland. Similarly,
Chey (2013) argues that the extensions of swap lines to emerging market economies during
the previous financial crisis was motivated, at least in part, by the need to strengthen the
relationship of the United States with key emerging market in order to maintain its influence
in global economic governance. Marple (2020) adds to this discussion by arguing that social
similarity in terms of similarities in professional backgrounds, similarity in central bankers’
speeches, and institutional similarity between central banks contributed to the decision to
extend swap agreements, especially in a context of a high degree of uncertainty. Marple
(2020) finds that higher the degree of social similarity a central bank has with the Federal
10Interestingly, Broz (2015) shows that the Representatives and Senators that voted against this bill were
those that received the largest campaign contributions from large U.S. commercial banks.
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Reserve, higher is the likelihood that a central bank received a swap line from the Federal
Reserve during during the global financial crisis. In this chapter, we also challenge the now
conventional wisdom that the identifying of feature of countries that received swap lines
from the Federal Reserve are those that had significant US bank exposure. Specifically, it
provides the example of Brazil, when it required emergency liquidity in 2001, and had US
bank exposure similar to that of South Korea in 2008. However, the Banco Central do Brasil
did not receive a swap lines from the Federal Reserve in 2001. Therefore, US bank exposure
does not fully explain the recipients of swap lines from the Federal Reserve. What then,
according to these studies, explains access to the ILLR for emerging market economies?
Chey (2013) emphasizes the importance of the emerging market economies that received
swap lines in the G-20 leadership. Brazil was in the annual rotating position of G20 chair in
2008, while this position was occupied by South Korea in 2010. In fact, this paper cites the
comments of the US Treasury Secretary in 2008, made on the eve of the first G20 summit,
that the Federal Reserve swap lines with 4 emerging market economies was an indicator of
strong international cooperation. Singapore, on the other hand, is a member of the exclusive
Financial Stability Forum. Similarly, Sahasrabuddhe (2019) shows that the Federal Reserve
was more likely to extend a swap arrangement to emerging market economies that shared
its policy preference for greater financial openness, had a greater and growing role in forums
of global economic governance such as the G-20, and did not raise objections against a
US-centric global governance system.
Despite being an institution that is independent from the government, political consider-
ations are known to have affected Federal Reserve policy. For example, political controversy
around an ESF loan in 1995 prompted the FOMC to re-evaluate the utility of existing swap
arrangements. The decision of the Clinton Administration to use the ESF to extend a $20
billion stabilization loan to the Government of Mexico in 1995 created a significant political
controversy. This was because it followed Congress not approving a $40 billion package of
economic assistance, as the use of the ESF was at the discretion of the Secretary of the
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Treasury (Henning, 1999). Therefore, the extension of the stabilization loan to the govern-
ment of Mexico was seen in some quarters as the President and the Secretary of Treasury
of the United States side-stepping the democratic accountability of the elected representa-
tives of the Congress. The Federal Reserve supplemented the ESF loan by establishing a
swap agreement with the Banco de México (Conti-Brown and Zaring, 2019). However, the
political controversy surrounding the economic rescue provided to the Mexican economy al-
lowed the FOMC participants that saw Federal Reserve swap lines as anachronistic and as
a threat to its independence from the government to recommend the termination of existing
swap arrangements. As a result, in 1998, after several years of disuse, all standing swap
agreements were allowed to expire, with the exception of the swap agreements with Mexico
and Canada under the North American Framework Agreement (Bordo et al., 2014). In the
context of foreign exchange intervention being conducted, Humpage (2008) acknowledges
that while the US Treasury (which has a distinct legal mandate to intervene in the foreign
exchange market) cannot compel the Federal Reserve to intervene in the foreign exchange
market when it determines it should, but the Federal Reserve is unlikely to refuse as it has
only rarely done so.
Another interesting case study is the absence of ILLR assistance for countries that were
worst affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998, especially South Korea that did
receive a swap line from the Federal Reserve in 2008. Henning (1999) argues the Clinton
administration did not use the ESF to make stabilization loans to Thailand, South Korea, or
Indonesia as it was politically difficult to do so after the recent controversy over similar loans
made to Mexico in 1995. This was especially the case since as per the D’Amato amendment
(that was later allowed to lapse), any loans that were larger than $1 billion for a period longer
than 6 months would require Congressional approval. However, Congressional disapproval
was something that the Clinton administration did not want to risk (Henning, 1999). Once
the D’Amato amendment was not renewed, the US Treasury was prepared to contribute $3
billion of contingent financing as part of the “second line of defense” for the IMF program
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in Indonesia. However, this could also be in response to the growing talks and negotiations
about creating an Asian Monetary Fund, which US authorities feared would undermine the
IMF.
In contrast, the Asian financial crisis does not appear in FOMC meeting minutes in 1997,
until December, by when Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea were already in IMF pro-
grams. William McDonough, who at the time was the President of the New York Fed, argued
that the economies of East Asia that were in financial trouble had “command economies
in which resources are allocated by politicians and bureaucrats and not by the market-
place”(FOMC, 1997, pp. 19-20). According to McDonough, even though the politicians and
bureaucrats had successfully managed these economies for a long time, they were unable to
respond to changes in the global economy, which had resulted in this crisis. Here he draws
a distinction with the Mexican peso crisis, as the political leadership of the Mexico under-
stood “how a market economy behaves” (pp. 20), which he identified as the cause of the
recovery from the crisis. He believed that the Asian economies are unlikely to have success
that Mexico achieved with assistance from the Federal Reserve. Therefore, even though the
possibility of swap arrangements with Thailand, South Korea, or Indonesia were not explic-
itly discussed in the FOMC in 1997, their unfavorable political orientation in the eyes of the
FOMC members meant that they would be disinclined to consider swap arrangements with
the central banks of these countries as they believed they would not be successful programs.
This is arguably consistent with the hypothesis in Sahasrabuddhe (2019) that the FOMC
favored swap agreements with countries that shared its policy preference for financial open-
ness. Alternatively, it is also consistent with the informal criterion that determine which
countries received swap arrangements from the Federal Reserve System as per the GAO
(GAO, 2011) according to which a swap arrangement should make an economic difference,
which perhaps it was already too late to do in December of 1997. It is unsurprising then,
in this context, that the countries affected by the Asian Financial Crisis did not receive
swap agreements from the Federal Reserve. Therefore, it does appear that several political
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economy factors play a role in determining which countries have access to support from the
ILLR institutions.
This chapter parses out which factors are most important in this regard in the extension
of support from the ILLR between 1980-2018. Based on the literature, we identify the most
relevant economic and political factors and examine the role they play in determining which
countries received assistance from the Federal Reserve system and from the US Treasury.
This builds on the work of Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), McDowell (2017), and Sahasrabud-
dhe (2019), that analyze the extension of swap agreements by the Federal Reserve during
the previous financial crisis, by extending the period under analysis, and focusing greater
attention on the international political economy factors. In particular, McDowell (2017) is
the only other study to examine which countries received assistance from the US Treasury.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically examine the selective
extension of ILLR assistance from both the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury taking into
account both economic and political factors over a long time period.
3.3 Quantitative Data and Econometric Methodology
This section lays out the data and methodology used to answer the question: what deter-
mines access to emergency financial assistance from the United States, either in the form of a
central bank swap line or emergency loan arrangement from the Exchange Stabilization Fund
of the U.S. Treasury? Do these institutions provide emergency liquidity to the countries that
have strong linkages with the U.S. economy, countries that exhibit “good” policy behavior,
countries that can help the U.S. further its foreign policy objectives, or some combination
thereof?
The data used in this chapter are collected from a variety of sources. The variables
included in this study are listed here, and a detailed list of the sources are listed in the
Appendix.
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Details of the loans extended by the US Treasury through the ESF to foreign governments
were obtained from the website of the Treasury Department of the US government. This
is presented in Table C.1, which, for the purposes of the econometric analysis is coded as
a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a country received a loan in a given quarter, for
the duration of the loan, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, details of the swap agreements between
the Federal Reserve and the central banks of other countries are listed in Table C.2. For the
purposes of the econometric analysis, the countries that received swap lines from the Federal
Reserve in a given quarter, for the duration of the loan, and 0 otherwise. These are our key
independent variables. Data for both these variables are available from 1962Q1 to present,
however, the availability of data of key independent variables are only available for a shorter
period of time.
In order to identify the characteristics that made the difference between receiving and
not receiving support from the ILLR institutions, we implement a random effects11 panel
logistic model. This takes the following form:




1 + exp(µi + x′itβ)
(3.1)
where y is the binary variable that indicates whether a country i has access to a swap
line from the Federal Reserve or whether a country i has a short-term loan from the US
Treasury through the ESF in a given quarter t, xit is the vector of our explanatory variables
and β is the vector of coefficients of our explanatory variables. The country specific effects,
µi, are assumed to be normally distributed, that is µi ∼ N (0, σ2µ). All continuous variables
are in natural logarithmic form.12
11We do not use a fixed effects model since a fixed effects model would eliminate between country differences
and estimate only the within country effects over time, and we are interested in the differential access of
countries to the ILLR institutions.
12Since some continuous variables in our dataset have negative values, we create a linear positive trans-
formation of those variables of the form x+ c, where c = |min(x)|+ ε and ε is a small positive value, before
taking the natural logarithm.
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In addition to this, we also need to examine how the ILLR institutions respond to contem-
porary crises. Even though some instances of ILLR assistance, especially from the Federal
Reserve have been in place regardless of an imminent crisis, it is likely that most extensions
of ILLR assistance is in response to an imminent crisis, that is when emergency liquidity
is needed. Therefore, we examine the behavior of the ILLR institutions when a sovereign
default, or a currency crisis, or a banking crisis is imminent. We do this by interacting our
dependent variables with a crisis variable that takes the value 1 if there is a systemic bank-
ing crisis, or currency crisis, or sovereign debt crisis in the previous quarter, and estimating
our logit model using these interactions. The data on crises is obtained from Laeven and
Valencia (2018).13 Examining the extension of emergency liquidity in response to a crisis
and in normal times is done since, in some cases, we have seen that the Federal Reserve and
U.S. Treasury instituted the mechanisms to extend ILLR assistance without any imminent
crisis in a precautionary manner, while in others ILLR assistance was only extended in the
event of a crisis.
3.3.1 Explanatory Variables
3.3.1.1 Economic Variables
The vector of explanatory variables considered are a series of economic and political
variables. As is mentioned in the Section 3.2, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) and McDowell
(2017) discuss the importance of US bank exposure and share of a country’s trade in US
trade in determining the recipients of the assistance from the Federal Reserve and the ESF.
Data of US bank exposure to the each economy as a share of total international exposure of
US banks is obtained from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. This data is available
quarterly from 1983Q4 to 2019Q4. Similarly, data for the share of a country’s exports in
13In this dataset, the duration of systemic banking crisis are identified. Therefore our crisis variable takes
the value of 1 for the duration of the banking crisis. It does not identify the duration of sovereign debt crisis,
but does identify the date of a sovereign debt restructuring. Therefore, we code crisis as 1 for the duration
between the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis or currency crisis and sovereign debt restructuring.
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US total exports and the share of a country’s imports in US total imports are obtained on
a quarterly basis from the website of the US Census Bureau. Data is available from 1987Q1
to 2019Q4. Furthermore, we have also included data on countries that have Free Trade
Agreements (FTA) with the United States. The United States has FTAs with 20 countries,
which are coded as a binary variable that takes the value 1 from the date of signing, and 0
otherwise.
Based on the analysis in Aizenman et al. (2010b), data on foreign exchange reserves as a
share of GDP and as a share of external debt are also included. These are only available on
an annual basis14, and are taken from the Global Financial Safety Net database (Scheubel
and Stracca, 2016). We also extract data on whether a country is a member of a Regional
Financial Arrangement(RFA). Membership in an RFA may be relevant since the formation
of some RFAs have been seen as an unwelcome development by some, since it is seen as
undermining the position of the IMF. For example, the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund
was scuppered in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98 (Park and Wyplosz,
2008). Data on capital account openness, the share of the country’s GDP in world GDP and
data on whether a country has a swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China are also
obtained from this database. Similarly, we also have quarterly inflation data from the IMF
International Financial Statistics in order to account for sound economic policies, as high
and persistent inflation would indicate poor fiscal and monetary policies in an economy.
3.3.1.2 Political Variables
In order to ascertain the importance of political factors and alliances in the determination
of ILLR assistance, we also include data on the voting records of countries in the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In the political science literature, the voting record in
the UNGA are used as one of the standards to measure foreign policy preference of countries.
14Given that Aizenman et al. (2010b) argue that the size of foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP
and External Debt reflect sound economic management of the external account, which is unlikely to change
rapidly, the use of annual data is acceptable.
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Bailey et al. (2015) create a measure of “ideal points” that reflect a country’s foreign policy
preference according to its voting record, while accounting for changes in the UN agenda.
These ideal points, estimated using a Item Response Theory statistical model, are able to
“consistently capture the position of states vis-à-vis a US-led liberal order” (Bailey et al.,
2015, pp. 431), such as the Cold War and the shift in the foreign policy stance of the United
States governments towards several Latin American countries after the election of Left-wing
governments. Therefore, we include data on the difference between the calculated ideal point
of a given country and that of the United States, which is used as our measure of foreign
policy alliance with the United States. Similarly, we also include the ideal point difference
between a country and that of China. We do so because of the typically differing foreign
and economic policy objectives between the governments of the United States and China.
The United States also has several strategic military alliances with other countries and
can provide insights into the strategic importance of certain nations to the Military-Industrial
complex in the United States. Therefore, we include data on bilateral defense cooperation
agreements from the Defense Cooperation Agreement Database, created by Kinne (2019).
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements create the legal apparatus that facilitates the signa-
tories’ join engagement in joint defense exercises, formulation of coordinated defense policies,
and joint production of weapons and technology (Kinne, 2019). While the Defense Coopera-
tion Agreement Database contains data on various types of defense cooperation agreements
(DCA), we create a binary variable that codes the existence of any DCA with the United
States as a 1, and zero otherwise.
The domestic political and economic conditions in the United States may also play a
role in determining whether countries will receive assistance from the ILLR. This is because
the key function of the US Treasury is to implement policies to serve the interests of US
citizens, and the primary policy objectives of the Federal Reserve is the maximization of US
employment subject to maintaining price stability. Therefore, it may be politically difficult
for the Treasury Secretary and the FOMC to justify assistance to foreign governments and
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Central Banks if the United States economy is facing a downturn. Therefore, we include
quarterly data on unemployment that is obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Similarly, party alliances
of the US President and the Senate and House of Representatives may also play a role in
determining which countries, if any, receive assistance from the ILLR. Therefore, we create
three binary variables that take the value 1 if the President in office is from the Republican
Party, if the Senate is in Republican control, and if the House of Representatives is in
Republican control, and zero otherwise.
In our econometric model, we consider the impacts of economic variables and political
variables on access to the Federal Reserve and access to the US Treasury in turn, and then
consider both sets of variables in determining access to the ILLR institutions. As explained
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Since 1962, the we find several instances of countries receiving assistance from ILLR
institutions. Between 1962 and 2002, 27 countries received 93 mostly short-term loans from
the ESF in 346 country-quarters, while between 1962 and 2020, 32 countries15 received
assistance from the Federal Reserve through 674 swap agreements with their respective
central banks16. Figures 3.1 and 3.3 shows the number of countries that have received
15This count includes individual Euro Zone countries when the Federal Reserve has a swap agreement with
the European Central Bank
16Details are presented in Table C.2, each renewal and change in size of line are counted as a new swap
agreement.
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assistance from the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve since 1962, respectively and Figures
3.2 and 3.4 shows the total volume of loans outstanding from the US Treasury.
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We present the descriptive statistics of our key variables based on whether a country
received assistance from the Federal Reserve in Table 3.1 and based on whether a country
received assistance from the ESF in Table 3.2. The last column shows results of a t-test to
check whether the means are significantly different at the 5 percent level between the two
groups, accounting for unequal variances.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Recipients of swap lines from the Federal Reserve





Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Bank Exposure 3.20 4.79 1275 0.58 2.02 12839 Yes
Import Share 3.42 5.36 1987 0.39 1.64 18647 Yes
Export Share 3.71 5.86 1987 0.36 1.31 18647 Yes
Reserves/GDP 6.79 11.98 2190 15.60 18.21 20138 Yes
GDP share 2.43 3.22 2209 0.30 1.24 22569 Yes
Inflation 4.19 10.75 2437 35.85 660.82 19641 Yes
Political Variables
Ideal point 1.64 0.59 1814 3.03 0.77 20866 Yes
difference w/
U.S.
Chinn-Ito 0.86 0.22 1981 0.43 0.35 20855 Yes
Index
U.S. Trade 0.10 0.29 2445 0.04 0.20 25493 Yes
Agreements
D.C.A. 0.42 0.49 2418 0.11 0.31 23946 Yes
U.S. 6.37 1.81 2346 6.16 1.67 25082 Yes
unemployment
Republican 0.53 0.50 2445 0.59 0.49 25493 Yes
President
Republican 0.47 0.50 2445 0.49 0.50 25493 Yes
Senate
Republican 0.43 0.50 2445 0.50 0.50 25493 Yes
House
3.5 Results
Based on the literature, we would expect the signs on our variables across our independent
variables shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics by Recipients of loans from the US Treasury





Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Bank Exposure 5.84 4.18 49 0.84 2.68 14111 Yes
Import Share 4.15 0.43 99 0.69 2.52 20569 Yes
Export Share 5.15 4.66 99 0.70 2.45 20569 Yes
Reserves/GDP 4.61 2.54 172 14.73 17.91 22296 Yes
GDP share 1.18 0.65 172 0.71 2.88 24830 Yes
Inflation 44.83 103.87 150 32.05 623.10 22093 No
Political Variables
Ideal point 2.68 0.89 180 2.90 0.87 22644 No
difference w/
U.S.
Chinn-Ito 0.52 0.39 174 0.47 0.37 22810 Yes
Index
U.S. Trade 0.18 0.38 180 0.05 0.21 28008 Yes
Agreements
D.C.A. 0.06 0.24 180 0.12 0.32 19508 Yes
U.S. 6.50 1.63 180 6.18 1.69 27498 Yes
unemployment
Republican 0.76 0.43 180 0.58 0.49 28008 Yes
President
Republican 0.48 0.50 180 0.49 0.50 28008 No
Senate
Republican 0.21 0.41 180 0.49 0.50 28008 Yes
House
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Table 3.3: Expected Signs of Coefficients
Economic Variables Political Variables
Variable Expected Variable Expected
Sign Sign
Bank Exposure (+) Ideal point (-)
difference w/
the U.S.
Import Share (+) Chinn-Ito (+)
Index
Export Share (+) U.S. Trade (+)
Agreements
Reserves/GDP (+/-) D.C.A (+)
GDP share (+/-) U.S. (-)
unemployment






We would expect bank exposure, trade share, and import share to affect the likelihood
of having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve positively as these indicators would be
higher for countries that are of greater importance to the U.S. banking system (Aizenman
and Pasricha, 2010; Broz, 2015; McDowell, 2017) and to the U.S. economy in general (GAO,
2011). Similarly, we expect that inflation would negatively impact the likelihood of receiving
assistance from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury as high and persistent inflation
can be considered an indicator of poor inflation management by a central bank (Aizenman
and Pasricha, 2010). The coefficient on Reserves and GDP share could be either positive
or negative. Higher reserves as a share of GDP could indicate either that a central bank
or government do not need a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve or a loan from
the U.S. Treasury, thereby lowering the likelihood of having a swap agreement or an ESF
loan; alternatively, higher reserves could also indicate a higher ability to repay any drawings
on a swap line or ESF loan, thereby increasing the likelihood of having a swap agreement.
Similarly, a country with higher share of world GDP has greater economic mass in the global
economy and therefore is more likely to be important to the U.S. economy (GAO, 2011).
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Alternatively, a country with a higher share of world GDP may not need support from the
Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury as much as they perhaps have access to other sources of
emergency liquidity.
When considering our political variables, we would expect that the Chinn-Ito Index, U.S.
Trade Agreements, and Defense Cooperation Agreements to have a positive impact on the
likelihood of receiving assistance from the Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury. This is because
a higher Chinn-Ito index means higher capital account openness which in turn indicates a
greater neoliberal orientation of economic policy (Sahasrabuddhe, 2019), and having a Trade
Agreement or Defense Cooperation Agreement would indicate greater political importance
of an economy to the U.S. economy. We expect the coefficient on Ideal point difference
to be negative as greater deviation from the U.S. voting record indicates a higher foreign
policy deviation of a national government from that of the United States. We also expect
the coefficient on U.S. unemployment to be negative as a higher rate of unemployment in
the U.S. would make providing emergency loans to foreign governments and central banks
politically unpopular in the United States. It is not immediately clear if we can expect either
the Republic party or the Democratic party to be more or less amenable to assisting foreign
governments and central banks. Therefore, the impact of these variables could be positive
or negative.
3.5.1 Results for Federal Reserve Swap Agreements
Table 3.4 shows the results of our panel logistic model when we consider whether a country
had a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve as the dependent variable. Columns (1),
(2), and (3) show us the results for the model with economic independent variables, political
independent variables, and both economic and political variables, respectively. On the other
hand columns (4), (5), and (6) shows the results when we estimate the model with the
interaction of our independent variables with our lagged crisis variable. When only economic
variables are considered (Column 1), only foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP is
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negatively and significantly correlated with the likelihood of having a swap agreement with
the Federal Reserve. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in foreign exchange reserves held by a
central bank as a share of GDP reduces the log odds of having a swap agreement with the
Federal Reserve by 1.68. From Column 2, we can see that the political variables on their own
do not determine the access to Federal Reserve swap lines. However, when we consider both
sets of variables together, several of our coefficients become significant. A higher share of
imports in total US imports, higher capital account openness, having a defense cooperation
agreement with the United States, and higher US unemployment increases the likelihood of
a country having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve. On the other hand, a higher
share of exports in total US exports and foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP decrease
the likelihood of receiving a swap agreement. Furthermore, swap lines are less likely to be
extended by a Republican President, a Republican Senate, and a Republican House. From
the results in Column 3, it appears the the size of the impact of our political variables on
the likelihood of receiving a swap line from the Federal Reserve is larger than that of our
economic variables, with the exception of foreign exchange reserves.
Table 3.4: Regression Results for Federal Reserve Swap Lines
Interacted with Crisis Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Political Both Economic Political Both
Bank Exposure -0.010 0.544 0.016 0.460
(0.346) (0.344) (0.339) (0.334)
Import Share 0.579 1.033∗∗ 0.511 1.003∗
(0.568) (0.451) (0.654) (0.563)
Export Share -0.458 -1.348∗∗∗ -0.459 -1.343∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.346) (0.408) (0.356)
FX Reserves -1.683∗∗∗ -2.035∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗ -2.069∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.527) (0.585) (0.581)
GDP Share -1.836 -0.012 -1.448 0.512
(1.170) (0.567) (1.049) (0.654)
Inflation -7.266 0.706 -26.497∗∗∗ -8.784
(9.204) (0.826) (9.742) (6.882)
Ideal point difference -3.441 -1.085 -4.304 -0.670
w/ U.S. (23.000) (1.335) (.) (1.469)
Capital Account 0.770 2.992∗∗ 1.473 2.987∗∗
Openness (10.385) (1.214) (0.973) (1.456)
U.S. Trade -0.275 0.775 1.610 2.029∗∗
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Agreement (18.946) (0.985) (22.566) (0.963)
D.C.A -0.735 2.175∗ -0.181 1.519
(9.239) (1.214) (7.754) (1.456)
U.S. unemployment 3.640 2.537∗∗∗ 2.515 2.157∗∗
(13.532) (0.749) (.) (0.861)
Republican -1.115 -2.321∗∗∗ -1.625 -2.509∗∗∗
President (3.661) (0.552) (3.525) (0.609)
Republican -0.657 -0.701∗∗ 0.222 -0.583
Senate (2.175) (0.345) (.) (0.364)
Republican -1.476∗∗∗ -2.484 -1.697∗∗∗
House (0.419) (3.142) (0.530)
Emerging Market 2.622 -1.018 -2.590 2.621 -2.763 -4.602∗∗
Dummy (7.163) (67.868) (1.659) (7.674) (.) (1.861)
Bank Exposure* 1.741∗ 2.082∗∗∗
Crisis (0.943) (0.540)
Import Share* -0.511 -0.178
Crisis (0.863) (0.584)
Export Share* 0.778 2.609∗∗∗
Crisis (0.629) (0.706)
FX Reserves* -3.203∗∗∗ -5.395∗∗∗
Crisis (1.084) (0.990)




Ideal point difference 2.934 -12.284∗∗∗
w/ U.S.*Crisis (.) (4.224)
Capital Account -0.202 1.823
Openness* Crisis (.) (1.564)
U.S. Trade 0.789 0.291
Agreement*Crisis (.) (1.871)
D.C.A* Crisis -0.566 0.730
(3.339) (1.218)








Emerging Market -4.482∗ 3.047 8.846∗∗∗
Dummy*Crisis (2.359) (.) (1.974)
Constant 20.463 -12.473 -5.958 106.786∗∗ -8.901 38.457
(43.088) (36.840) (4.985) (45.973) (.) (31.676)
N 10682 20936 8776 10682 20936 8776
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results in columns (4), (5), and (6) should be interpreted as follows: the coefficient
of the interaction term is the additional impact of that variable on the log odds of having a
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swap agreement if there is an economic crisis in the previous quarter. Therefore, the total
impact of any given variable on the log odds would be the sum of the coefficient on the
variable under consideration and the coefficient on the interaction between that variable
and the lagged crisis variable. When we interact all our variables with our lagged crisis
variable, we find that, similar to the results in Column (1), economic variables alone do not
appear to explain access to the Federal Reserve swap lines. The impact of foreign exchange
reserves as a share of GDP is even larger than we previously estimated, as a 1 percent
increase in foreign exchange reserves in the previous quarter reduces the log odds of having a
swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve by 4.61 (-1.406 + -3.203). Our inflation variable
becomes significant, and 1 percent increase in inflation reduces the log odds of having a swap
agreement by 4.91. Interestingly, the coefficient on our bank exposure variable also becomes
significant, but at the 10 percent level. Significant. Similar to our results in Column (4),
political variables alone do not explain access to the swap lines, even when we interact them
with our lagged crisis variable. In Column (6), on the other hand, we find that several of
our political variables are large and significant. Specifically, an increase in capital account
openness by 1 percent increase the log odds of having a swap agreement with the Federal
Reserve by 2.99, a trade agreement with the United States increases the log odds of a swap
agreement by 2.03, and and a 1 percent increase in US unemployment increases the log odds
by 8.87. On the other hand, deviation from voting record of the United States in the United
Nations General Assembly (Ideal point difference), a Republican President lowers the log
odds of a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve by 12.24 and 2.51, respectively, while a
Republican House raises the log odds by 1.32.
Our economic variables also become significant in Column (6). Specifically, consistent
with the literature, we find that a 1 percent increase in bank exposure increases the log odds
of having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve by 2.08. Similarly, a 1 percent increase
in export share is correlated with an increase in the log odds by 1.27. The coefficient on
our inflation variable is not longer significant. The coefficient on foreign exchange reserves
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continues to negative and significant: a 1 percent increase in reserves as a share of GDP
in the previous quarter is associated with a decline in log odds by 7.46. Interestingly, our
GDP share variable is also significant, and a 1 percent increase is share of GDP in world
GDP decreases the log odds of receiving a swap line by 3.85. Interestingly, in Column 6,
the emerging market economies were more likely than other economies to have an swap
agreement with the Federal Reserve.
Once we account for the occurrence of crises, we find that bank exposure is important in
determining access to Federal Reserve swap lines. The importance of a country in the trade
portfolio also appears to play a role in determining access, with higher export share increas-
ing the likelihood of having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve. Contrary to the
hypothesis in Aizenman, we consistently find that reserve accumulation actually reduces the
likelihood of receiving a swap line. This result is not surprising, as it may indicate reverse
causation even though we use lagged values: central banks that do not expect to receive
assistance from ILLR institutions have probably increased the long-term accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, despite the claims of technocratic and apolitical
decision making by central banks, our political variables do appear to play a significant role
in determining whether a country receives a swap line from the Federal Reserve. US Trade
agreements and the party composition of the US government plays an important role. Inter-
estingly, the coefficient on US unemployment is positive and significant across specifications,
contrary to our expectations. An explanation of this could be that the increasingly global
nature of several economic crisis, and that the need for swap agreements in other countries
may coincide with economic downturn in the United States. However, since there is no
obvious tradeoff between the Federal Reserve responding to domestic unemployment and
extending a swap agreement to another central bank, it appears that the Federal Reserve
does extend swap agreements even if domestic unemployment is high. Alternatively, it could
also be the case that the Federal Reserve seeks to support the world economy in order to
maintain or expand U.S. exports, especially when domestic unemployment is high.
113
3.5.2 Results for Loans from the Exchange Stabilization Fund
Table 3.5 shows the results of our panel logit model when we consider whether a country
received a loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the US Treasury as the dependent
variable. As in Table 3.4, columns (1), (2), and (3) show us the results for the model with
economic independent variables, political independent variables, and both economic and
political variables, respectively. Additionally, columns (4), (5), and (6) shows the results
when we estimate the model with the interaction of our independent variables with our
lagged crisis variable. When we consider our economic variables alone as determinants of
receiving a loan from the US Treasury, only the coefficients on foreign exchange reserves
and GDP Share is negative and significant at the 10 percent level of significance. However,
unlike the results in Table 3.4, we find that several political variables play an important role
in determining whether a country will receive an ESF loan, when only political variables
are considered in our model. Specifically, an increase in the the deviation of a country’s
voting record in the UNGA from that of the United States, U.S. unemployment, and a
Republican House reduces the likelihood of receiving a loan from the Exchange Stabilization
Fund. Counterintuitively, having a defense cooperation agreement with the U.S. also lowers
the likelihood of receiving a ESF loan. On the other hand, having a trade agreement with
the United States, a Republican President and a Republican House increases the likelihood
of receiving an ESF loan. However, when we consider both economic and political variables,
the coefficient on bank exposure becomes positive and significant, and the coefficient on GDP
share becomes negative and significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on our foreign exchange
reserves variable is no longer significant. The coefficients on deviation of a country’s voting
record from that of the United States in the UNGA, defense cooperation agreement variable,
and the variables that measure the party composition of the US government are no longer
significant. However, having a trade agreements with the United States continues to have a
positive and significant impact on the likelihood of receiving an ESF loan, and unemployment
114
in the United States has a negative and significant impact on the likelihood of receiving an
ESF loan.
Table 3.5: Regression Results for ESF Loans
Interacted with Crisis Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Political Both Economic Political Both
Bank Exposure -0.190 0.693∗ -0.423 0.504∗∗
(0.545) (0.397) (0.608) (0.241)
Import Share 0.481 0.389 0.747 0.062
(0.554) (0.396) (0.804) (0.208)
Export Share 0.952 0.521 1.233∗ 0.335
(0.608) (0.655) (0.745) (0.478)
FX Reserves -1.616∗ -1.632 -2.413 -2.465
(0.875) (1.041) (2.032) (2.381)
GDP Share -0.925∗ -1.426∗∗ -1.235∗ -0.737∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.601) (0.663) (0.238)
Inflation -1.031 -1.379 0.954∗ 2.033∗
(0.848) (1.047) (0.538) (1.130)
Ideal point difference -2.611∗∗ 3.153 -4.856∗∗∗ -1.523
w/ the U.S. (1.276) (2.140) (1.834) (2.478)
Capital Account 0.063 -0.256 -0.138 -0.522
Openness (0.319) (0.366) (0.344) (0.794)
U.S. Trade 1.447∗∗∗ 3.245∗∗∗ 0.638 8.728
Agreement (0.552) (0.519) (0.733) (5.330)
D.C.A -2.343∗∗∗ 1.029 1.496 3.470∗
(0.712) (1.817) (1.284) (1.869)
U.S. unemployment -4.659∗∗∗ -9.608∗∗∗ -6.415∗∗∗ -5.362∗∗
(1.221) (3.645) (2.071) (2.650)
Republican 1.720∗ -0.066 2.044∗∗ -0.437
President (0.921) (0.927) (0.858) (1.349)
Republican -2.728∗∗∗ -2.668∗∗ -3.460∗∗∗
House (0.597) (1.344) (1.341)
Republican 1.870∗∗∗ 1.095 1.855∗∗
Senate (0.390) (0.869) (0.747)
Emerging Market 2.415 3.497∗∗∗ 1.770 2.881 4.271∗∗ -0.933
Dummy (1.501) (1.192) (1.541) (1.897) (1.770) (3.384)
Bank Exposure* 0.457 0.033
Crisis (0.834) (0.647)
Import Share* -0.009 0.317
Crisis (0.866) (0.727)
Export Share* -0.632 1.186
Crisis (1.014) (1.190)
FX Reserves* 1.781 1.429
Crisis (1.861) (2.496)




Ideal point difference 7.248∗∗ 6.057
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w/ the U.S.*Crisis (3.501) (4.455)
Capital Account 0.403 0.392
Openness*Crisis (0.535) (1.143)












Emerging Market -2.334 -2.000∗ 0.820
Dummy*Crisis (1.716) (1.036) (3.876)
Constant -1.003 0.018 12.872∗∗ -9.975∗∗∗ 4.136 -2.817
(4.528) (2.281) (5.686) (2.952) (3.971) (2.267)
N 2939 12584 2812 2939 11580 2371
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
When we interact all our variables with our lagged crisis variable, we find that, the co-
efficient of export share is positive and significant at the 10 percent level of significance.
Furthermore, we can see that the impact of GDP share and inflation is negative and sig-
nificant in Column (4). In Column (5) we find that several political variables play a role
in determining whether a country receives a loan form the ESF. Specifically, we find that
deviation from the United States voting record in the UNGA, unemployment in the US, and
the party composition of the governments are important in order to determine whether a
country receives a loan from the ESF. Counterintuitively, our results suggest that a greater
deviation of a country’s voting record from that of the US increases the likelihood of receiv-
ing a loan from the ESF. On the other hand, a Republican President and Senate increases
the log odds by 2.04 and 1.85, respectively. However, a Republican House reduces the log
odds of receiving an ESF loan by 3.24. A Republican House lowers the log odds of an ESF
loan by 3.46. Furthermore, a one percent increase in unemployment in the United States
reduces the log odds of receiving a loan from the ESF by 6.42.
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Column (6) shows the results of our model when we consider both economic and political
variables interacted with our lagged crisis variable. Interestingly, when all relevant variables
are considered, bank exposure once again becomes positive and significant. Specifically, a 1
percent increase in bank exposure leads to a 0.50 increase in the log likelihood of receiving
a loan from the ESF. Furthermore, a 1 percent increase in GDP share is associated with a
0.74 decline in the log odds of receiving a loan from the ESF. The presence of inflation in a
potential recipient nation also reduces the probability of receiving an ESF loan: a 1 percent
increase in inflation is associated with a decline of log odds by 1.35. A defense cooperation
agreement with the United States increases the log odds of receiving an ESF loan by 3.47
units, and 1 percent increase in unemployment in the United States is associated with a
5.36 units decline in the log odds of receiving an ESF loan. Finally, a Republican President
increases the log odds of receiving an ESF loan by 2.31.
These results are interesting in several respects. Bank exposure continues to play an
important role in determining access to this ILLR institution. Although, the size of its
impact on the likelihood of receiving a loan from the ESF is relatively low as compared to
the other factors we considered. Similarly, inflation plays a negative and significant role in
determining access to the ESF, although, once again, the size of its impact is relatively small.
In comparison, the impact of our political variables is larger in comparison. Furthermore,
an increase in unemployment in the United States consistently reduces the likelihood of
receiving an ESF loan. It is important to note that it is not the case that there is any trade-
off between the funds of the US Treasury being used to stimulate the domestic economy and
the ESF being used to make loans to foreign governments since the ESF is a self-financed fund
that is earmarked for very specific uses. Nonetheless, a rise in unemployment in the United
States likely makes it politically difficult to justify making loans to foreign governments
when there is a downturn in the US economy. Contrary to our findings in Table 3.4, a
Republican President is more likely to use the ESF to make loans to foreign governments
across specifications.
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3.5.3 Results for Federal Reserve Swap Agreements or loans from the Exchange
Stabilization Fund
Table 3.6 shows the results of our panel logit model when we our dependent variable takes
the value 1 if a country has a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve or if a country received
a loan from the ESF in a given quarter. As before, columns (1), (2), and (3) show us the
results for the model with economic independent variables, political independent variables,
and both economic and political variables, respectively. Columns (4), (5), and (6) shows the
results when we estimate the model with the interaction of our independent variables with
our lagged crisis variable. Similar to the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, none of the economic
or political variables are significant on their own, with the exception of foreign exchange
reserves. When we only considered our economic independent variables in our model, we
find that a percent increase in the reserves to GDP ratio reduces the log likelihood of receiving
support from either of the ILLR institutions by 1.71 units. When we consider both economic
and political variables together, we find that the coefficients on our bank exposure variable
and import share variable become positive and significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on
the export share variable becomes negative and significant. As before, the reserves variable
continues to be negatively a significantly related to the likelihood of receiving assistance
from the ILLR institutions. Once again, a defense cooperation agreement is associated with
1.72 higher log odds of receiving assistance from the ILLR institutions. Furthermore, higher
unemployment in the U.S. increases the log odds, while Republicans in the Presidency, the
Senate, and the House lower the log odds of assistance from the ILLR institutions.
Table 3.6: Regression Results for Federal Reserve Swap Lines or ESF Loans
Interacted with Crisis Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Political Both Economic Political Both
Bank Exposure 0.032 0.594∗∗ 0.039 0.468∗
(0.334) (0.291) (0.336) (0.263)
Import Share 0.574 0.828∗∗ 0.570 0.772
(0.551) (0.408) (0.660) (0.506)
Export Share -0.489 -1.269∗∗∗ -0.477 -1.250∗∗∗
(0.428) (0.327) (0.402) (0.322)
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FX Reserves -1.706∗∗∗ -2.133∗∗∗ -1.422∗∗ -2.042∗∗∗
(0.575) (0.501) (0.586) (0.540)
GDP Share -1.856 0.052 -1.534 0.536
(1.158) (0.469) (1.186) (0.567)
Inflation -6.264 -1.017 -20.875∗∗ -6.912
(6.350) (1.322) (9.513) (4.733)
Ideal Point difference -3.140 -1.970 -3.730 -1.603
w/ the U.S. (138.692) (1.409) (28.564) (1.526)
Capital Account 0.299 1.044 0.484 1.337
Openness (9.029) (0.691) (10.651) (1.155)
U.S. Trade Agreement -0.082 1.098 0.999 1.692∗
(14.654) (0.963) (18.920) (1.025)
D.C.A -0.728 1.724∗ -0.869 1.453
(4.219) (1.042) (8.040) (1.312)
U.S. unemployment 3.423 2.288∗∗∗ 3.252 2.056∗∗∗
(159.271) (0.698) (10.501) (0.774)
Republican -0.854 -2.139∗∗∗ -0.759 -2.263∗∗∗





Emerging Market 2.381 0.096 -2.726∗ 1.440 -0.221 -4.254∗∗
Dummy (7.152) (1.737) (1.645) (9.056) (520.386) (1.661)
Bank Exposure* 1.312∗∗ 1.181∗∗
Crisis (0.669) (0.496)
Import Share* -0.644 -0.346
Crisis (0.902) (0.609)
Export Share* 0.515 1.770∗∗∗
Crisis (0.614) (0.648)
FX Reserves* -2.661∗∗∗ -2.833∗∗∗
Crisis (0.861) (0.846)




Ideal point difference 3.549 -5.948∗∗∗
w/ the U.S.*Crisis (30.158) (1.577)
Capital Account 0.175 -0.619
Openness*Crisis (12.914) (1.454)
U.S. Trade Agreement 0.837 2.961
(77.550) (2.384)
DCA* Crisis -0.055 1.856∗∗
(.) (0.811)









Emerging Market -1.388 0.499 5.141∗∗∗
Dummy*Crisis (1.142) (43.043) (1.678)
Constant 16.084 -10.990 3.116 81.325∗ -10.519 30.666
(30.159) (.) (6.813) (45.881) (129.268) (21.773)
N 10682 20936 8776 10682 20936 8776
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
When we estimate our model with our political variables interacted with crisis variables,
none of the coefficients are significant. However, when we consider the economic variables
interacted with the crisis variable (Column 4), we find that the a 1 percent increase in bank
exposure increases the log odds of receiving assistance from the ILLR institutions by 1.31
units. Furthermore, we find that a 1 percent increase in reserves as a share of GDP reduces
the log odds of support from the ILLR institutions by 4.08 units. Similarly, an increase in
inflation also reduces the likelihood of having a swap line with the Federal Reserve or of
receiving a loan from the ESF.
Column 6 shows the results of the model when we use all our economic and political
variables interacted with the crisis variable as independent variables. The bank exposure
variable is positive and significant, and our results show that a 1 percent increase in bank
exposure leads to a 1.65 increase in log odds of receiving support from the ILLR institutions.
Our trade variables are also important, as a 1 percent increase in export share leads to a
0.52 unit increase in the log odds of having access to the ILLR institutions. As in the other
columns, we also find that an increase in reserves reduces the likelihood of receiving support
from the Federal Reserve or the US Treasury. We also find that having a trade agreement
with the United States and having a defense cooperation agreement with the United States
increases the likelihood of receiving ILLR assistance. However, a Republican President and
a Republican Senate lowers the likelihood of receiving assistance from the ILLR institutions.
Finally, our results indicate that a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate in the United
States increases the log odds of having access to the ILLR institutions by 2.06 units.
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3.5.4 Robustness Checks
We check whether these results are robust to alternate specifications by estimating a
panel probit model and a linear probability model with random effects. The results are
presented in Tables C.3 and C.4, respectively, in Appendix II. It is important to note that
the sizes of the coefficients in the logit model are not comparable to the ones in the probit and
linear probability model, given that there are very different assumptions about the nature
of the data generating process underlying these models. However, when we consider our
logit results for the extension of Federal Reserve Swap Lines, we find that in most instances,
the signs of this coefficients are consistent across out logit, probit, and linear probability
models. The exceptions are the that the positive and significant coefficient on the import
share variable in Columns (3) and (6) in Table 3.4 and the negative and significant coefficient
on the Republican Senate variable in Column (3). The positive and significant coefficient
on the Export share variable in Column (6) in Table 3.4 becomes negative and significant
in the linear probability model, even though it is also positive and significant in the probit
model. Similarly, while the negative and significant coefficient on the GDP share variable is
also seen in the probit model, it is not significant in the linear probability model. The logit
coefficients on all political variables, with the exception of the coefficient on the Republican
Senate variable, are robust to the alternative probit and linear probability specifications.
When we consider the coefficients in the logit results for the determinants of the recipients
of ESF loans in Table 3.5 and in the probit model in Table C.3 and in the linear probability
model in Table C.4, we can see that, once again, most of our coefficients have the same
sign across all three models. Furthermore, the coefficients that are statistically significant in
the logit model are also statistically significant in the probit model, except the coefficient of
the GDP share variable. The coefficients of all the political variables that are statistically
significant in the logit model are also significant in the probit model. However, when we
consider the linear probability model, only some of the coefficients are statistically significant:
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the coefficients on US bank exposure, GDP share, Inflation, US unemployment are not
significant.
Finally, when we consider the logit coefficients in Table 3.6, for the model in which we
consider the determinants of receiving any support from either ILLR institutions, we find all
coefficients that are statistically significant in the logit model are also statistically significant
in the probit and linear probability model, with the exception of coefficients on import share
and GDP Share. The coefficient on export share in Columns (3) and (6) in Table 3.6 maintain
their sign and significance in our probit model, but the sign changes in the linear probability
model.
3.5.5 Summary of Results
Figure 3.5 graphically shows the marginal impacts of the results in Column 6 of Tables
3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 for the likelihood of having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve,
receiving a loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury, or either having
a swap agreement or receiving a loan from the ESF, respectively. Please note that Figure
3.5 shows the marginal impacts of our variables while the Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the
log odds of a percent change in our independent variables. The confidence intervals around
the marginal effects are shown at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance.
Table 3.7 summarizes the results from our different models. It identifies the direction of
the impact of our variables on the likelihood of having a swap agreement with the Federal
Reserve or receiving a loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury and
whether the coefficients were statistically significant as per our panel logit model, and the
cells that are shaded gray are the results that are robust to our alternative panel probit and
linear probability models.
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Table 3.7: Summary of Regression Results
Variable Swap Agreement ESF Loan Swap Agreement
or ESF Loan
Economic Variables
Bank Exposure Positive and Positive and Positive and
Significant Significant Significant
Import Share Positive and
Significant
Export Share Positive and Positive and
Significant Significant
Reserves/GDP Negative and Negative and
Significant Significant





Ideal point Negative and Negative and




U.S. Trade Positive and Positive and
Agreements Significant Significant
D.C.A. Positive and Positive and
Significant Significant
U.S. Positive and Negative and Positive and
unemployment Significant Significant Significant
Republican Negative and Positive and Negative and
President Significant Significant Significant
Republican Negative and
Senate Significant
Republican Positive and Positive and
House Significant Significant
Emerging Market Positive and Positive and
Dummy Significant Significant
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3.6 Intertemporal comparison of Recipients of ILLR suppport
There are several countries in our database that have received ILLR support when they
needed it in some instances and not in others. For instance, while the Bank of Korea had a
swap agreement with the Federal Reserve in October 2008 and again in March 2020, it did
not have a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve during the East Asian Crisis in 1998.
Similarly, the Argentine government received support from the US Treasury through the
ESF on several occasions in 1995, 1988, 1987, 1985, and 1968, but did not receive assistance
from the ESF or the Federal Reserve before or during its sovereign debt crises in and after
2002. This differential treatment allows us to further examine the factors that are important
in determining the circumstances in which governments and central banks have access to the
ILLR institutions, and acts as another robustness check of our results. Table 3.8 lists the
countries that had a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve in some circumstances and
not in others.
Table 3.8: Countries that had a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve in one or more
instances, and not in others
Country Year of Crisis Type of Crisis Notes
Brazil 1982 Currency Crisis The Banco Central do Brasil
1987 Currency Crisis received a swap
1990 Banking Crisis agreement from the Federal
1992 Currency Crisis Reserve in October 2008,
1994 Banking Crisis April 2009, and March 2020
1999 Currency Crisis
Estonia 1992 Currency Crisis Estonia received
and Banking a swap agreement from the Federal
Crisis Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Finland 1991 Banking Crisis Finland received
1993 Currency Crisis a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Greece 1983 Currency Crisis Greece received
a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Latvia 1992 Currency Crisis Latvia received
1995 Banking Crisis a swap agreement from the Federal
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Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Lithuania 1992 Currency Crisis Lithuania received
a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
New Zealand 1984 Currency Crisis New Zealand
received a swap agreement from
the Federal Reserve in October 2008
and March 2020
Slovak Republic 1998 Banking Crisis Slovak Republic received
a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Slovenia 1992 Banking Crisis Slovenia received
a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
South Korea 1997 Banking Crisis South Korea
received a swap agreement from
1998 Currency Crisis the Federal Reserve in October 2008
and March 2020
Spain 1983 Currency Crisis Spain received
a swap agreement from the Federal
Reserve in December 2007, September 2008,
May 2010, and February 2014 as
part of the EU
Of the countries that received ILLR assistance from the Federal Reserve mentioned in
Table 3.8, most countries later received a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve by virtue
of becoming members of the European Union. Therefore, the most interesting cases are those
of Brazil, South Korea, and New Zealand. In all three cases, the central banks did not have
swap agreements with the Federal Reserves during past crises, but did receive assistance
from the Federal Reserve later during the global financial crisis and during the Coronavirus
pandemic, even though there did not appear to be an imminent financial crisis taking shape
in any of these countries at the time.
From the results in Table 3.4, it is clear that bank exposure, export share, GDP share,
foreign exchange reserves, capital account openness, trade agreements with the United States,
126
defense cooperation agreements with the United States, US unemployment, and the party
composition of the government of the United States play a role in determining which countries
are likely to have a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve. Therefore, it is instructive to
examine the evolution of these variables in the countries that had swap agreements with the
Federal Reserve during the global financial crisis and afterwards, but not during an earlier
crisis.
Specifically, the primacy of exposure of the US banking system in determining the ex-
istence of a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve is often discussed in the literature.
However, if we examine the evolution of the banking exposure share in South Korea, New
Zealand, and Brazil over time, as we do in Figure 3.6, we can see that the share of exposure
of US banks as a share of their total foreign exposure was higher in all these countries when
their Central Banks had higher US bank exposure relative (and would have needed support
from the ILLR) to when their Central Banks did have a swap agreement with the Federal
Reserve. Furthermore, these importance of these countries as destinations for U.S. exports
also appears to be lower when the Central Bank of a country received a swap line from the
Federal Reserve relative to when it did not, as is evident from Figure 3.7. However, this is not
the case when we consider exports to Brazil, as exports to Brazil constituted a higher share
of total US exports at the time the Banco Central do Brasil received a swap line relative to
when it did not. Furthermore, while we do not have trade data for the first two quarters of
2020, the share of exports to South Korea as a share of total US exports trended upwards
after 2012.
Figure 3.8 shows us the trend in capital account openness as measured by the normalized
Chinn-Ito index. Interestingly, the trend in capital account openness exhibits an increasing
trend in South Korea after 1999, with the Chinn-Ito index being much higher in 2008 (when
the Bank of Korea did have a swap line with the Federal Reserve) onwards relative to 1997
(when the Bank of Korea did not have a swap line with the Federal Reserve). This is also
the case for New Zealand and Brazil (except for in 2020).
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Table 3.9 shows the descriptive statistics of our significant variables in Table 3.4 in two
cases: two years or eight quarters prior to having a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve
and two years or eight quarters prior to the beginning year of a financial crisis when the
country did have a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve. The countries considered here
are South Korea, New Zealand, and Brazil. Interestingly, we find that US bank exposure is
on average lower when their central banks had a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve
relative to when they did not. This is also the case for the average countries’ share in US
exports, but the difference is not significant. Also, in contradiction with the results in Table
3.4, on average these countries had a significantly higher level of reserves as a share of GDP
immediately prior to receiving a swap agreement relative to when these countries did not
receive a swap agreement.
These descriptive statistics once again confirm the importance of our political variables.
On average, these countries had greater capital account openness prior to receiving swap
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agreements with the Federal Reserve relative to when they did not. The logit regression
results in Table 3.4 found that higher U.S. unemployment was correlated with a higher
likelihood of receiving a swap agreement. However, within this smaller sample, we find
that the opposite is the case: US unemployment was lower when the central banks of these
countries received swap agreements relative to when they did not. Furthermore, a Republican
President and Republican Senate were more likely to be in office when these central banks
received swap agreements with the Federal Reserve, contrary to our logit regression results.
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics by Recipients of swap lines from the Federal Reserve Coun-
tries in one or more instances, and not in others
Fed Swap = 1 Fed Swap = 0 Significant
& Crisis = 1 difference
based on
t-test
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Bank Exposure 2.30 1.45 40 6.15 3.34 25 Yes
Export Share 2.24 1.13 40 2.39 1.12 40 No
Reserves/GDP 17.21 6.92 28 6.11 4.19 48 Yes
GDP share 1.82 0.68 28 1.98 0.96 48 No
Ideal Point 2.73 0.43 16 2.75 0.73 48 No
Difference w/
the U.S.
Chinn-Ito 0.48 0.06 16 0.20 0.19 48 Yes
Index
U.S Trade 0.275 0.45 40 0 0 48 Yes
Agreement
US 4.11 0.44 40 6.68 1.66 48 Yes
unemployment
Republican 1 0 40 0.42 0.50 48 Yes
President
Republican 0.8 0.41 40 0.42 0.50 48 Yes
Senate
Republican 0.5 0.51 40 0.5 0.51 48 No
House
Table 3.10 lists the countries that received a loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund
of the US treasury in some circumstances and not in others. Similar to Table 3.9, Table 3.11
shows the descriptive statistics of our significant variables in Table 3.5 in two cases: two
years or eight quarters prior to receiving an ESF loan from the US Treasury and two years
or eight quarters prior to the beginning year of a financial crisis when the country did not
receive an ESF loan from the US Treasury. The countries considered here are the ones listed
in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Countries that received a loan from the ESF in one or more instances, and not
in others
Country Year of Crisis Type of Crisis Notes
Argentina 2002 Currency Crisis Argentina received ESF loans in
March 1995, October 1988,
February 1988, October 1987,
March 1987, June 1985,
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December 1984, March 1984,
May 1968, May 1967,
and June 1962
Costa Rica 1981 Currency Crisis Costa Rica received an ESF loan in
May 1990
Ecuador 1999 Currency Crisis Ecuador received an ESF loan in
December 1987
Guyana 1992 Currency Crisis Guyana received an ESF loan in
1993 Banking Crisis June 1990
Jamaica 1991 Currency Crisis Jamaica received an ESF loan in
December 1983
Nigeria 1997 Currency Crisis Nigeria received an ESF loan in
October 1986
Peru 1981 Currency Crisis Peru received an ESF loan in
1983 Banking Crisis March 1993
1988 Currency Crisis
Philippines 1997 Banking Crisis Philippines received ESF loans
1998 Currency Crisis in October 1984 and May 1962
Uruguay 1990 Currency Crisis Uruguay received an ESF loan in
1983 Currency Crisis August 2002
1981 Banking Crisis
Venezuela 2002 Currency Crisis Venezuela received ESF loans in
March 1990, March 1989, and March 1968
Several other countries, such as Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia also fall
into this group. They have been left out of this table since they received a loan from the ESF prior to 1980
for which we do not have most relevant comparative data.
The data in Table 3.11 confirms the results of our logit regression when we consider the
exposure of US banks to these countries. Specifically, the average exposure of US banks in
these countries was higher immediately prior to receiving an ESF loan relative to when these
countries did not receive an ESF loan. However, contrary to our logit regression results, the
countries in Table 3.10 had a higher share of world GDP immediately prior to receiving an
ESF loan relative to when they did not receive an ESF loan. None of these countries had trade
agreement with the United States, and interestingly, none of these countries had a defense
cooperation agreement with the United States when they received an ESF loan. Interestingly,
these countries received an ESF loan when US unemployment was higher relative to when
they did not receive an ESF loan, and Republican President was more likely to be in office
when these countries received an ESF loan relative to when they did not receive an ESF
loan.
132
Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics by Recipients of ESF loans in one or more instances, and
not in others
ESF = 1 ESF = 0 Significant
& Crisis = 1 difference
based on
t-test
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Bank Exposure 2.33 2.23 46 1.13 1.21 40 Yes
GDP share 0.35 0.32 111 0.17 0.21 103 Yes
Inflation 175.97 824.41 56 43.52 28.59 80 No
US Trade 0 0 111 0 0 0
Agreement
DCA 0 0 111 0.09 0.28 91 Yes
US 6.90 1.63 111 5.87 1.28 103 Yes
unemployment
Republican 0.91 0.29 111 0.46 0.50 103 Yes
President
Republican 0.37 0.48 111 0.35 0.48 103 No
Senate
The discussion in this section complicates the picture of the determinants of the recipi-
ents of emergency assistance from the international lenders of last resort in the form of swap
agreements or U.S. dollar loans. These descriptive results provide a note of caution to our
regression results. It may reflect a kind of hysteresis: once the ILLR institutions decide to ex-
tend support to a specific economy, the evolution of the specific variables identified here may
matter less. This could reflect a situation in which something very dramatic has to change
geo-politically for a country to then be informally disqualified for support. For instance, even
though Venezuela received several emergency loans from the U.S. Treasury prior to 1990,
the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Venezuela worsened dramatically
with the election of Hugo Chavez in 1999. Therefore, the Venezuelan government would be
an unlikely candidate for a loan during the currency crisis of 2002. This section does confirm
that the decision to extend ILLR support is the result of a complex geo-political process,
and not a simple straightforward one as the literature has suggested thus far.
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3.7 Conclusions
During the Eurozone crisis, the then President of the European Central Bank, Mario
Draghi famously announced that “within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it
takes to preserve the Euro.” The announcement in July 2012 and the policy actions that
are followed are widely believed to have created the conditions for stabilizing the financial
markets in Europe. However, these policy actions and the dollar support that the European
Central Bank provided to banks in its jurisdiction was supported by the ECB drawing on its
swap agreement with the Federal Reserve. However, not all central banks have the ability
to do whatever it takes to stabilize a national financial system that has significant dollar
liabilities, unless they have access to the international lender of last resort institutions.
This chapter shows that only some countries have had access to international lender of last
resort institutions, namely, the Federal Reserve through Reciprocal Currency Arrangements,
and the US Treasury through the Exchange Stabilization Fund. And this access depends on a
variety of economic and political factors. Countries that US banks have greater exposure to,
countries that have a higher share in US exports, countries that have lower foreign exchange
reserves, and countries that have a trade agreement or a defense cooperation agreement
with the United States are more likely to have a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve.
Furthermore, countries are more likely to have a swap agreement when US unemployment
is high (potentially, an indicator of increasingly global nature of economic crises), and when
Democratic President or Republican House is in power. Similarly, countries that US banks
have greater exposure to, a lower share of world GDP, low inflation, a trade agreement or a
defense cooperation agreement with the United States are more likely to receive a loan from
the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the U.S. Treasury. Our results also show that
countries are more likely to receive a loan from the ESF when unemployment in the US is
low, and when a Republican President or Republican Senate is in office.
Our analysis confirms the importance of US bank exposure, as has been previously dis-
cussed in the literature. However, when we examine the trends in bank exposure in countries
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that received swap agreements in one instance but not in others, bank exposure appears less
important, since the average US bank exposure to these countries were actually lower when
they had a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve relative to when they did not. When
we examine the trend in bank exposure in countries that received loans from the ESF, the
importance of bank exposure is confirmed. Therefore, we have mixed results in the relative
importance of economic variables in explaining selective extension of support from the Inter-
national Lender of Last Resort (ILLR) institutions. However, the importance of our political
variables is confirmed when we analyze their trends in periods in which countries received
loans from the ESF relative to when they did not.
Therefore, not only do ILLR institutions exercise discretion in which countries to assist
and which countries to not assist, this discretion also depends to a large extent on political
factors that have nothing to do with effective conduct of economic policy, but more to do
with forging political alliances with the United States. Therefore, the issuers of the global
reserve currency, namely our ILLR institutions are playing a key role in reinforcing several
foreign policy goals of the United States. An alternative, but not necessarily incompatible,
explanation is that the importance of financial openness and diplomatic connections reflects a
desire on the part of U.S. policymakers in keeping many recipient economies open or further
opening up recipient economies as destinations of trade and investment from the United
States.
This matters because the implication is that the stability of the global financial system,
the ultimate responsibility of which can only be on the ILLR institutions, depends on politi-
cal importance of certain countries to policymakers in the United States and on the political
and economic stability within the United States. This exposes the global financial system
to important sources of instability: whether the newest venue or source of global financial
instability has sufficient political allegiance to the United States. The selective extension
of emergency liquidity support from the ILLR institutions also raises concerns about the
United States influencing national economic and foreign policy orientation of other coun-
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tries, or underwriting or backstopping a certain neoliberal policy orientation, specifically as
regards openness of the capital account. The selective extension and its political motivation
can also be with a view to opening up new avenues and destination of production, trade,
and investment for U.S. firms and financial actors. It is plausible, then, that a major fi-
nancial crisis resulting from a dollar shortage that can be resolved quickly and efficiently
by intervention from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury may not be resolved due to,
for instance, foreign policy positions of the governments of the economies involved. Alterna-
tively, it might create incentives among policymakers to move their policy orientation into
one that the Federal Reserve and U.S. governments finds amenable, which is not necessarily
the optimal policy choice for the economy in question. The implication is that the public
good provided by a lender of last resort internationally is contingent on several political
factors making the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury only possible lender of last resort,
but one that is unreliable for most countries, save a few. Therefore, the global monetary US
dollar system has several sources of instability unless there is genuine internationalization
of lender of last resort institutions or there is organic movement to a new global reserve
currency. Both of these prospects appear highly unlikely.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
A.1 Appendix A: Details of Variables Used
Variable Description Source
Reserves/GDP Total Reserves Excluding Gold, US Dollars as






Total Reserves including gold, US Dollars, as




Total Reserves in months
of imports




Short-term Debt to Re-
serve Ratio
Short Term Debt of maturity of one year or
less as a share of total Reserves including gold
International Financial
Statistics
Interest Rate Interest rate on short-term government secu-
rities, percent per annum
International Financial
Statistics
Chinn-Ito Index Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness
normalized between 0 (completely closed cap-
ital account) and 1 (completely open capital
account)
Chinn and Ito (2006a)
RFA Membership in Regional Financial Arrange-




Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from
a central bank or multilateral swap agreement.
1 if swap agreement, 0 otherwise
Scheubel and Stracca
(2016)
Fed Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from




ECB Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from
the ECB. 1 if swap agreement, 0 otherwise
Scheubel and Stracca
(2016)
PBOC Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from
the PBOC. 1 if swap agreement, 0 otherwise
Scheubel and Stracca
(2016)
BOJ Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from
the BOJ. 1 if swap agreement, 0 otherwise
Scheubel and Stracca
(2016)
BOE Swap Indicates whether country has swap line from




A.2 Appendix B: Country Classification
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil Chile China












Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Chad Comoros
Republic
Congo Costa Rica Cuba
Democratic Republic Djibouti Dominica
of Congo
Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador














Papua New Guinea Paraguay Qatar
Rwanda Saint Lucia Saint Vincent
& the Grenadines
Samoa São Tomé & Príncipe Saudi Arabia
Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore
Solomon Islands Somalia South Korea
Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname
Swaziland Syria Tanzania
Tonga Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia




Albania Antigua & Barbuda Armenia
Australia Austria Azerbaijan
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Belarus Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria Canada Croatia





Kosovo Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia
Malta Moldova Montenegro
Netherlands New Zealand Norway
Poland Portugal Romania
Russia Saint Kitts & Nevis San Marino
Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain
Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan
Timor Turkmenistan Ukraine
United Kingdom United States Uzbekistan
Note: The classification into "Emerging Market Economies" is based on S&P Emerging Markets Core
Index, while the classification into "Developing Economies" is based on 2014 Classification by the United
Nations, which can be found here. The remaining countries are classified as "Advanced Economies"
139
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II
B.1 Appendix A
Table B.1: Full List of Variables Used and their Sources
Variable Source Notes
Gross Capital Inflows as a
share of GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017)
Dependent Variable;
Change in Total Liabili-
ties
Gross Capital Outflows as
a share of GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017)
Dependent Variable;
Change in Total Assets
Net Capital Inflows as a
share of GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017)
Dependent Variable;
Gross Capital Inflows −
Gross Capital Outflows
External Debt as a share
of GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017)
Dependent Variable
Short-term External Debt
as a share of GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017)
Dependent Variable
Currency Crisis Laeven and Valencia (2018) Dependent variable; 1 if
first year of currency cri-
sis; 0 otherwise
Systemic Banking Crisis Laeven and Valencia (2018) Dependent variable; 1
if first year of systemic
banking crisis; 0 otherwise
Sovereign Debt Crisis Laeven and Valencia (2018) Dependent variable; 1 if
year of sovereign default;
0 otherwise
Reserves as a share of
GDP
IMF International Financial Statistics and




Volatility Website of Chicago Board Options Exchange Control Variable; calcu-
lated as rolling standard
deviation of closing values
of the daily S&P 500 In-
dex for each year
Commodity Index IMF International Financial Statistics Control Variable; Global
Primary Commodity
Price index
Real GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators Control Variable; con-
stant 2010 US dollars
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Real GDP World Bank World Development Indicators Control Variable; con-
stant 2010 US Dollars
Real GDP growth World Bank World Development Indicators Control Variable; rate of
growth of Real GDP
Chinn-Ito Index Chinn and Ito (2006b) Normalized de-jure index
of Capital account open-
ness; 0 < Chinn-Ito In-
dex < 1, where 1 indicates
fully free capital mobility
Interest Rate IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics Short-to-medium term
Government bond yields
per annum
Exchange Rate Regime Ilzetzki et al. (2017) Categorical variable vary-
ing from 1 (fixed exchange
rate) to 6 (freely falling
exchange rate)
Cross-border claims of
BIS reporting banks on
residents of a country






Table B.2: Country Classification based on Per-capita Income
Low Income Countries
Benin Burkina Faso Ethiopia Mali
Nepal Niger Senegal Togo
Lower-Middle Income Countries
Angola Bangladesh Cote d’Ivoire Ghana
India Kyrgyz Republic Moldova Mongolia
Morocco Myanmar Pakistan Papua New Guinea
Philippines Solomon Islands Sri Lanka
Upper-Middle Income Countries
Armenia Botswana Bulgaria Fiji
Malaysia Maldives Mauritius Mexico
Romania Russia South Africa Thailand
Venezuela
High Income Countries
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Hungary
Iceland Ireland Italy Japan
Republic of Korea Lithuania Luxembourg Malta
Netherlands New Zealand Poland Portugal
Seychelles Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia
Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom
United States
Table B.3: Country Classification based on World-Bank Lending Category
IDA
Bangladesh Benin Burkina Faso Cote D’Ivoire
Ethiopia Ghana Kyrgyz Republic Maldives
Mali Myanmar Nepal Niger
Senegal Solomon Islands Togo
Blend
Fiji Moldova Mongolia Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
IBRD
Angola Armenia Botswana Bulgaria
India Malaysia Mauritius Mexico
Morocco Philippines Poland Romania
Russia Seychelles South Africa Sri Lanka
Thailand Venezuela
No Classification
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Hungary
Iceland Ireland Italy Japan
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Republic of Korea Lithuania Luxembourg Malta
Netherlands New Zealand Portugal Singapore
Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden
Switzerland United Kingdom United States
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B.3 Appendix C
Table B.4: Impact of Relative Reserve Accumulation on Net Capital Inflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.Zreserves 0.0358 0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0702 -0.0614
(0.0261) (0.0125) (0.0666) (0.0600)
l2.Zreserves -0.0231 -0.0315∗ -0.0166 -0.0175
(0.0242) (0.0167) (0.0263) (0.0288)
l3.Zreserves -0.0092 -0.0081 -0.0125 -0.0162
(0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0194) (0.0197)
l4.Zreserves 0.0081 0.0036 0.0070 0.0060
(0.0315) (0.0171) (0.0259) (0.0277)
l5.Zreserves 0.0067 0.0135 -0.0090 -0.0076
(0.0219) (0.0134) (0.0210) (0.0222)
Consistent 0.0016 0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0050
(0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0069)
Volatility -0.0085 -0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0009
(0.0175) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0025)
Commodity Index 0.0003 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
per-capita Income -0.0489 -0.0179 -0.0396 0.0114
(0.0387) (0.0164) (0.0607) (0.0225)
GDP growth 0.0556 0.0050 0.0315 0.0509
(0.0487) (0.0300) (0.0487) (0.0469)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.0421 0.0603∗∗∗ -0.0343 -0.0344
(0.0257) (0.0132) (0.0544) (0.0548)
Interest Rate -0.0007 0.0001 0.0012 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Exchange Rate 0.0260∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0370 0.0097
(0.0151) (0.0085) (0.0248) (0.0168)
ER Regime 0.0010 0.0019 -0.0039 -0.0020
(0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0129) (0.0108)
Constant -0.8602 -0.8769∗∗∗ -1.5472∗∗ -2.0332∗∗∗
(0.5544) (0.2213) (0.6637) (0.3679)
N 980 902 1040 1013
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the Fixed Effects model, five lags of the dependent variable are also used as controls
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Table B.5: Impact of Relative Reserve Accumulation on Relative Net Capital Inflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Difference GMM System GMM System GMM w/ IV
l1.Zreserves 0.117 0.169∗∗ -0.362 -0.278
(0.104) (0.068) (0.316) (0.293)
l2.Zreserves -0.017 -0.055 0.016 0.010
(0.091) (0.090) (0.089) (0.105)
l3.Zreserves -0.052 -0.032 -0.056 -0.051
(0.079) (0.091) (0.105) (0.111)
l4.Zreserves -0.067 -0.084 -0.064 -0.062
(0.105) (0.093) (0.114) (0.109)
l5.Zreserves 0.089 0.172∗∗ -0.005 0.014
(0.101) (0.073) (0.096) (0.099)
Consistent -0.005 0.018 -0.094∗∗ -0.098∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.043) (0.043)
Volatility -0.180 0.016 0.003 0.006
(0.120) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023)
Commodity Index 0.003 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Per-capita Income -0.175 0.001 -0.047 0.058
(0.200) (0.090) (0.292) (0.153)
GDP growth 0.458∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.320 0.308
(0.243) (0.164) (0.271) (0.245)
Chinn-Ito Index 0.105 0.315∗∗∗ -0.213 -0.254
(0.094) (0.070) (0.196) (0.189)
Interest Rate 0.000 0.009∗∗ 0.017 0.017
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Exchange Rate 0.072 0.109∗∗ 0.087 0.047
(0.052) (0.045) (0.152) (0.110)
ER Regime -0.009 0.015 -0.097 -0.085
(0.016) (0.017) (0.084) (0.072)
Constant 4.147 -2.402∗∗ -1.271 -2.072
(2.529) (1.068) (3.437) (2.389)
N 980 902 1040 1013
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
C.1 Appendix A
Table C.1: ESF Loans to Foreign Governments, 1962–present
Country Signing Date Amount, Multilateral First Drawn Fully Repaid
millions USD /Bilateral /Expired
Uruguay August 2002 1466 B 08/05/2002 08/09/2002
Mexico December 2000 3000 B not used 12/01/2001
Mexico December 1999 3000 B not used 12/01/2000
Mexico December 1998 3000 B not used 12/01/1999
Brazil December 1998 5000 M 12/18/1998 04/12/2000
Mexico December 1997 3000 B not used 12/01/1998
Mexico December 1996 3000 B not used 12/01/1997
Mexico December 1995 3000 B not used 12/01/1996
Argentina March 1995 250 M 05/04/1995 12/01/1995
Mexico February 1995 20000 B 03/14/1995 01/16/1997
Mexico January 1995 1500 B not used 02/21/1995
Mexico August 1994 3000 M not used 12/30/1994
Mexico April 1994 3000 B 01/09/1995 01/29/1996
Macedonia February 1994 5 M not used 02/22/1994
Mexico March 1994 3000 B not used 04/26/1994
Mexico January 1994 300 B not used 04/26/1994
Mexico November 1993 3000 B not used 03/30/1994
Peru March 1993 470 B 03/18/1993 03/18/1993
Panama January 1992 143 B 01/31/1992 03/11/1992
Mexico January 1992 300 B not used 01/12/1994
Romania March 1991 40 M 03/07/1991 03/21/1991
Honduras June 1990 82 M 06/28/1990 11/20/1990
Guyana June 1990 32 M 06/20/1990 09/20/1990
Hungary June 1990 20 M 06/21/1990 09/05/1990
Costa Rica May 1990 28 B 05/21/1990 05/21/1990
Mexico March 1990 600 M 03/28/1990 07/31/1990
Venezuela March 1990 104 M 03/30/1990 04/30/1990
Mexico January 1990 300 B not used 01/12/1990
Bolivia December 1989 75 B 12/27/1989 01/12/1990
Poland December 1989 100 B 12/28/1989 02/09/1990
Bolivia September 1989 100 B 09/22/1989 12/29/1989
Mexico September 1989 4124 M 09/25/1989 02/15/1990
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Bolivia July 1989 100 B 07/18/1989 09/15/1989
Venezuela March 1989 450 B 03/15/1989 04/03/1989
Argentina October 1988 265 M 11/22/1988 02/28/1989
Mexico July 1988 300 B 06/01/1988 09/15/1988
Brazil July 1988 250 M 07/29/1988 08/26/1988
Yugoslavia June 1988 50 M 06/15/1988 07/01/1988
Argentina February 1988 550 B 02/24/1988 05/31/1988
Mexico December 1987 300 B 12/31/1989
Ecuador December 1987 31 B 12/04/1987 01/26/1988
Argentina October 1987 200 M 11/13/1987 12/30/1987
Argentina March 1987 225 M 03/09/1987 07/15/1987
Nigeria October 1986 37 M 10/31/1986 12/11/1986
Bolivia September 1986 100 B not used 11/14/1986
Mexico July 1986 273 M 06/29/1986 02/13/1987
Ecuador May 1986 150 B 05/16/1986 08/14/1986
Mexico December 1985 300 B not used 12/31/1987
Argentina June 1985 150 M 06/19/1985 09/30/1985
Argentina December 1984 500 B 12/28/1984 01/15/1985
Philippines October 1984 45 B 11/07/1984 12/28/1984
Argentina March 1984 300 B not used 09/15/1984
Mexico December 1983 300 B not used 12/31/1985
Jamaica December 1983 50 B 12/29/1983 03/02/1984
Yugoslavia April 1983 75 M not used 11/15/1983
Brazil February 1983 400 B 02/28/1983 03/11/1983
Brazil December 1982 500 M not used 11/30/1983
Brazil December 1982 250 B 12/13/1982 01/11/1983
Brazil November 1982 450 B 11/29/1982 03/03/1983
Brazil November 1982 280 B 11/18/1982 02/01/1983
Brazil October 1982 500 B 10/28/1982 12/28/1982
Mexico August 1982 600 M 09/16/1982 08/26/1983
Mexico August 1982 1000 B 08/16/1982 08/24/1982
Mexico December 1981 300 B not used 12/31/1983
Netherlands August 1981 500 B not used 08/17/1991
Mexico December 1979 300 B not used 12/31/1981
Mexico December 1977 300 B 06/30/1978
Portugal February 1977 300 02/01/1977 09/01/1977
United December 1976 250 M not used 08/01/1977
Kingdom
United June 1976 1000 M 06/01/1976 12/09/1976
Kingdom
Mexico September 1976 235 B not used 08/25/1977
Mexico September 1976 365 B 10/02/1976 11/05/1976
Mexico September 1976 300 B 11/01/1976 04/01/1977
Mexico December 1975 300 B not used 12/31/1977
Mexico December 1973 200 B not used 12/31/1975
Mexico December 1971 100 not used 12/31/1973
Mexico December 1969 100 not used 12/31/1971
Argentina May 1968 75 05/02/1969
Venezuela March 1968 50 03/18/1970
Nicaragua January 1968 5 not used 03/04/1969
Mexico December 1967 100 not used 12/31/1969
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Argentina May 1967 75 not used 05/02/1968
Colombia April 1966 13 04/01/1966 06/30/1969
Venezuela March 1966 50 not used 03/17/1968
Mexico January 1966 75 not used 12/31/1967
Brazil February 1965 54 not used 01/12/1966
Chile February 1965 16 02/04/1965 01/30/1966
Dominican August 1964 6 08/10/1964 06/30/1967
Republic
Chile March 1964 15 03/13/1964 02/04/1967
Mexico January 1964 75 not used 12/31/1965
Chile January 1963 10 01/31/1963 06/30/1966
Philippines May 1962 25 03/31/1963
Argentina June 1962 50 06/07/62 06/30/1966
Source: Henning (1999) and U.S. Department of Treasury Resource Center
Table C.2: US Dollar Swap Lines of the Federal Reserve, 1962–present
Country Signing Amount, Unilateral/ Expiration Notes
Date millions USD Bilateral Date
Australia
March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 30000 April 2009 U
Austria
December 1973 250 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
annually
December 1969 200 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
annually





July 1967 100 December 1968 B
July 1964 50 July 1967 B 12 months
duration, renewed
annually





December 1973 1000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
annually
December 1971 600 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
annually












December 1967 150 December 1968 B 12 months
March 1967 50 December 1967 B 3 months
duration, renewed
twice
December 1964 100 December 1967 B 12 months
duration, renewed
twice




March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
October 2008 30000 April 2009 U
Canada
February 2014 Unlimited Standing facility U
February 2013 30000 February 2014 U Renewal
August 2012 30000 February 2013 U Renewal
August 2011 30000 August 2012 U Renewal
May 2010 30000 August 2011 U
April 2009 30000 February 2012 U Renewal
September 2008 30000 April 2009 U




December 1973 2000 December 1994 B 12 months
duration, renewed
20 times
December 1968 1000 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
December 1967 750 December 1968 B 12 months
duration
December 1966 500 December 1967 B 12 months
duration
December 1963 250 December 1966 B 12 months
duration, renewed
twice




March 2020 30000 September 2020 U
April 2009 15000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 15000 April 2009 U




December 1969 200 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
thrice




May 1967 100 December 1968 B
European February 2014 Unlimited Standing Facility U
Central February 2013 240000 February 2014 U Renewal
Bank August 2012 240000 February 2013 U Renewal
August 2011 240000 August 2012 U Renewal
May 2010 240000 August 2011 U
April 2009 240000 February 2012 U Renewal
September 2008 240000 April 2009 U Renewal








December 2007 20000 April 2008 U
France
December 1973 2000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
24 times
December 1968 1000 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
July 1968 700 December 1968 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
March 1963 100 July 1968 B 3 months
duration, renewed
22 times




December 1978 6000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
19 times
December 1977 4000 December 1978 B 12 months
duration
December 1973 2000 December 1977 B 12 months
duration, renewed
thrice
December 1968 1000 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times





February 1967 400 December 1967 B 6 months
duration, renewed
once
August 1964 250 February 1967 B 6 months
duration, renewed
4 times
February 1964 250 August 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
February 1963 150 February 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
thrice




December 1974 3000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
23 times





December 1970 1250 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
twice











March 1967 450 December 1967 B
March 1965 450 March 1967 B 12 months
duration, renewed
twice
October 1964 250 October 1965 B 12 months
January 1964 250 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
December 1962 150 January 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
thrice




February 2014 Unlimited Standing facility U
February 2013 120000 February 2014 U Renewal
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August 2012 120000 February 2013 U Renewal
August 2011 120000 August 2012 U Renewal
May 2010 120000 August 2011 U Renewal
April 2009 120000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 120000 April 2009 U
December 1978 5000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
19 times
December 1973 2000 December 1978 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
December 1968 1000 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times





July 1965 250 July 1967 B 12 months
duration, renewed
once





January 1964 150 July 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
October 1963 100 January 1964 B 3 months
duration
South March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
Korea April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
October 2008 30000 April 2009 U
Mexico
March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
October 2008 30000 April 2009 U




December 1996 3000 December 1998 U 12 months
duration, renewed
once
February 1995 3000 January 1996 U 12 months
duration
April 1994 3000 December 1995 U 20 months
December 1993 700 April 1994 U
December 1979 700 December 1993 U 12 months
duration, renewed
13 times










December 1968 130 December 1973 U 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
May 1967 130 May 1968 U
Netherlands
December 1973 500 December 1978 B 12 months
duration, renewed
24 times
December 1969 300 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
thrice






September 1967 225 December 1967 B 3 months
duration
March 1967 150 September 1967 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
December 1963 100 million March 1967 B 3 months
duration, renewed
12 times
June 1962 50 December 1963 B 3 months
duration, renewed
5 times
New March 2020 30000 September 2020 U
Zealand
April 2009 15000 October 2009 U Renewal
October 2008 15000 April 2009 U
Norway
March 2020 30000 September 2020 U
April 2009 15000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 15000 April 2009 U
December 1973 250 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
24 times
December 1969 200 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
thrice






May 1967 100 May 1968 B 12 months
Singapore
March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
October 2008 30000 April 2009 U
Sweden
March 2020 60000 September 2020 U
April 2009 30000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 30000 April 2009 U
December 1973 300 December 1998 U 12 months
duration, renewed
25 times
December 1968 250 December 1973 U 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
July 1967 100 July 1968 U 12 months
duration
July 1964 50 July 1967 U 12 months
duration, renewed
twice




February 2014 Unlimited Standing Facility U
February 2013 60000 February 2014 U Renewal
August 2012 60000 February 2013 U Renewal
August 2011 60000 August 2012 U Renewal
May 2010 60000 August 2011 U
April 2009 60000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 60000 April 2009 U




December 2007 4000 April 2008 U
December 1978 4000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
19 times
December 1973 1400 December 1978 B 12 months
duration, renewed
4 times
December 1971 1000 December 1973 B 12 months
duration, renewed
once






December 1967 400 December 1968 B 12 months
duration
July 1967 250 December 1967 B
January 1967 200 July 1967 B 6 months
duration




January 1964 100 July 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
once
July 1962 100 January 1964 B 3 months
duration, renewed
4 times
United February 2014 Unlimited Standing Facility U
Kingdom February 2013 80000 February 2014 U Renewal
August 2012 80000 February 2013 U Renewal
August 2011 80000 August 2012 U Renewal
May 2010 80000 August 2011 U
April 2009 80000 February 2010 U Renewal
September 2008 80000 April 2009 U
December 1974 3000 December 1998 B 12 months
duration, renewed
23 times














May 1965 750 May 1967 B 12 months
duration, renewed
once






August 1962 50 August 1963 B 3 months
duration, renewed
thrice
Source: Minutes of several FOMC meetings 1962–2020
Change in size of swap lines are listed as new swap arrangements
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C.2 Appendix B: Robustness Checks
Table C.3: Results of Probit Model
Federal Reserve Swap ESF Loan Swap or ESF Loan
w/ Interactions w/ Interactions w/ Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Exposure 0.077 0.109 0.411∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.284) (0.288) (0.194) (0.088) (0.141) (0.123)
Import Share 0.867 0.905 0.243 -0.022 0.385∗ 0.360
(0.672) (0.609) (0.272) (0.062) (0.201) (0.235)
Export Share -0.571 -0.419 0.136 0.091 -0.668∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.485) (0.296) (0.168) (0.182) (0.178)
FX Reserves -1.030∗∗ -0.996∗∗ -0.747 -0.750 -1.166∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗
(0.506) (0.414) (0.607) (0.553) (0.244) (0.263)
GDP Share -1.396 -1.295∗∗ -0.789 -0.362∗ 0.071 0.307
(2.990) (0.600) (0.561) (0.195) (0.227) (0.271)
Inflation 0.346 -7.478 -0.599 0.834 -1.026 -3.270
(1.839) (5.978) (0.413) (0.547) (0.740) (2.034)
Ideal point difference 1.138 -0.683 -1.033 -0.957
w/ the U.S. (0.857) (0.473) (0.762) (0.806)
Capital Account 1.582∗ 1.620∗ -0.194 -0.129 0.324 0.392
Openness (0.823) (0.846) (0.194) (0.189) (0.254) (0.390)
U.S. Trade 1.183 1.952 1.251∗∗∗ 3.491∗∗∗ 0.472 0.776
Agreement (2.778) (1.558) (0.295) (1.311) (0.541) (0.579)
D.C.A. 0.650 0.642 0.397 2.280∗∗ 0.921 0.878
(1.471) (1.341) (0.764) (1.162) (0.582) (0.692)
U.S. unemployment 1.183∗∗ 0.955∗∗ -3.633∗ -2.603 1.115∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗
(0.590) (0.415) (1.975) (1.704) (0.348) (0.393)
Republican -0.904∗∗∗ -0.896∗∗∗ -0.367 0.072 -1.133∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗∗
President (0.275) (0.160) (0.898) (0.594) (0.233) (0.257)
Republican 0.035 0.067 -0.461 -0.501∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗
Senate (0.101) (0.572) (0.174) (0.174)
Republican -0.813∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -0.749∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗
House (0.449) (0.315) (0.214) (0.269)
Emerging Market 0.964 -2.850 0.918 0.280 -1.504∗ -2.311∗∗∗
Dummy (7.042) (5.762) (1.086) (0.530) (0.789) (0.817)
Bank Exposure* 1.014∗∗ 0.188 0.567∗∗
Crisis (0.479) (0.329) (0.222)
Import Share* -0.845 0.528 -0.225
Crisis (0.547) (0.389) (0.310)
Export Share* 1.022∗∗ 0.540 0.900∗∗∗
Crisis (0.423) (0.532) (0.327)
FX Reserves* -2.885∗∗∗ 0.352 -1.206∗∗∗
Crisis (0.566) (0.601) (0.338)
GDP Share* -0.810 -0.817∗∗∗ -1.381∗∗∗
Crisis (0.671) (0.300) (0.345)
Inflation* 8.267 -1.798∗∗∗ 0.151
Crisis (5.446) (0.622) (1.812)
Ideal point difference 2.447∗∗ -2.897∗∗∗
w/ U.S.*Crisis (1.102) (0.710)
Capital Account 2.832 0.120 -0.293
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Openness*Crisis (2.519) (0.367) (0.459)
U.S. Trade 0.604 0.000 2.635∗∗
Agreements*Crisis (4.920) (.) (1.112)
D.C.A.* Crisis 0.750 0.000 0.955∗∗
(1.023) (.) (0.421)
Republican -1.585 0.995∗ -0.472





Emerging Market 6.282 -0.480 2.417∗∗∗
Dummy*Crisis (4.189) (0.988) (0.725)
Constant -9.883 27.340 3.994 -1.947 3.980 14.557
(29.315) (26.756) (3.017) (1.210) (3.703) (9.467)
N 9798 9798 2812 2371 8776 8776
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.4: Results of Linear Probability Model
Federal Reserve Swap ESF Loan Swap or ESF Loan
w/ Interactions w/ Interactions w/ Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Exposure 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
Import Share 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.000 0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Export Share -0.024∗∗ -0.017∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.025∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010)
FX Reserves -0.116∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.006 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.007) (0.005) (0.026) (0.026)
GDP Share 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.012)
Inflation -0.047∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.016 0.010 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.034) (0.014) (0.009) (0.018) (0.034)
Ideal point difference -0.065 -0.066 0.001 -0.004 -0.070 -0.071
w/ U.S. (0.045) (0.043) (0.008) (0.005) (0.046) (0.043)
Capital Account 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
Openness (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010)
U.S. Trade -0.017 -0.007 0.226∗ 0.291 -0.018 -0.007
Agreement (0.025) (0.025) (0.132) (0.185) (0.025) (0.025)
D.C.A. 0.050 0.044 -0.007 -0.019 0.051 0.043
(0.063) (0.060) (0.006) (0.013) (0.063) (0.060)
U.S. Unemployment 0.136∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.030 0.133∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Republican -0.075∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.008 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
President (0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Republican -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.006 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
Senate (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Republican -0.022∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.007 -0.005 -0.023∗∗ -0.026∗∗
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House (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Emerging Market 0.004 -0.007 0.039 0.022 0.005 -0.008
Dummy (0.045) (0.042) (0.025) (0.015) (0.046) (0.042)
Bank Exposure* 0.042∗∗∗ 0.001 0.041∗∗∗
Crisis (0.014) (0.004) (0.014)
Import Share* -0.014 -0.003 -0.015
Crisis (0.017) (0.004) (0.017)
Export Share* 0.007 0.009 0.011
Crisis (0.023) (0.007) (0.023)
GDP Share* -0.022 0.004 -0.021
Crisis (0.042) (0.007) (0.043)
Ideal point difference -0.175∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.161∗∗
w/ U.S.*Crisis (0.077) (0.020) (0.074)
Capital Account 0.008 0.003 0.008
Openness*Crisis (0.013) (0.006) (0.014)
U.S. Trade 0.051 0.632∗∗∗ 0.040
Agreement* Crisis (0.055) (0.218) (0.056)
D.C.A.* Crisis 0.012 0.053∗∗ 0.028
(0.076) (0.025) (0.074)
U.S. unemployment* 0.342∗∗∗ -0.064 0.308∗∗
Crisis (0.113) (0.040) (0.120)
Republican -0.036 0.024 -0.044
President*Crisis (0.032) (0.023) (0.031)
Republican -0.018 0.036 -0.019
Senate*Crisis (0.035) (0.024) (0.035)
Republican 0.144∗∗∗ -0.043∗ 0.140∗∗∗
House*Crisis (0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
Emerging Market 0.034 -0.013 0.037
Dummy*Crisis (0.094) (0.019) (0.096)
Constant 0.476∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.035 0.525∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.198) (0.081) (0.051) (0.117) (0.197)
N 8776 8776 2812 2812 8776 8776
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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